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Nomenclature
Abbreviations Description
ASCII American Standard Code for Information Interchange
BMBF Bundesministerium fu¨r Bildung und Forschung
BOStrab Verordnung u¨ber den Bau und Betrieb der Straßenbahnen
BR F Baureihe F
BR H Baureihe H
BVG Berliner Verkehrsbetriebe
DNS Direct numerical simulation
DoE Design of experiment
EMD Earth mover’s distance
ENT Emergent norm theory
FDS Fire Dynamics Simulator
FDSgeogen Framework for automated processing of FDS simulations
FEC Fractional effective concentration
FED Fractional effective dose
FIC Fractional irritant concentration
FSE Fire safety engineering
JPSfire Pre-processing interface between FDS and JuPedSim
JuPedSim Ju¨lich Pedestrian Simulator
LES Large eddy simulation
LHS Latin hypercube sampling
MBO Musterbauordnung
MPI Message Parsing Interface
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
OpenMP Open Multi-Processing
PADM Protective active decision model
PA System Personal announcement system
PBefG Personenbefo¨rderungsgesetz
RABT Richtlinien fu¨r die Ausstattung und den Betrieb von
Straßentunneln
SHE Smoke and heat extraction system
TRStrab Technische Regeln fu¨r Straßenbahnen – Brandschutz in
unterirdischen Betriebsanlagen
XML Extensible Markup Language
Notations Description Units
ASET Available safe egress time min
c Consequences
cp Specific heat kJ kg
−1 K−1
d Diameter, thickness m
d(i, j) Euclidean distance between observations i
and j
D Occupant density m−2
E Extinction coefficient m−1
∆Hc Heat of combustion kJ kg
−1
HRR Heat release rate kW
HRRPUA Heat release rate per unit area kW m−2
k Dimensionality
λ Thermal conductivity W m−1 K−1
l Length m
µ Mean
n Number of samples
N Number of occupants
ρ Density kg m−3
RSET Required safe egress time min
RTI Response time index m1/2s1/2
σ Standard deviation
σi Volume concentration of gas i ppm
T Temperature ◦C
t Time s,min
v Velocity ms−1
V˙ Volume flow m3 h−1
γ Yield g g−1
Chemical Notations Description
CO2 Carbon dioxide
CO Carbon monoxide
COHb Carboxyhemoglobin
HCN Hydrogen cyanide
HCl Hydrogen chloride
O2 Oxygen
PVC Polyvinyl chloride
PUR Polyurethane
Abstract
The assessment of life safety in case of a building fire is based on the
comparison of the available safe egress time (ASET ) and the required
safe egress time (RSET ). With regards to simulation experiments, this
straightforward approach is accompanied by uncertainties including the
underlying models, the specification of inputs, and the analysis of outputs.
Concerning the two latter aspects, this thesis introduces methodological
extensions in order to conduct ASET -RSET analyses in a multivariate
fashion. For the specification of inputs, the multitude of possible sce-
narios is represented with the help of systematic sampling techniques.
Uncertainties in terms of analysis are tackled with multi-criterial maps
rendering both ASET and RSET in spacious environments. The subtrac-
tion of both maps is used to determine a measure of consequences.
These methods are applied to a multi-level underground station which is
investigated with numerical simulations based on the formation of two sub-
systems, namely Fire and Evacuation. The analysis incorporates an en-
semble of 8, 640 combined fire scenarios and evacuation scenarios. Through-
out the entire design space, more than 95 % of the scenario combinations
account for less than half of the maximal observed consequences. This
analysis is refined by agglomerative clustering in order to group all ob-
servations hierarchically. It becomes evident that the lowest margins of
consequences are represented by two clusters covering approximately 75 %
of all observations. The investigation of the parametric relations of all
clusters allows for the systematic identification of the determining charac-
teristics of fire and evacuation scenarios. In addition to the consequence
measure derived from ASET -RSET, fractional effective doses (FED) are
calculated to supplement the analysis. Within the clusters, the number
of occupants exceeding common FED thresholds applicable to incapac-
itation corresponds to the introduced ASET -RSET measure. However,
throughout the entire design space, this correspondence is not clear and
needs further investigation.
Kurzfassung
Die Bewertung der Personensicherheit bei Bra¨nden in Geba¨uden stu¨tzt
sich auf den Vergleich der verfu¨gbaren Ra¨umungszeit (ASET ) mit der
erforderlichen Ra¨umungszeit (RSET ). Im Hinblick auf Simulationsexper-
imente ist dieser nachvollziehbare Ansatz mit Unsicherheiten behaftet.
Diese beziehen sich unter anderem auf die verwendeten Modelle, die Fest-
legung von Eingaben, aber auch die Auswertung der Ausgaben.
Zur Beru¨cksichtigung der beiden letztgenannten Aspekte fu¨hrt die vor-
liegende Arbeit eine methodische Erweiterung des ASET -RSET Ansatzes
ein, die sich an den Prinzipien der multivariaten Analyse orientiert. Zur
Repra¨sentation der Vielzahl denkbarer Szenarien werden die Modellein-
gaben mit systematischen Stichprobenverfahren spezifiziert. Um Unsicher-
heiten bei der Auswertung in ausgedehnten Ra¨umen zu begegnen, erfolgt
die Darstellung von ASET und RSET auf multikriteriellen Karten. Die
Differenzbildung beider Karten ermo¨glicht die Bestimmung eines Maßes
fu¨r die Konsequenzen.
Die Methoden werden auf eine mehrgeschossige, unterirdische Personen-
verkehrsanlage angewandt. Hierzu werden zwei Subsysteme Brand und
Ra¨umung gebildet und mit numerischen Simulationen untersucht. Die
Analyse basiert auf einem Ensemble mit 8 640 kombinierten Brand- und
Ra¨umungsszenarien. Ca. 95 % aller Szenarien fu¨hren zu Konsequenzen,
die geringer als die Ha¨lfte der maximal erwarteten Konsequenzen sind.
Diese Auswertung wird durch eine Cluster-Analyse verfeinert, um alle
Beobachtungen hierarchisch zu gruppieren. Es stellt sich heraus, dass die
niedrigsten Konsequenzen durch zwei Cluster repra¨sentiert werden, die
ca. 75 % aller Beobachtungen beinhalten. Die parametrischen Urspru¨nge
der Cluster erlauben Ru¨ckschlu¨sse auf die bestimmenden Charakteristika
der Brand- und Ra¨umungsszenarien. Fu¨r die zusa¨tzliche Beschreibung
der Cluster wurde neben den mittels ASET -RSET ermittelten Konse-
quenzen das fractional effective dose (FED) Konzept angewandt. Inner-
halb der Cluster ist ein Zusammenhang zwischen den Personenzahlen,
die ga¨ngige FED Grenzwerte u¨berschreiten und dem ASET -RSET Kon-
sequenzmaß feststellbar. Mit Blick auf den gesamten Ergebnisraum ist
jedoch kein eindeutiger Zusammenhang erkennbar, woraus sich weiterer
Untersuchungsbedarf ergibt.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Urbanisation and mobility are two of the so-called mega trends of the 21st century.
By 2050, the world’s population is expected to increase to 9.3 billion people, whereas
6.3 billion of them will live in cities [United Nations, 2012]. Contrary to popular
belief, these trends do not solely impact emerging nations overseas. In Germany, for
instance, almost ten million out of eighty million people have left rural areas and have
moved to cities since 1960 [World Bank, 2015].
For the most means of urban transportation, these and other circumstances have
resulted in increasing traffic volumes throughout the past years [Stadt Berlin, 2014].
Moreover, mobility has been identified as one of the key factors for liveable urban areas
in the future. In terms of capacity and environmental protection, individual traffic
will not be able to cope with these developments. Thus, the importance of public
and, in particular, rail-mounted transportation systems will increase. For reasons
of urban planning and system optimisation, these systems are oftentimes engineered
underground.
Given these facts, infrastructures will either have to be built entirely new or they
will have to be extended. The latter case especially poses big challenges to the
stakeholders of an underground transportation system. In Germany, most of the
underground systems were designed during the decades after World War II, when
requirements as well as available technologies were completely different. Apparently,
ageing infrastructures do not only affect operational aspects but also the system’s
resistance against emergencies. In this respect, a fire in the underground is a notable
incident.
Meanwhile, the state of the art in fire safety has moved forward. On the one hand,
legal requirements and technical specifications regarding fire safety have continuously
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been advanced during the last decades. On the other hand, designers increasingly
utilise computer simulations in order to predict the system’s resistance against fire
incidents. These historic developments imply a diffuse discrepancy between the per-
formance of newly built infrastructures and the ones which have been in service since
decades.
In 2014, the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF ) ac-
knowledged these challenges and funded the ORPHEUS project. On the basis of
experiments and simulations, the primary project objective is to optimise concepts
for smoke control and evacuation – especially for existing infrastructures [ORPHEUS,
2015]. Within work package WP 2.4, the central objective of this thesis is to sys-
tematically evaluate the resilience of a complex escape route system in case of fire.
In this respect, resilience is understood as a system’s capability to resist against a
certain disturbance. For this purpose, the existing station Osloer Straße located in
Berlin will serve as case study.
1.2 Underground Transportation Systems
Underground transportation is the backbone of the mobility of metropolitan areas.
The first system was built in London in 1863. At this time, the carriages were powered
by steam engines. By the end of the 1890s, electrification advanced the breakthrough
of this transportation concept resulting in an increasing number of systems being set
up, e.g. in Budapest, Berlin, and Hamburg [Fiedler, 2005].
A multitude of different classifications and terminologies has formed worldwide.
According to [URP, 2011], “Urban Guided Transport Systems” are distinguished
into metros, trams, and light rails. In this respect, metros are “operated on their own
right of way and segregated from general road and pedestrian traffic”. In turn, trams
“share their right of way with general road and/or pedestrian traffic and are therefore
embedded in their relevant national road traffic legislation”. Finally, light rails are
partly “not segregated from general road and pedestrian traffic”. Beside these quasi-
isolated systems, conventional rails are operated on an interconnected system and
involve commuter and intercity services. The latter also are and will increasingly be
operated underground in Germany, e.g. in Leipzig, Munich, or Stuttgart.
Having said that, this study generally aims at the challenges of transportation
systems built underground. Hence, in this thesis, the latter will be referred to as
underground systems. In this respect, the focus will be exclusively set on the stations.
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1.2.1 Challenges
Underground stations pose a variety of challenging system features to the fire safety
design. Contrary to the basic idea of prescriptive building design, it is oftentimes not
possible to ensure an appropriate compartmentalisation. Hence, the most fundamen-
tal issue is that buoyancy-driven smoke spread may potentially affect the ascending
means of escape, which are oftentimes the only option for clearing a station. De-
pending on the scenario, a fire can yield high orders of heat release and remarkable
mass flows of fire eﬄuents. These problems may be aggravated by comparatively
low ceiling heights and enclosure volumes. Narrow spaces also account to limited
capabilities regarding mechanical or natural ventilation. The latter case may addi-
tionally be influenced by the specific climatic conditions and resulting airflows in the
underground.
By means of operation, underground transportation systems are inherently sup-
posed to handle large crowds of diverse sizes and compositions. Furthermore, the
evacuation of occupants towards the surface is a complex sequence of events, which
heavily depends on a multitude of physiological and psychological factors. Moreover,
underground stations do usually not represent isolated systems. In many cases, they
are connected or they even occupy further building uses, such as assembly, retail, or
office.
1.2.2 Major Fire Incidents
Over the course of the past decades, numerous fire incidents have occurred in un-
derground stations. A very comprehensive collection of incidents is presented in the
Handbook of Tunnel Fire Safety [Carvel and Marlair, 2005]. On the following pages,
four major incidents will chronologically be described in more detail. The character-
istics of the single events widely differ in terms of cause of fire, outcome, behavioural
aspects, intervention and so forth. However, the examination of the particular in-
cidents may be valuable for a more sensible understanding of potential interactions
within the entire system.
London 1987 In the evening of November 18th, 1987, a fire incident occurred in
King’s Cross St. Pancras station in London, United Kingdom. The fire resulted in
31 fatalities and 100 injured occupants. The investigation of the incident was carried
out by C. Fennell, whose report was submitted to the Department of Transport in
1988 [Fennell, 1988]. The following information are excerpts of this source.
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King’s Cross St. Pancras station is a multi-modal station unifying both over-
ground and underground services. The fire was most likely ignited by a match and
developed – fed by grease and fibrous materials – underneath a wooden escalator.
15 minutes after ignition, the fire flashed over, i.e. rapidly developed to an extensive
fire. Due to the slope of the escalator, a kind of jet flame spread into the ticket
hall. The subsequent smoke and heat spread killed most of the present occupants.
This effect resulted in the loss of the escape routes for occupants still being in lower
levels. These were evacuated with the help of a train later on. The fire was extin-
guished five hours after ignition. Besides the material’s lacking fire performance, the
report moreover revealed severe drawbacks related to the staff’s training, response,
communication, and supervision.
The behavioural aspects leading to the outcome have been considered by I. Donald
and D. Canter in 1990 [Donald and Canter, 1990]. The following insights are derived
from this work. It has been found that social roles had a major influence. In this
respect, the authors distinguish between the public, the underground staff, and the
police officers. The inquiry revealed that instructions given by the staff mostly were
ignored by the public. On the other hand, they immediately followed instructions,
that were given by the police officers. To a greater or lesser extent, these role conflicts
reappeared when surveying underground passengers in the aftermath. Beside author-
itarian instructions, the report shows that only multiple and independent evacuation
cues will result in appropriate actions by the occupants. One very impressive example
of this mechanism is the statement of a male occupant who requested information
from a police officer and already felt heat: “Whilst in this passage I picked up one
of the wall phones intending to phone my Wife. I put a lOp piece into the slot but
left the phone because the (smoke) became thicker” [Donald and Canter, 1990]. This
example clearly shows, that even two evacuation cues, e.g. smoke and heat, did not
result in the behaviour expected. After having left the ticket hall, others proceeded
to adjacent shopping, coffee, or toilet areas inside the station. The authors concluded
that not only the perception of cues is important but also the process of interpreting
and cross-checking them.
The impact of spatial knowledge is another very interesting factor that has been
examined in more detail. Given the instruction to clear the station via adjacent es-
calators – right towards the ticket hall – the authors conclude that the police officers
were not aware about the station’s layout. In this respect, the inquiry figured out
that the spatial meaning “of clearing the station” was not consistently interpreted
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among the occupants. The authors also worked out that both staff and police of-
ficers narrowed their focuses of attention more and more to the escalator over the
course of time. Consequently, the consideration of the occurrences in the surrounding
decreased.
Baku 1995 Until 2016, the incident in Baku, Azerbaijan has been the most severe
underground fire. The following information are excerpts of the work by Hedefalk
and Wahlstrom published in 1998 [Hedefalk and Wahlstrom, 1998]. There were 289
fatalities and 270 injured people. In the evening of October 28th, 1995, a train
encountered an electrical malfunction just when entering the tunnel between the
stations Ulduz and Nariman Narimanov. The train subsequently came to a stop
within the tunnel, which instantly was filled by heat and toxic smoke. Since some of
the pneumatic carriage doors did not open properly, passengers attempted to use the
windows as emergency exits. However, the majority of fatalities was later found dead
inside the carriages. Many of the evacuees, who were able to disembark the train,
perished in the tunnel either effected by the fire or by electric shocks. The latter
occurred due to the fact that evacuees reached for wall-mounted cables in order to be
geared to the tunnel’s walls. As the fire broke out in the penultimate carriage, the
200 m path towards Ulduz was blocked for most of the evacuees. Another namable
fact is that the tunnel was equipped with a ventilation system. The activation of the
latter – approximately 15 minutes after ignition – caused a flow reversal worsening the
conditions in the areas which were less affected until then. A number of 40 fatalities
was later found along the tunnel. It is also notable that the responding fire brigade
was not able to start efficient firefighting operations, since they were not equipped
with breathing apparatus.
Berlin 2000 Although there were no fatalities, the fire incident at the Deutsche
Oper station in Berlin, Germany is noteworthy. Until this time the station was only
equipped with one exit towards the surface. During the major event Love Parade on
July 8th, 2000, the station was densely crowded with visitors. At the same time, a
carriage caught fire right when arriving at the station. The ignition was caused by
electrical problems resulting in an emergency breaking, which again caused an electric
arc. The incident has never been investigated systematically. However, an operational
report, published by the Berlin fire brigade a few weeks later, allows for some informed
conclusions [Kirchner, 2000]; this is the source of the following information. When
the fire brigade arrived at the scene, approximately 350 occupants were trapped
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underground. The carriage on fire was located at the platform edge towards the only
exit; resulting in untenable conditions within the two adjacent staircases and the ticket
hall. Fortunately, the remaining areas of the platform were relatively smoke-free.
Again, the behavioural aspects of this event are concerning. Based on the report of
single fire fighters, there was a certain concern among the occupants. However, others
interpreted the incident as a big “happening”. In addition, a number of passengers
had to be prompted to disembark the carriages. With increasing smoke spread, the
fire brigade subsequently decided to evacuate the crowd via the tunnel system. All
in all, a number of 26 persons were taken to hospitals. With respect to the time
sequence of the incident, the report states that the last occupants were evacuated
safely after approximately 45 minutes. The fire was under control after one and a
half hours. It is notable that the fire department utilised two large scale ventilation
units placed on outlet shafts at the adjacent tunnels. However, the laborious setup
of the latter allowed for an activation right after the station was evacuated. Another
remarkable factor is the presence of background airflows in the tunnel system. Since
crossing underground services in the neighbouring station were stopped very late, the
fire brigade reported about batch-wise smoke spread during the tunnel evacuation.
In addition to that, there is video material available capturing approximately
20 minutes from ignition until the time, when the fire brigade guided occupants out
of the station through the tunnel system. In terms of various behavioural aspects,
such as risk perception, delayed response, or group affiliation, these recordings are
valuable for getting an understanding of human behaviour in fire.
Daegu 2003 On February 15th, 2003, a fire incident with 192 fatalities occurred
in the Jungangno station in Daegu, South Korea. In the aftermath, Jeon and Hong
conducted an interview and questionnaire study with 96 recovered survivors. Six years
after the incident, they published a journal paper revealing numbers and factors in
terms of behavioural aspects [Jeon and Hong, 2009]. In this respect, it is certainly the
most comprehensive documentation of an underground fire incident. The following
information are sourced from the aforementioned study.
Jungangno station is a three-level underground structure consisting of one plat-
form level, one ticket hall, and one shopping mall. The fire was maliciously set with
flammable liquids inside a train. Five minutes after ignition, the opposite train arrived
in the station. The fire immediately spread to the latter resulting in extensive smoke
and heat release. It has been estimated that approximately 640 persons were inside
the station or the trains as the fire started. In terms of familiarity, the study revealed
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that almost half of the subjects used the station more than once a day. Worrying facts
are the findings related to the individual response of the occupants. After each of the
subjects became aware of the fire, 49 % simply “waited”. Another 19 % attempted
to “contact someone outside”. On average, the subjects who escaped instantly made
their decision based on the observation of smoke (42 %) or due to hearing the corre-
sponding announcement (33 %). However, the authors identified a relation between
the distance from the fire origin and the susceptibility of the different evacuation
cues. For instance, 83 % of the passengers inside the carriage furthest away from the
fire, escaped after hearing the announcement for three times. Beside the response
behaviour, the authors also investigated the route choice of the subjects. The plat-
form level of the Jungangno station is equipped with four exits towards the surface.
It was found that approximately 65 % of the occupants used the two exits opposite
to the burning carriages. Only 10 % chose the exits nearby the latter. Another 23 %
could not provide certain information. Further on, it has been worked out that more
than 60 % of the subjects followed an evacuation route they had planned in advance.
Only 25 % of this group were able to complete their planned passage. In contrast,
the remaining 75 % deviated from their initial route. The authors mainly identified
three different reasons for that: movement in a dense crowd, poor visibility condi-
tions, and ineffective escape route lighting systems. In addition to that, half of the
subjects repeatedly traversed particular passages due to smoke obscuration. In terms
of the structural design, it was found that massive pillars placed on the platform level
severely impaired the movement and orientation capabilities of the occupants. The
fire was declared out almost four hours after ignition.
Lessons Learned The numbers and facts outlined above give an impressive overview
of the complex interactions between all system elements in an underground station.
Major elements are, e.g. the occupants, the fire, the built environment, as well as
aspects regarding organisation and intervention. It has clearly been shown that the
system is not solely driven by physics but also by human factors.
In terms of fire scenarios, it turned out that fully developed fires are possible in
principle. Fires in areas other than the platforms may also severely impact the sys-
tem’s performance. Moreover, the presence of smoke yields a variety of interactions
with the evacuation of occupants. Notable aspects are, e.g. route choice, walking
speed reduction, or incapacitation. Furthermore, the occurring smoke dynamics may
be influenced by climatic effects induced either naturally or technically. With regards
to occupant behaviour, the incident studies reveal that occupants do not necessarily
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respond adequately – especially if no or ambiguous information is provided. These
characteristics are distinctively influenced by any action undertaken by staff or au-
thorities.
1.2.3 Case Study: Osloer Straße
History The underground station Osloer Straße located in the district Wedding in
central Berlin is operated by the Berlin transportation service (BVG). It connects
the U8 service from Wittenau to Hermannstraße with the U9 service starting at
Rathaus Steglitz and terminating at Osloer Straße. Construction works started at
the beginning of 1973 and were completed in 1977. In line with the extension of the
U8 service in 1987, the station became a through station. As further extension plans
have meanwhile been abandoned, the station will remain the northbound terminal
stop of the U9 service [Schomacker, 2009].
Operation Based on the last major traffic report, Osloer Straße is used by 90, 000
passengers per day on average. This number is composed of approximately 55, 000
customers using the U8 service and another 35, 000 using the U9 service [Stadt Berlin,
2014].
The station is served by large structure gauge vehicles providing a variety of differ-
ent train generations. The two main generations are “Baureihe F” and “Baureihe H”,
which are referred to as BR F and BR H from now on. Despite different ratios be-
tween seats and stances, both vehicles can carry approximately 750 passengers [BVG,
2007]. Moreover, BR F can be operated as two-car, four-car, and six-car trainset,
whereas BR H represents an inseparable trainset.
Depending on weekday and daytime, the operation intervals are adjusted accord-
ingly. During the peak hour on work days, the trains are operating in five minute
intervals. The early and late hours are served with a ten minute interval.
Building Layout In principle, the station can be divided into four floors ordered
from lowest to highest elevation above sea level: platform U8 (27 m), platform U9 (31
m), concourse level (35 m) and surface (40 m). Each platform level is approximately
110 m long and 20 m wide and has a slightly curved shape. The ceiling heights
above the platform range from 2.85 m to 3.0 m, while notable areas are obstructed
by binding beams and display panels. Moreover, the stair lintels are equipped with
static smoke curtains, which have a height of approximately 0.45 m. The concourse
level comprises traffic and shopping areas and extends to approximately 3, 000 m2.
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Finally, the surface area above the station consists of a large crossroad as well as a
tramway and several bus stops.
Moreover, ten staircases access the particular areas of the station. Starting from
the U8 level, two staircases directly lead towards the concourse level, whereas a double
staircase leads to the U9 level. The U9 level itself is connected to the concourse level
by two further staircases. Finally, there are five staircases that connect the concourse
level with the surface. The layout of the station as well as the main elements of the
escape route system are schematically illustrated in Figure 1.1.
Surface 
Concourse 
U9 
U8 
G
J 
E
DC
A
B
H
I F 
Figure 1.1: Schematic overview of the station.
Both the colour distinction and the nomination presented in Figure 1.1 are used
throughout the entire thesis. The staircases are designed in three different ways: con-
ventional stairs, escalators, or a combination of both. Table 1.1 provides an overview
of the differently equipped staircases within the station.
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Table 1.1: Overview of layout and types of staircases. The ways from origin to
destination are assumed from underground to surface. U8 = U8 level, U9 = U9 level,
CL = Concourse level, SU = Surface.
Name Origin Destination Stair Escalator
A  U8  CL - x
B  U8  U9 x -
C  U8  CL x x
D  U9  CL - x
E  U9  CL x x
F  CL  SU x x
G  CL  SU x x
H  CL  SU x -
I  CL  SU x x
J  CL  SU x x
Technical Building Equipment All rooms that are not accessible by the public
are monitored by a fire detection system. In addition to that, each shopping unit on
the concourse level is equipped with smoke detectors as well. An occurring alarm is
directly transmitted to the technical control centre of the BVG.
The shopping units inside the concourse level are equipped with a fire suppression
system. The latter is a conventional sprinkler system consisting of 135 glass bulb
sprinkler heads with a normal response rating. The system is designed to serve for
40 minutes.
A mechanical smoke and heat extraction system (SHE ) is installed on the shopping
areas in the concourse level. The system serves for both purposes: ventilation in
normal service and smoke extraction in the event of fire.
The means of escape are marked with luminescent signs, which are mounted in
close proximity to the floor levels. Moreover, emergency and information telephones
are provided on the platforms. A personal announcement system (PA) paired with
surveillance cameras can be utilised to initiate and monitor an evacuation.
1.3 State of the Art
1.3.1 Fire Safety Engineering
Design Methods In principle, fire safety engineering (FSE ) can be based on the
prescriptive or the performance-based design approach. The prescriptive design relies
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on the straightforward fulfilment of tangible requirements that are postulated in rele-
vant building codes or comparable specifications. In case of compliance, the proposed
design then is “deemed to satisfy” the code’s overall protection goals [Hurley and
Rosenbaum, 2016, p. 1246]. Despite advantages like simplicity and confirmability,
this procedure cannot be applied consistently in some cases, e.g. non-trivial building
layouts or varying occupancies. Moreover, in particular situations, the prescriptive
design may yield cost-intensive measures.
In these cases, it is possible to conduct the performance-based design approach,
which is supposed to provide the answer if a system’s resistance is greater than a
particular influence. For this purpose, objectives are formulated and quantified by
performance criteria. The latter are specified based upon the relevant engineering
problem. In fact, this methodology allows for more individual and efficient design
solutions. The performance-based design process is utilised within this thesis and is
taken up in Chapter 2.
In principle, the performance-based approach is distinguished in deterministic or
risk-based analyses. In the first case, “scenarios that are expected to occur with a
frequency above a threshold value are analyzed to determine their consequences”.
In case of a risk-based analysis, “the consequences of each scenario are analyzed;
however, these consequences are weighted by the probability of the event occurring”
[Hurley and Rosenbaum, 2016]. Regarding the latter, a comprehensive review and
application example on risk-based FSE has been conducted by Albrecht [Albrecht,
2012].
Finally, depending on the complexity, deterministic and risk-based FSE analyses
commonly utilise different models for predicting both fire and evacuation processes.
In this respect, models are considered as mathematical models.
Fire Modelling Fire modelling involves a diversity of scientific fields. The most
relevant are thermodynamics, fluid mechanics, thermochemistry as well as heat and
mass transfer. The consolidation of the latter in the form of control volumes and con-
servation laws allows for the mathematical formulation of different model approaches
[Quintiere, 2006]. Based on the classification proposed in the German vfdb guide-
line, these formulations can be as follows: empirical approaches, zone models, or field
models [vfdb, 2013].
Empirical approaches are commonly sourced from experiments, which have been
designed regarding a specific scientific question. The gathered experimental data
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has been used to derive correlations for partial phenomena, e.g. single enclosure
temperatures, plume mass flows, or ceiling jet velocities.
Moreover, zone models and field models are based on the conservation of mass,
momentum, and energy, whereas the degrees of abstraction are differing. Given a
compartment fire, zone models assume a persistent formation of a cold gas layer and
an overlying hot gas layer, while both zones are assigned with homogenous temper-
atures and densities. Moreover, the mass exchange between the two zones is solely
assumed via the plume. Common software frameworks also provide the implementa-
tion of openings, vents, or the combination of multiple rectangular compartments.
Field models are characterised by the discretisation of the computational domain
into a finite number of elements. For all elements, the governing differential equations
of the above-mentioned conservation terms are approximated with certain discreti-
sation schemes, e.g. finite differences. Due to the higher spatial resolution, field
models provide more localised information about varying FSE -relevant quantities. In
addition to that, filigree building components or additional boundary conditions can
be incorporated in more detail. In turn, the computational demand is significantly
higher compared to zone models.
Evacuation Modelling Evacuation processes incorporate the movement of pedes-
trians. According to Hoogendoorn, a comprehensive representation of this can be
achieved by considering the strategic, tactical, and operational level of motion [Hoogen-
doorn et al., 2002]. With regards to pedestrians, the strategic level covers the question
“which activities they like to perform” as well as “the order of these activities”. The
tactical level concerns “short-term decisions made by the pedestrians”, e.g. route
choice. Finally, the operational level “describes the actual walking behavior of pedes-
trians” [Schadschneider et al., 2009].
Given these fundamentals, the broad variety of available models can be classified
based upon multiple characteristics. In terms of the representation of pedestrians, the
differentiation in microscopic and macroscopic models has well established. Micro-
scopic models consider pedestrians as agents with individual characteristics whereas
macroscopic models assume pedestrians as compact streams with unique attributes
such as velocities and densities. The movement of the assumed streams then is cal-
culated according to hydraulic principles. Having said that, macroscopic models can
usually be solved by hand calculation methods, while microscopic models require
computer resources. In case of microscopic models, the computational domain can be
12
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represented in different ways. In concrete terms, the movement patterns can either
be calculated in continuous or discrete space.
Besides these physical aspects, the strategic and tactical levels especially imply
a strong necessity of understanding behavioural aspects when modelling evacuation
dynamics. The importance of that has been emphasised within the incident studies
provided in Section 1.2.2. Similar thoughts are given by Purser, who found that –
for a long time – the focus of evacuation modelling was merely set on the underlying
physics [Purser, 2016b]. Henceforth, a more exclusive summary of human behaviour
in fire is given in the following section.
1.3.2 Human Behaviour in Fire
The need for a consolidation of human factors and fire safety is more or less acknowl-
edged. Since the 1970s, the research field of human behaviour in fire formed as a
multi-disciplinary intersection between human scientists, natural scientists, and en-
gineers. A comprehensive review about this branch and the related theories, models,
studies, and subsequent engineering implications has been carried out by Kuligowski
[Kuligowski, 2016]. If no additional references are given, the following contents and
sources are derived from this work.
In general, human behaviour in fire is defined as “the study of human response,
including people’s awareness, beliefs, attitudes, motivations, decisions, behaviours,
and coping strategies in exposure to fire and other similar emergencies in buildings,
structures and transportation systems”.
In terms of time, behavioural aspects doubtlessly affect both the pre-evacuation
phase and the movement phase. As “the pre-evacuation period can be significantly
longer than the movement period” in certain cases, an informed understanding of the
underlying processes and their particular time demands is inevitable. The same ap-
plies to the question whether the movement phase may also be affected by behavioural
aspects. These thoughts are taken up in Chapters 2, 3, and 5.
Theories and Models Over the course of the past decades, a number of theories
were proposed, advanced, or rejected. This applies to early attempts to explain
disasters by Panic, Disaster Shock, or Group Mind. The overwhelming majority of
past incidents and subsequent inquiries clearly showed that occupants neither act
irrationally or selfishly nor remain in certain states of shock. This statement may not
be misinterpreted in the way that anxiety and fear do not play any role. Kuligowski
states that “these are natural emotions in emergency situations”. Another abandoned
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behavioural theory in case of emergency is the assumption that individuals strictly
form groups that can be described with one unified response without considering any
diversities within the particular group.
The major theory currently accepted is the emergent norm theory (ENT ). It
covers the transition from a routine situation to an emergency, in the sense that certain
“norms” no longer apply and new ones have to be agreed. Initially, individuals initiate
communication in order to assess the new situation and to “seek coordinated action
to find a solution to the shared problem”. It should be noted that this communication
is not necessarily verbal. Individuals can provide the process with both their “social
stock of knowledge” and “conventional norms”.
In order to apply and extend the ENT, Kuligowski utilises the protective active
decision model (PADM ) which was introduced by Lindell and Perry [Lindell and
Perry, 2012]. It represents a versatile, state-of-the-art framework for the description
of “information flow and decision-making [...] in response to natural and techno-
logical disasters”. Initially, the pre-decisional phase of PADM consists of individual
attributes such as social context, available information, and a number of others. The
starting point of the decision process is the perception of cues, which must be no-
ticed and understood by an individual. In terms of different perceptions, the PADM
distinguishes three different types: threat, protective actions, and stakeholders. Hav-
ing received an arbitrary set of cues, an evaluation sequence is triggered consisting
of the following steps: risk identification, risk assessment, protective action search,
protective action assessment, and protective action implementation. However, this
sequence is bypassed by a loop that addresses the generation, communication, and
assessment of additional information, which an individual deems as necessary before
making a decision. The resulting sequence of (protective) actions can be summarised
in so-called decomposition diagrams.
Another broad field of theories covers the understanding of group behaviour. Al-
though the group mind theory has been rejected to describe egress dynamics holis-
tically, the consideration of group behaviour is inevitable. In general, Kuligowski
employs three different layers to distinguish group behaviour: affiliative behaviour,
helping others, and convergence clusters.
The affiliative behaviour theory has been proposed by Sime [Sime, 1983] and states
that single persons form groups in case of an emergency evacuation. The coherence
of these groups strongly depends on their social relation. In other words: it is rather
likely that a group of friends will separate than a family group will do. With re-
gards to physical characteristics, Proulx found that groups will adapt, e.g. movement
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speeds to the lowest possible within a particular group [Proulx, 1995]. Moreover,
Kuligowski states additional studies that indicate an increasing relation between so-
cial familiarity within a group and delays in the response behaviour. With regards to
helping others, Kuligowski relies on several incident studies that prove cooperation
and mindfulness during emergency evacuations. She explains these observations with
the redefinition of the situation within the PADM, which results in an implicit “we-
ness” within a group. The third theory about group behaviour is the formation of
convergence clusters. The latter occur in areas that are supposed to provide safety.
This phenomenon has especially been observed when an evacuation was perceived as
impossible.
11 Behavioural Facts Finally, Kuligowski summarises her statements and the
contribution of Gwynne in the form of eleven behavioural facts in order to cover the
present findings in the research field of human behaviour in fire [Kuligowski, 2016].
The latter are the basis of assumptions made for the model inputs in this study.
• Initially, people rather feel safe than panic in case of a fire emergency,
• Provision of information does not generally result in adequate actions by occu-
pants,
• Occupants must identify a certain threat and personal risk before protective
actions are undertaken,
• If evacuation cues are ambiguous or inconsistent, occupants attempt to gather
further information,
• Before escaping, occupants take preparative actions, which delay the response,
• Occupants act rationally in case of a building fire,
• An occupant’s decision making process is influenced by the surrounding popu-
lation,
• Stress decreases occupant’s capabilities of receiving and understanding cues,
• The response of occupants is influenced by any kind of familiarity (social, spatial
and others),
• Roles of occupants prior to an emergency form the basis of their roles when
redefining a particular situation,
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• Heterogeneity among occupants affects behaviour.
1.3.3 Research Projects
The following paragraphs provide a brief review of the most recent research projects
related to fire safety in underground systems.
TRANSFEU The TRANSFEU project was a trans-European project funded for
three and a half years. It involved fire laboratories, standardisation organisations,
railway producers, and operators across the continent. Although the project mainly
focussed on rolling stock – especially for surface transportation – the achieved outcome
also has a notable influence on the fire safety of underground transportation systems.
Two work packages of the project considered the toxicity of fire eﬄuents on both the
laboratory and the numerical scale. In addition, existing FSE methodologies and tools
were advanced and adapted according to the context of rolling stock. Many of the
project’s insights were directly introduced to the finalisation of the European standard
EN 45545. This standard covers the fire safety design of underground vehicles, which
are designed or refurbished nowadays. Further insights into the results and impact
of the project are summarised in the final report [Heuze, 2012].
METRO The METRO project was funded by several public bodies in Sweden for
a duration of three years. The project team involved a multitude of partners across
public transport, fire services, research, academia, and defence. In particular, the
project tasks were divided into seven work packages. For the scope of this thesis, the
most relevant tasks were: design fires, evacuation, and smoke control. The centrepiece
of the work related to design fires was the conduction of medium and full-scale fire
tests. These provided valuable insights into tunnel fire dynamics, ignition sources,
ventilation influences, and variable interior material performances. In addition to
that, field studies on average fire loads resulting from luggage have been conducted.
The insights into evacuation were derived from questionnaire studies and small and
medium-scale experiments. Experimental data was gathered for scenarios, where
an evacuation is initiated inside a smoke-filled tunnel. Further on, the effectivity of
varying designs of escape routes and emergency exits was assessed. The smoke control
work package mainly consisted of small-scale laboratory and numerical studies. The
focus of those works was the performance of different smoke exhaustion systems in a
single-exit station. Further reading can be found in the final project report [Ingason
et al., 2012].
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OrGaMIR and OrGaMIR Plus The OrGaMIR project and the following exten-
sion OrGaMIR Plus were German research projects funded by the BMBF. All in all,
both projects lasted for nearly seven years involving partners across academia, in-
formation and micro technology, engineering, and public transport. The project was
mainly focussed on terroristic attacks and potential releases of airborne toxins inside
the underground system. In order to ensure adequate rescue operations in such cases,
a prognosis system was developed. The latter aims at providing the rescue services
with information about contaminated areas. In this conjunction, extensive and long-
term field studies on climatic effects inside underground systems have been initiated.
In order to ensure an appropriate control about the egress processes, the impact of
human factors in terms of decision-making as well as aural and visual perception was
investigated. More detailed information on both projects can be found in the final
reports of the particular work packages [BMBF, 2015].
1.4 Methodology and Objectives
This thesis concerns the assessment of life safety in case of fire applied to a complex
escape route system. The latter is represented by the underground station Osloer
Straße. The basic methodology is to conduct a deterministic system analysis, which
is inspired by the principles of multivariate analyses. Using the basic idea of Systems
Engineering, two subsystems Fire and Evacuation are formed. Initially, both of them
are assessed separately by specifying simulation ensembles, which are combined within
the final stage of the analysis.
Based upon the scientific findings, problems, and challenges discussed throughout
this chapter, the outlined methodology is applied in order to pursue the following
objectives:
1. Automated setup, computation, and post-processing of simulation ensembles for
both fire and evacuation simulations covering a multitude of possible scenarios,
2. Conceptual and technical implementation of interfaces between fire simulation
data and JuPedSim,
3. Data-driven implementation of underground climate for the purpose of fire sim-
ulation,
4. Investigation of impact on fire scenarios induced by underground climate,
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5. Generation of variable occupant populations accounting for heterogeneity, tem-
poral dynamics and multiple building uses,
6. Extension of the ASET -RSET concept by spatiotemporal and multi-criterial
distributions,
7. Identification of scenario clusters out of all combined fire and occupant scenarios
based on the similarity of consequences,
8. Enrichment analysis regarding the main determinants of the scenario clusters,
9. Provision of a clustered, deterministic data pool for further work in the OR-
PHEUS project. The data is supposed to serve as basis for a subsequent risk-
based analysis, which will be conducted according to the methodology presented
in [Berchtold et al., 2016].
1.5 Thesis Outline
This thesis is organised in seven chapters. Chapter 1 already addressed underground
systems in general, major fire incidents, as well as the presentation of the station
Osloer Straße, which will serve as case study. Moreover, the current state of the art
regarding fire safety engineering, human behaviour in fire and past research projects
was reviewed. On this basis, the methodology and objectives of the thesis were
formulated.
Chapter 2 sets up the methodological frame of this study. For this purpose, a
system formation is conducted, to which the performance-based design process is
applied. In this respect, the main problem resolution of the upcoming analysis is
represented by comparing the available safe egress time (ASET ) and the required
safe egress time (RSET ). In the next instance, scenarios are introduced in order to
supply the system with inputs. The resulting complexity requires systematic methods
for designing and analysing simulation experiments, which are finally introduced.
Chapter 3 provides information about all conducted modelling works, which were
necessary to achieve the objectives of this thesis. In concrete terms, the consideration
of climatic conditions in fire simulations as well as the implementation of interfaces
between fire and evacuation simulations are presented.
Chapter 4 covers the design, computation, and analysis of the fire simulation
ensemble. For this purpose, the specified parameter variations are presented. Within
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the analysis, an advanced workflow for determining ASET is introduced. The latter
is than incorporated into a preliminary correlation analysis.
Chapter 5 addresses the evacuation simulation ensemble. Within the design of
experiment, all relevant parameters are discussed. In particular, a new method for
generating occupant scenarios is presented. Finally, a preliminary analysis applied
to a reference occupant scenario ensemble provides major insights into the expected
pedestrian dynamics.
Chapter 6 tackles the life safety analysis and unifies the subsystems assessed in
the two preceding chapters. In this respect, a combined simulation ensemble is set
up. The subsequent analysis utilises an agglomerative clustering approach, which pro-
vides a consequence-based ranking of the particular combinations of fire and occupant
scenarios. The identified clusters are then analysed with regards to the expectable
consequences.
Chapter 7 finally provides concluding remarks upon the completion of the study.
This covers the major conclusions as well as the outlook for future research.
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Methodology
In this chapter, the methodological framework of this study is set up and conjunct
with the case study Osloer Straße. In order to provide the basis for the system
definition, a brief review of Quality and Systems Engineering is presented initially.
After that, the overall system, its underlying subsystems, and their elements are
defined.
Once the system is set up, the process steps of the performance-based design
approach are presented and – as appropriate for the scope of this thesis – slightly
modified or refined respectively. The project scope addresses the system’s bound-
aries as well as the most relevant stakeholders. In the next step, safety goals of the
latter are used in order to derive more concrete objectives. In this respect, the en-
gineering time line model unifying both ASET and RSET is introduced. Moreover,
the necessary performance criteria are discussed. Once this fundament is set up,
scenarios as well as their classification are introduced in general and then conjunct
with the subsystems Fire and Evacuation. The related methodological and technical
challenges are identified for both the engineering time line model and the scenario
framework. Finally, the broad topic Design and Analysis of Simulation Experiments
is propounded in order to cope with the identified challenges.
2.1 System Formation
In the first instance and secluded from any FSE context, it may be helpful to go one
step back and have a more generalised view on methods of solving complex problems.
The following considerations are provided since both methods and vocabulary in FSE
are occasionally blurred in everyday usage. In addition, guidelines and standards are
rather focussed on the process view than on the system view. In order to profit from
superordinate and globally acknowledged guidance on engineering tasks, the basic
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ideas of Quality and Systems Engineering will initially be reconsidered. Both terms
are closely linked to each other and provide an appropriate and holistic basis for
solving complex engineering problems.
Quality and Systems Engineering Quality is defined as the “degree to which
a set of inherent characteristics of an object fulfils requirements” [ISO 9000, 2015].
Having said that, assuring quality of complex systems is the ultimate objective of
Systems Engineering. This task basically consists of the subtasks problem definition,
problem resolution, and finally the implementation of the solution. A comprehensive
review of (generic) Systems Engineering and its application for complex tasks is pro-
vided by Winzer [Winzer, 2013]. It is moreover characterised by a number of basic
principles e.g. that everything generally has system character. Having said that,
every system can be described and modelled and thus be combined to more complex
systems. Another principle is the decomposition of problems. It is based on the as-
sumption that the solution of a subproblem contributes to the solution of the overall
problem. In other works, this approach is also referred to as “divide and conquer
strategy” [Mahajan, 2014]. The major challenge of this principle is the identification,
arrangement and – where necessary – the minimisation of relations. Moreover, it
is possible to utilise different views of the system, e.g. on the basis of components,
processes, requirements, or functions.
Setting up the System Since this thesis will not consider concrete design tasks,
the Systems Engineering term may probably be slightly inappropriate. However,
the concept provides a very good methodological and semantic fundament for the
systematic evaluation of a fixed, existing design too.
According to the principles stated above, the system definition presented schemat-
ically in Figure 2.1 has been set up. In principle, three levels are distinguished: sys-
tem, subsystems, and elements. Beginning at the top, the superordinate system has
been chosen as Fire Incident during Operation. This system is supplied by inputs,
i.e. scenarios and the system outputs are incorporated into the life safety analysis.
Hence, other classical FSE tasks, e.g. proofing structural integrity in case of fire are
excluded in this study. On the subjacent level, the superordinate system contains the
subsystems Fire and Evacuation. Within its particular boundaries, each subsystem
comprises a variety of different elements, which can have different relations to each
other. As already stated, systems and subsystems can receive inputs and yield certain
outputs. The fact that these are solely exchanged on the system level and subsystem
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level is an important convention. Moreover, the system boundaries are defined in
terms of space, time, as well as the process view. The detailed specification of these
boundaries will be taken up in the following section.
Throughout this chapter, the presented system will successively be updated with
all relevant information and assumptions. In the frame of this thesis, the subsequent
transformation from the system to the model level is realised within the subsystems.
Concretely, numerical models will be applied for the description of both fire and
evacuation dynamics. According to [Winzer, 2013, p. 71], both can thus be classified
as prognosis models.
System 
Fire Evacuation 
Design Fire 
… 
Detection 
Population 
Subsystems 
Elements 
… 
Route Choice Location 
Input Output Fire Incident 
during Operation 
Life Safety  
Analysis Scenarios 
Figure 2.1: Schematic system definition for life safety analysis in case of fire. Based
on [Winzer, 2013, p. 69].
2.2 Performance-based Design Process
A general definition of the system to be analysed is now prepared. Henceforth, the
system can be unfold to a process in order to focus on the methodological frame. The
so-called performance-based design process is supposed to transfer the ideas presented
above to the context of FSE. It has been incorporated in various standards, guidelines,
and handbooks all over the world during the past decades [vfdb, 2013; DIN 18009-1,
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2015]. Above all, the basic task has always remained the same: a system is checked
against the fundamental question if an arbitrary exposure is lower than the system’s
resistance. In some cases, the sequences and terminologies slightly differ from each
other. Thus, for demonstration purposes, the design process presented in [Hurley and
Rosenbaum, 2016] is utilised for the following statements.
In order to implement a performance-based analysis, a whole sequence of defi-
nitions and tasks has to be carried out. First of all, the project scope needs to be
defined. It describes the determination of the system boundaries. In addition to that,
all applicable stakeholders and their particular requirements are listed. The subse-
quent process step is the definition of goals, which are intended to be a qualitative
description of the desired system performance in case of fire. Depending on the legal
framework, this process step represents a direct interface to applicable building codes,
which often postulate goals as for instance in Germany [MBO, 2012, § 14]. In the
following step, the defined goals are substantiated in terms of objectives. This covers
the identification of appropriate quantities that allow for a quantification of the sys-
tem’s performance. Having said that, these quantities are evaluated against certain
thresholds, henceforth called performance criteria. The two following process steps
comprise the development of both scenarios and so-called trial designs. Subsequently,
the latter are evaluated on the basis of the agreements stated in the first four steps
of this process.
In principle, this process has now reached a decision box consisting of the ques-
tion if a certain design is compliant with the employed performance criteria. If yes,
the trial design can be selected as final design and can be documented respectively.
If not, the designer has to adjust either the objectives or the trial designs. In the
context of this thesis, the latter case is only of ancillary interest. This also applies
to the consideration of multiple trial design as an existing design is exclusively evalu-
ated. A corresponding process modification including the relevant section references
is presented in Figure 2.2.
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Figure 2.2: Performance-based fire safety design process (left) according to [Hurley
and Rosenbaum, 2016] and its adaption (right) for the purpose of this work. The
numbers in brackets correspond to the relevant sections of this thesis.
The outlined understanding is more or less the basis of all performance-based
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design approaches. However, the real differences arise when considering both the as-
sumption of system inputs and the interpretation of system outputs. This observation
is vividly demonstrated during the presentation of national case studies referring to
one particular project, e.g. in [SFPE, 2014].
Both the system and the method are now defined and are vitalised throughout
the following sections. For this purpose, the three main steps of problem solving are
used as central thread: problem definition, problem resolution, and implementation
of the solution.
2.3 Problem Definition
2.3.1 Project Scope
System Boundaries The definition of system boundaries for this study has multi-
ple aspects, which, of course, imply some assumptions that can not entirely account
for the complexity of the real world. In terms of space, the focus is exclusively set on
the underground station. Henceforth, the tunnel system is solely considered rudimen-
tarily. The same applies to the surface, which is partially represented. For sure, the
station’s life cycle implies ongoing changes of particular design features. However, this
study refers to the current design of Osloer Straße. Having said that, no so-called trial
designs including any additional measures will be considered. The temporal bound-
aries have two different aspects. In general, the analysis is supposed to cover different
times of the year as well as varying daytimes during the hours of operation. In terms
of a particular fire incident, a short-termed analysis period of 20 minutes is evaluated.
Finally, the definition of process boundaries assumes no firefighting operations by the
fire service until the end of this period. On the other hand, staff intervention at an
early stage will be considered.
Stakeholders Underground transportation systems involve a multitude of differ-
ent stakeholders with diverse interests. In the frame of this study, however, the focus
will be set on four major groups: customers, transportation department, authorities,
and fire service. In this respect, the primary and most extensive group of stakehold-
ers are the customers, whose primary interest is an undisturbed journey. Without
doubt, safety is an inherent customer demand as well. However, to some extent, the
risk perception when using underground systems may be different compared to other
means of transportation, e.g. automobile traffic or aviation. The Berlin transporta-
tion department (BVG) is another stakeholder, whose primary objective is to ensure
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a profitable and undisturbed operation of the entire transportation system. Likewise,
in the sense of responsibility and sustainability, providing a sufficient level of safety for
customers is a fundamental interest of the BVG. Moreover, authorities have varying
interests depending on their responsibilities. On the one hand, public transportation
is put out to tender in Germany. This involves demands regarding the fulfilment of
requested transportation capacities as well as fines in case of non-performance. On
the other hand, the primary interest of approving authorities is the safe design and
operation of facilities. Another body is the fire service, who has to ensure efficient
and safe rescue operations in case of a fire incident.
Legislative Basis Multiple regulations account for the fire safety-related inter-
ests of the above-mentioned stakeholders. The superordinate statute is the German
constitutional law. Amongst others, the underlying level accounts for both build-
ing legislation and transportation legislation. It consists of the building codes (here:
MBO) and the passenger transportation act (PBefG). By means of fire safety, building
codes are concretised by additional regulations applicable to different building uses,
e.g. mercantile, assembly, or industry, whereas no specific regulations for transporta-
tion facilities are available. On the other hand, the Transportation Act enables the
regulation of the operation of tramways (BOStrab). For the purpose of fire safety de-
sign, the latter is again rendered more precisely by a technical guideline for tramways
(TRStrab BS ).
2.3.2 Safety Goals
The German constitutional law provides every individual with the right to physical
integrity. On that basis, MBO states that every built environment has to be placed,
built, modified, and maintained without posing any hazards to life and health (free
and condensed translation) [MBO, 2012, § 3]. Similar intentions are incorporated by
the transportation act PBefG, whose primary demand for approval is a safe operation
[PBefG, 2016, § 13(1)]. In the next instance, PBefG empowers BOStrab, which
ensures safety of both facilities and rolling stock [BOStrab, 2007, § 2].
These general requirements are extended to fire-related hazards by safety goals in
both MBO [MBO, 2012, § 14] and BOStrab [BOStrab, 2007, § 3(1)]. In this respect,
the safety goal of particular interest for this study is the following: ensuring rescue
of occupants.
In principle, this goal is achieved by two subtasks. Initially, occupants are sup-
posed to engage in self-rescue, whereas rescue operations by the fire services are
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assumed in the subsequent phase. The temporal quantification and potential overlap
of these phases make for a vivid discussion in engineering practice. Concrete specifi-
cations are provided in TRStrab BS, which states a calculative quantification of the
self-rescue phase. Moreover, rescue operations are assumed to last from the comple-
tion of the self-rescue phase until the thirtieth minute of the incident. The focus of
this study, however, is exclusively set on the self-rescue phase.
2.4 ASET vs. RSET
2.4.1 Objective
Every occupant has to have left a built environment before any fire effects result
in untenable conditions. This objective is simple, reasonable, and comprehensible
as well. Relying on the concept of performance-based design, it is incorporated in
several standards and regulations for years. Concretely, it is represented by the
so-called engineering timeline model [Gwynnee and Boyce, 2016]. It consists of an
inequation, opposing the available safe egress time (ASET ) with the required safe
egress time (RSET ) and a certain margin of safety as shown in Equation 2.1. It is
thus also called ASET -RSET concept in everyday language.
ASET > RSET + safety margin (2.1)
In this respect, ASET describes the performance of a built environment in terms
of resistance against the consequences of a particular fire. This is achieved by deter-
mining the time when tenability criteria of certain fire effects are exceeded. On the
other side, RSET captures the occupant’s egress out of the building. The potential
difference between these two times is usually referred to as safety margin. The latter
may be utilised to cover uncertainties and to characterise the overall performance of
a design.
RSET itself is derived from a multitude of relevant time components for the
description of egress processes. It is composed of the maximal sum of time periods,
such as detection, alarm, pre-movement, and travel as shown in Equation 2.2. It is
important to note that this term is accompanied by large uncertainties and may be
shaped differently for every particular occupant i (see Section 1.3.2).
RSET = max(tdetection,i + talarm,i + tpre−movement,i + ttravel,i) (2.2)
Finally, the entire ASET -RSET concept is summarised in Figure 2.3:
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ASET 
RSET safety 
margin 
detection alarm pre-movement travel 
time ignition evacuation 
complete 
Figure 2.3: Summary of the ASET -RSET concept. In orientation to [Gwynnee and
Boyce, 2016].
2.4.2 Performance Criteria
In order to determine ASET, the performance criteria and corresponding threshold
values are used as presented in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Performance criteria for determination of ASET.
Quantity Unit Threshold
Extinction coefficient
Temperature
Carbon dioxide
Carbon monoxide
Hydrogen cyanide
Hydrogen chloride
m−1
◦C
ppm
ppm
ppm
ppm
0.23
45
10,000
100
8
200
The specifications are excerpted from the German vfdb guideline [vfdb, 2013,
p. 260]. The recommendations collected there refer to exposure times of up to
30 minutes. The quantities are evaluated at a height of 1.95 m above floor level, which
is supposed to represent the upper bound of body heights. Furthermore, this height
approximately corresponds to the smoke layer height claimed for existing stations in
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TRStrab BS. The further procedure regarding the determination of ASET is provided
in Chapter 4.
2.4.3 Challenges
So far, the preceding section presented ASET -RSET as a conceptual framework for
the life safety analysis in case of fire. The vitalisation of the latter is achieved by the
introduction of scenarios, which will be described in more detail in Section 2.5. Hence-
forward, the concept’s initial simplicity evolves into a highly complex and non-linear
problem. The introduction of scenarios for both fire and evacuation incorporates a
certain variability into the inputs of both subsystems. Having said that, one gener-
ally has to consider any modes of (probability) distributions regarding the output as
well. As an example of an acceptable design, Figure 2.4 illustrates the probability
distributions of ASET and RSET qualitatively.
t
p
(t
)
RSET
ASET
Figure 2.4: Qualitative illustration of ASET and RSET (probability) distributions
of an acceptable design.
In this respect, distributions of both ASET and RSET induced by parameter
variations have already been utilised in a number of works, e.g. in probabilistic
studies such as [Albrecht, 2012] or [Kong et al., 2016].
However, additional questions arise with regards to the determination of RSET
and ASET itself. With respect to RSET, the total egress time may be noted as the
time when the last occupant has left the building. This convention is rather simple
but may lead to an extensive underestimation of the design’s performance. It gets
even more complicated when considering ASET. Which quantity shall be considered?
What tenability criteria is relevant and last but not least what should the resolution
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look like in terms of space and time? At least here, it should become obvious that
it is hardly possible to determine one single ASET for a particular enclosure or
building. The spatiotemporal resolution of the concept needs to be considered during
the exploration and selection of scenarios as well. In addition to that, it has to be
noted that any uncertainties originating in the model application are excluded in this
discussion.
To sum up: the concept is appropriate but its application is by far non-trivial,
as it also has been discussed in [Seyfried et al., 2015]. In concrete terms, the proper
application of the ASET -RSET concept is not only a problem in terms of design and
computation of (simulation) experiments, it is also an analysis problem that has to
be solved.
2.5 Scenarios
Scenarios are the centrepiece of performance-based fire safety design. In terms of
literary usage, the scenario term has become rather popular since the 1980’s [Michel
et al., 2011] and is even identified as a buzzword in [Kosow and Gaßner, 2008]. As
a consequence of that, both definitions and taxonomies may widely differ in daily
routines.
The origin of scenario-based techniques can be found in fields like military, poli-
tics, and economics. Apart from a specific application, a scenario can be defined as a
“hypothetical sequence of events which is constructed in order to assess causal rela-
tions” (free translation) [Dudenredaktion, 2006]. According to [Kosow and Gaßner,
2008, pp. 14-17], scenarios cover four major functions: exploration, communication,
objective formation, and decision. Referring to this source, the explorative func-
tion is supposed to account for the generation, systematisation, and enhancement of
knowledge as well as the identification of uncertainties and complexity. In terms of
communication, scenarios can either be the result of discussion processes with multiple
stakeholders and demands or serve as illustrative input for the latter. Moreover, the
objective function of scenarios involves the formulation of nominal states. In terms
of the decision function, scenarios serve as orientation points in order to evaluate the
consequences of particular measures and strategies.
In general, the scenario term is closely linked to uncertainties since one scenario
represents one particular excerpt out of an infinite space of events. Consequently, the
utilisation of scenarios represents an indispensable reduction of complexity. However,
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the extent of this reduction may obtain a crucial role and will, thus, be pursued in
the Sections 2.5.3 and 2.5.4.
Given these general characteristics, this study utilises scenarios in order to simu-
late the subsystems Fire and Evacuation as defined in Section 2.1. For this purpose,
basic principles of both fire and occupant scenarios are briefly reviewed in the fol-
lowing two sections. Thereafter, the combination of the two as well as the scenario
classification applied in this study are discussed.
2.5.1 Fire Scenarios
In conjunction with the performance-based design process, fire scenarios are world-
wide addressed in numerous standards and guidelines meanwhile. In this respect,
a comprehensive overview is provided in [Hadjisophocleous and Mehaffey, 2016].
Sourced from [ISO/TS 16733, 2006], the definition of fire scenarios needs to consider
the following aspects: potential fire hazards, location of fire, type of fire, systems im-
pacting on fire, and occupant response. The following specification of these aspects
is excerpted from [Hadjisophocleous and Mehaffey, 2016].
Insofar, fire hazards can either be derived from reviewing statistics or analysing
coincidences of combustibles and ignition sources. Challenging fire locations are e.g.
rooms with large occupant numbers or places that may affect certain means of es-
cape. Additionally, fires in hidden spaces may advance to a hazardous state before
being detected. Other relevant locations may be obstructed spaces that impair the
effectivity of active measures or areas which affect plume characteristics, e.g. mass
flows or spilled buoyancy. Specifying a fire type involves a qualitative description of
the ignition, the intensity, and the development of a fire. Usually, these aspects are
closely linked to particular fire locations. If applicable, the impact of passive and
active fire protection systems needs to be considered as well. Passive measures may,
for instance, be compartmentalisation or structural integrity, while active measures
involve the effects of smoke and heat extraction systems or suppression systems. Fi-
nally, the potential interactions between a fire incident and the present occupants or
staff have to be incorporated in the definition of fire scenarios. These aspects may es-
pecially be relevant for extinguishing measures or activities affecting the propagation
of fire effects.
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2.5.2 Occupant Scenarios
To some extend, the relevance of a fire scenario is always linked to an underlying oc-
cupant scenario. Having said that, Nilsson and Fahy conclude that “in FSE -analyses,
designers often spend a lot of time and effort on the fire problem,, e.g. estimating
design HRR curves or simulating smoke spread, but occupant aspects may not always
be incorporated appropriately in the design” [Nilsson and Fahy, 2016, p. 2048]. Thus,
it is inevitable to specify appropriate occupant scenarios carefully. For this purpose,
the consideration of different methodologies and aspects is recommended, e.g. in
[ISO/TS 29761, 2015] or [RiMEA, 2016]. In this respect, ISO/TS 29761 also includes
the definition of fire scenarios, whereas the RiMEA guideline exclusively accounts for
occupant scenarios.
Based on the draft work on DIN 18009-2, four major categories have been identi-
fied, which will be utilised in this study: occupancy and occupants, built environment,
safety measures, and hazard [Ja¨ger and Schro¨der, 2016]. In that regard, occupancy
and occupants is supposed to account for the emerging variabilities regarding that
category. On the one hand, this covers the building use and the related numbers and
distribution of occupants. On the other hand, the specification of occupant character-
istics is supposed to account for the knowledge in the field of human behaviour in fire
as presented in Section 1.3.2. This challenging task has to incorporate diverse factors
like age, gender, physical and sensory capabilities, susceptibility, familiarity, experi-
ence, knowledge, social and cultural roles, presence of others, or current activities
[ISO/TS 29761, 2015]. The category built environment covers building characteris-
tics, which are relevant for the evacuation process, e.g. detection and alarm systems,
signage, or egress paths. Safety measures account for all actions that are applied by
means of organisation and intervention in case of an evacuation. Finally, the category
hazard has two different levels. Initially, arbitrary hazards are assumed as primary
cause for an evacuation. Moreover, in terms of considering hazardous effects over
the course of an evacuation, this category may represent the interface with the fire
scenarios.
2.5.3 Combination and Classification
Once both fire and occupant scenarios are specified, the subsequent step of the analysis
is to combine the latter. In this respect, Nilsson and Fahy found that “there is always
an occupant scenario paired with each fire scenario. This means that the selection
of fire scenarios and occupant scenarios [...] cannot be done independently, but it
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is instead a process of finding combined scenarios, which challenge the proposed fire
safety design” [Nilsson and Fahy, 2016, p. 2048].
In Section 2.4.3, it has been concluded that each fire scenario corresponds to
unique distributions of ASET within a built environment. The same applies to oc-
cupant scenarios, which may additionally be influenced by the fire scenario’s charac-
teristics. Thus and except of fire scenarios that exclude certain occupant scenarios
and vice versa, the parameter space of a life safety analysis is spanned by a non-
hierarchical, full-factorial combination of the identified fire and occupant scenarios as
illustrated in Figure 2.5. In this regard, full-factorial involves m × n combinations
out of m fire scenarios and n occupant scenarios, while non-hierarchical means that
there is no sequential relation between the fire and occupant scenarios.
1 
1 
2 
n 2 
1 
2 
n 
m 
1 
2 
n 
Figure 2.5: Combination of fire and occupant scenarios. In orientation to [DIN
NABau 005-52-21 AK2, Personal notes, March 9, 2016].
The challenging character of a particular scenario combination refers to risk; con-
sidering both the consequences and the probability. Having said that, one of the
most crucial tasks is the identification of design scenarios as a challenging subset of
all possible scenarios. This reduction is necessary because of practical constraints in
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terms of design, computation, and analysis of simulation experiments. For this pur-
pose, a general classification of scenarios is incorporated in many handbooks [Hurley
et al., 2016] and standards [ISO/TS 29761, 2015], [DIN 18009-1, 2015] meanwhile.
The scenario taxonomy of the latter is described below and illustrated in Figure 2.6.
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Figure 2.6: Scenario classification [Ja¨ger and Schro¨der, 2016].
The totality of possible scenarios here is divided into relevant and non-relevant
scenarios. On the one hand, the latter consist of bagatelle and worst-case scenarios
which oftentimes may be excluded from the analysis by judgement. On the other
hand, the analysis may reveal unacceptable scenarios, which do not fulfil an arbitrary
requirement. Without further measures, a particular design has to eliminate these
scenarios.
The remaining significant scenarios represent the subset, which is relevant for the
further design process. For this purpose, these may be grouped into clusters on the
basis of comparable risks. Finally, these clusters are represented by design scenarios,
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which are supposed to yield the maximum “severe but reasonable” risk [Nilsson and
Fahy, 2016, p. 2048].
2.5.4 Challenges
Given the combination of fire and occupant scenarios as well as the classification of
the latter, the central engineering task is to reduce the complexity of the introduced
scenario space to a smaller extent. In concrete terms, the totality of scenarios is
supposed to be represented by design scenarios, which are “amenable to analysis”
[ISO/TS 29761, 2015, p. 5]. This process step is also referred to as screening [Had-
jisophocleous and Mehaffey, 2016] and is usually conducted a priori using (risk-based)
qualitative approaches. These employ statistics or judgement in order to determine
design scenarios. Contrary to that, quantitative approaches utilise systematic meth-
ods sourced from reliability engineering (e.g. event trees) in order to quantify the risk
associated with a scenario.
However, in case of increasing complexity, qualitative approaches may especially
suffer from limited predictability caused by non-linear relations and interdependences
between the subsystems. In turn, quantitative risk-based approaches are able to cope
with these questions but they involve one essential drawback: the lack of data or
uncertainties regarding probabilities of particular events.
Moreover, these challenges are not solely affected by input-related uncertainties
but also by the consideration of multiple objectives and performance criteria. Thus,
it is also an output-related data analysis problem.
According to Braha, the above-mentioned characteristics closely correspond to
the classical understanding of engineering processes which aim at system behaviours
that “can be predicted and encapsulated by precise description”. In that sense, he
further states that “there is a strong tendency to control or limit complexity instead of
embracing it”. Having said that, he concludes limitations regarding the “robustness
and resilience” of an engineered system [Braha et al., 2006, p. 7].
Similar thoughts have recently been addressed by Purser when reflecting on cur-
rent and potential developments in egress modelling. In terms of conceptual challenges
for further development, he figured out a number of different aspects e.g. “Exami-
nation of the entire escape and hazard development process involving all interactions
between the occupants, built systems and fire scenarios”. Moreover, he emphasised
the necessity for the “Identification of those parameters having the greatest effect on
safety outcomes” and to “collect data on the range of variability of each key parameter
to facilitate probabilistic analysis of simulation outcomes” [Purser, 2016b].
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2.6 Design and Analysis of Simulation Experiments
Inspired by the thoughts stated above, this study is based on a quantitative, deter-
ministic analysis, which is applied to an extensive, pre-computed scenario ensemble.
The latter is set up by combining different techniques of experimental design, which
allow for a more extensive representation of the infinite scenario space. The analy-
sis of the represented scenario space is supposed to provide an essential basis to the
scenario selection process: the grouping of scenario combinations, i.e. the formation
of scenario clusters. This analysis is conducted a posteriori based upon the com-
puted consequences of all scenario combinations. In this respect, the probabilities of
occurrence are initially not considered further, which is, of course, a limitation.
Having said that, the investigation of system outputs, e.g. consequences, will allow
for a more comprehensive understanding of the system behaviour. The subsequent
conjunction with system inputs, e.g. scenarios, essentially represents a sensitivity
analysis, which is one potential application within the research topic “design and
analysis of simulation experiments” [Kleijnen, 2008, p. 7]. According to Winzer,
simulation experiments are a powerful tool for the evaluation and implementation of
design variants within a modelled system [Winzer, 2013, pp. 198].
Amongst other aspects, the conduction of such studies essentially has to account
for two subtasks: designing and analysing the experiment as illustrated in Figure 2.7.
Input 
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Model 
(system of PDEs) 
Output 
(responses) 
Fire scenarios FDS	 Field data 
Occupant scenarios JuPedSim	 Trajectories 
Design Analysis 
IC 
BC 
MP 
IC 
BC 
MP 
IC 
BC 
MP 
IC=Initial conditions   BC=Boundary conditions   MP=Model parameters 
Figure 2.7: General overview of design and analysis of simulation experiments and
its application within this study.
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In this respect, experimental design essentially covers the definition of inputs.
These inputs may be initial and boundary conditions or model parameters that are
provided to a certain (black box) model. In the frame of this study, both of the
applied models (FDS and JuPedSim) represent systems of partial differential equa-
tions for simulating either fire or pedestrian dynamics. The outputs obtained from
the computational realisations are the basis of the subsequent data analysis. The
following two sections provide a brief overview of the two above-mentioned subtasks
and the corresponding methods applied within this study.
2.6.1 Design of Experiment
Initially, it is important to note that a more extensive scan of the scenario space is not
the guarantee for entirely capturing the system behaviour, but it is a good approx-
imation. The quality of the capture may significantly depend on the specifications
regarding the design space, e.g. dimensionality, size, or resolution. These aspects are
addressed in the design of experiment (DoE ) research field. DoE unifies “mathemat-
ical statistics and linear algebra [...] applied to experiments with deterministic and
random simulation models” and may serve for diverse goals, e.g. verification and val-
idation, sensitivity analysis, optimisation, or risk analysis [Kleijnen, 2008, pp. 7-10].
DoE essentially covers the input configuration of (simulation) experiments. In this
respect, a set of inputs is referred to as sample, which is tantamount to the scenario
term as introduced in Section 2.5.
According to Kleijnen, the inputs are represented by factors which involve pa-
rameters and variables. In that regard, it is important to denote that parameters are
“model quantities that have values that cannot be directly observed in the real world”,
which in turn applies to a variable [Kleijnen, 2008, p. 10]. Experimental designs
can be based on several different approaches, e.g. one-factor-at-a-time, full-factorial,
fractional-factorial, central composite, or Latin Hypercube. Both applicability and
appropriateness of the latter depend on the problem.
Given these general information, the experimental design of the fire simulation
ensemble (Section 4.4) has been conducted based upon a full-factorial sampling. For
this purpose, every level of the station has been assigned with a separate design space.
In case of the platform levels, the design factors consist of three parameters, whereas
two of the latter have three levels and one has five levels, i.e. 3 × 3 × 5 = 45 scenarios.
The concourse level consists of three factors as well. However, one parameter only
involves two levels, i.e. 3× 3× 2 = 18 scenarios. The above-mentioned characteristics
yield a total number of 45 + 45 + 18 = 108 scenarios.
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Moreover, for the specification of the evacuation scenario ensembles (Section 5.4),
Latin Hypercube Sampling (LHS ) has been applied. General information on this
so-called space-filling design method are provided in [Kleijnen, 2008] and [Viana,
2013]. Assuming a space of two factors to be represented by n samples, the basic
idea is to divide each parameter domain into n levels. In this respect, the levels can
either be distributed uniformly or according to a specified distribution as conducted
in [Schro¨der et al., 2014]. The initial sampling point is randomly chosen and the
design space then is expanded according to the following principle: each orthogonal
of a sample point may not intersect with another sample point in the particular level.
LHS henceforth represents an orthogonal sampling method, which can be applied to
multi-dimensional spaces. Questions about the random initialisation as well as the
spatial representation of the levels by a sample point allow for techniques in order to
optimise the coverage of the design space. Regarding these methods, further reading
can be found in [Rennen et al., 2010]. In the frame of this study, the levels have been
distributed uniformly and the sample points have been allocated centred within the
latter. Moreover, the design space coverage is significantly depending on the number
of samples. Unfortunately, it is not possible to define versatile thresholds for that
since it depends on the problem and the dimensionality to which LHS is applied.
As an orientation, Kleijnen states 100 samples as a rule of thumb [Kleijnen, 2008, p.
129].
2.6.2 Data Analysis
Data analysis is intended to assess and evaluate a particular design. Depending on
the extent of the design space and the complexity of the applied models, a simulation-
based life safety analysis can yield massive amounts of data, which can be looked at
from two perspectives. Firstly, both fire and evacuation processes are usually de-
scribed by spatiotemporal data series of diverse quantities. The second perspective
accounts for the variabilities introduced by applying design of experiment strategies
as described above. These circumstances imply the necessity for advanced analysis
workflows for the derivation of superordinate knowledge from the simulation exper-
iments. A comprehensive introduction into methods and tools of this purpose is
provided in [Myatt, 2007], which is also the source of the following basics. For the
conduction of an exploratory data analysis, Myatt identified four major process steps:
problem definition, data preparation, implementation of the analysis, and deployment
[Myatt, 2007, p. 6]. Since the first and the last step are part of the performance-based
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design process as presented in Section 2.2, data preparation and implementation of
the analysis will be the centrepieces of this section.
In this respect, data preparation solves tasks like consolidation, cleaning, and
transformation of data. In order to condense information and simultaneously reduce
the data extent, these process steps have been applied to the spatiotemporal data de-
rived from the fire and evacuation simulations. With regards to the fire simulations,
these data consist of various field quantities, which are highly resolved in space and
time. The data obtained from the evacuation simulation are massive sets of trajecto-
ries, which comprise the space and time information of every individual pedestrian.
In both cases, the data amounts could be reduced by at least three orders of magni-
tudes, which is achieved by map representations of ASET (Section 4.5.1) and RSET
(Section 5.5.1).
Finally, the implementation of a data analysis itself mainly consists of three tasks:
summarising the data, finding hidden relationships, and making predictions, whereby
the focus will be set on the first two subtasks in the frame of this study. In this respect,
summarising data utilises straightforward formats, e.g. tables or graphs. On the other
hand, finding hidden relationships within datasets may involve more sophisticated
data formats and methods. In this study for instance, correlation analyses will be
conducted in order to provide a principal understanding of the behaviours of the
two subsystems Fire (Section 4.5.2) and Evacuation (Section 5.5.2). Moreover, the
outputs of the consolidated simulation ensemble will be investigated using grouping
approaches such as hierarchical agglomerative clustering (Section 6.3.2). In order to
identify the design scenarios, the clusters will then be further investigated based on
relationships regarding the associated inputs (Section 6.3.3).
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Extending the Fire and Evacuation
Models
This chapter covers all modelling works which were necessary in order to assess the
scientific questions of this study. The model extensions cover both fire simulation and
pedestrian simulation. In the first step, the integration of available knowledge and
data about underground climate into the field of fire simulation will be discussed.
After that, the main extensions of the JuPedSim framework for incorporating fire
simulation data will be presented.
3.1 Fire Simulations and Underground Climate
In Germany, experiments with thermally-driven, artificial smoke are increasingly ap-
plied for the qualitative proof of smoke management concepts [iBMB, 2015, pp. 249-
308]. These physical experiments especially account for the fire development phase
with comparatively low rates of heat release. In a number of cases, the latter revealed
non-trivial airflow regimes, which were – to some extent – caused by climatic effects
[Schmundt and Wassermann, 2014]. Similar observations have been made during the
first pilot experiments in the frame of the ORPHEUS project. Moreover, some of the
incident studies presented in Section 1.2.2 emphasised the importance of airflows in
the underground as well. Thus, the necessity to consider potential climatic influences
in FSE analyses has been more and more acknowledged within the last years.
Underground systems especially can provide very particular climatic conditions,
which are likely to be relevant for FSE analyses. In this respect, the term “climate”
covers a multitude of quantities, such as temperature, airflow velocity, pressure, hu-
midity and many others. However, in the frame of this study, the focus will be set on
temperatures and airflow velocities.
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In terms of the latter, it is commonly assumed that airflows are predominantly
induced by the so-called piston effect caused by moving trains. Having said that,
the consideration of climate effects is often neglected arguing that the train traffic is
stopped immediately in case of fire.
However, extensive investigations carried out by researchers of the Ruhr-University
Bochum clearly proved that airflows in underground stations do not exclusively de-
pend on train movements [Pflitsch et al., 2012]. For instance, long-term field studies
conducted in Dortmund, Germany showed that background airflows establish one to
three minutes after the train service is ceased [Bru¨ne, 2007]. The characteristics of
these background airflows are mainly influenced by the ambient weather conditions.
In detail, the temperature differences between the station and the surface as well as
temperature differences within the station have been yielded as the main influencing
factors.
In general, it has been found that higher temperature gradients result in higher
flow velocities. In particular, this is the case during the winter period as the under-
ground temperature profiles are less dynamic than the ambient ones and as partially
strong chimney effects arise. In contrast, the summer period is rather characterised
by more localised temperature differences and more or less stable stratification phe-
nomena. These conditions lead to airflows with minor velocities that are prone to flow
reversals. In this case, the background airflow is predominantly driven by the tem-
perature differences within the station. With regards to safety research, the necessity
for further investigations about interactions between background airflows and those
which are thermally driven, e.g. by a fire, has already been pointed out in [Pflitsch
et al., 2013].
The insights summarised above allow for the assumption that climatic aspects may
be relevant for FSE analyses in underground stations. Assuming the low-energetic de-
velopment phase of a carriage fire at the basement of a two-level station, the following
two simple cases shall support this thesis.
Winter case: Comparatively low underground temperatures provide good buoy-
ancy conditions for the plume formation, resulting in a stable stratification of the hot
gas layer. However, the vertical temperature differences cause remarkable airflows
towards the surface. The latter are constricted at the staircases, which are the only
connection to the surface. On the one hand, this results in turbulent disruptions of
the hot gas layer in these areas but, on the other hand, it provides a notable natural
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ventilation of the platform level. In turn, this causes a remarkable smoke spread into
the escape routes and the adjacent level.
Summer case: Higher temperatures within the underground system result in a less
stable hot gas layer formation. However, the overall temperature equilibrium results
in minor airflow velocities and, thus, in less turbulent disruptions. Subsequently,
the natural ventilation is predominantly driven by the thermal impact of the fire
itself. Hence, the conditions on the platform level become unacceptable rather fast.
However, the escape routes and the adjacent level will remain almost smoke-free for
a longer time.
The question if climate conditions affect the development of performance criteria
cannot readily be answered. It depends on a multitude of aspects, e.g. the project
scope, the built environment, the system boundaries, or the occurring fire dynamics.
Since there are only few insights available so far, the points stated above shall serve
as a starting point for the consideration of these aspects within this study.
In this regard, the following paragraphs cover the implementation of available data
and knowledge into a CFD-based fire simulation. Since a literature review did not
reveal any recommendations for considering the aforementioned aspects in the scope
of underground stations, a brief review on other helpful documents is provided.
Across multiple building uses, a number of different design guidelines already ac-
count for the consideration of climatic conditions in FSE analyses. A first example is
the German RABT guideline, which applies to road tunnels [FGSV, 2006]. It requires
the proof of an adequate performance of a detection system design for longitudinal
airflow velocities up to 6 m s−1. This assumption is, however, supposed to represent
the traffic-induced airflows. Furthermore, the guideline series VDI 6019 covers the
smoke ventilation of buildings [VDI, 2006a], [VDI, 2006b]. In principle, Part 1 dis-
tinguishes the consideration of low-energetic and a high-energetic design fires. The
purpose of a fire scenario with a comparatively low heat release is to assess “the
influence of particular room-climatic conditions in the room on fire” and to prove
the “effectiveness of the planned smoke removal system including the automatic fire
detection and alarm systems” [VDI, 2006a]. In Part 2, the derivation of initial and
boundary conditions based on the particular climatic situations of a building is pos-
tulated. Though focussed on inlet airflows, the annex is supplementarily concerned
with processes related to both the washout of the plume and the disruption of the
hot gas layer.
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3.1.1 Climate Modelling
Airflows in underground stations – if considered at all – have usually been modelled
with explicit initial and boundary conditions either for pressure or velocity [Carvel
and Beard, 2005], [Flassak and Ba¨chlin, 2012]. In this section, a data-driven approach
is proposed, which incorporates temperature as the key determinant. The subsequent
configuration based on field data is presented in the following section.
The first consideration to model different climatic conditions in the frame of an
FSE -related analysis has been presented in [Schro¨der et al., 2014]. The climate model
was conjunct with a representative station, which had been derived from field studies
conducted in Germany [Borchert, 2014]. Based on field data collected by the Ruhr-
University Bochum in the underground system of Dortmund, the principal correlation
of temperature conditions and airflow velocities in the station determined by [Bru¨ne,
2007] could be reproduced with FDS.
The introduced modelling approach exclusively utilises the definition of initial and
boundary conditions for temperatures throughout the station. Firstly, the ambient
temperature of the computational domain is assumed as the surface temperature.
Moreover, all final staircases leading to the surface are fitted with boundary conditions
representing the ambient temperature as well. Additional temperature boundary
conditions are defined at the tunnel portals of U8 and U9. However, horizontal
temperature gradients are not considered within one level. In order to accelerate
the climate’s transient phase, initial zones have been set up in all three levels of the
station. In case of the platform levels, the initial temperatures are set equally to
the boundary temperatures of the latter. The initial temperature of the concourse is
assumed as the mean of the temperatures of surface and U9. A graphical summary
is provided in Figure 3.1
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Surface 
Boundary condition 
0.5 × (Tamb + TU9)  
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Figure 3.1: Overview of the climate model utilising ambient, initial, and boundary
temperature conditions throughout the station. The triangles illustrate the staircases.
Moreover, the initial approach has been extended by the consideration of the
built environment. On the basis of inside-wall measurements carried out by the Ruhr-
University Bochum, the correlation between outside-wall and inside-wall-temperature
has been determined. Given that, the initial temperature of all concrete building
components has been adjusted according to Equation 3.1.
TWall =
TU8 + TU9 + TCL
3
· 0.75 + 4.124 ◦C (3.1)
where:
TU8 is temperature at U8 in
◦C,
TU9 is temperature at U9 in
◦C,
TCL is temperature at concourse in
◦C.
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Finally, a period of 600 s of additional simulation time has been introduced prior
to the consideration of any fire in order to engage the climatic conditions properly.
3.1.2 Data Basis
In the frame of the projects OrGaMIR and OrGaMIR Plus (see Section 1.3.3), a
comprehensive dataset about climatic conditions in Osloer Straße has been collected
by the Ruhr-University Bochum [Pflitsch and Bru¨ne, 2016]. The time series are
resolved in 10-minute-intervals and comprise a multitude of climatic quantities, such
as temperature, airflow velocity, pressure amongst others. The data was collected with
the help of six multi-criterial ultra-sonic measurement devices, which were placed in
proximity to the tunnel portals of U8 and U9. In addition to that, two stations were
set up temporarily inside the two staircases connecting U8 and concourse. Moreover,
the ambient conditions have been recorded with a weather station at the surface.
Recordings of the concourse are not available. In order to supply the afore-mentioned
climate modelling approach, a selected subset of three data records has been utilised
(see Table 3.1).
Table 3.1: Overview of measurement locations, which have been analysed to configure
the climatic conditions.
Name Location No. Records Quantities
Ol U8 G2 fn o  U8 track 2
→ Franz Neumann Platz
146,900 T, v
Ol U9 G6 na o  U9 track 6
→ Nauener Platz
118,985 T, v
Ol OB OB  Surface 176,641 T
This reduced selection was based on a number of different findings and require-
ments. Firstly, no remarkable differences between the measurements within one level
have been found. Secondly, the data is intended to be used for simultaneous initial
and boundary conditions of the CFD simulations. Hence, a temporal coincidence of
the particular time series for both underground and surface had to be ensured. Since
not all measurements were ran continuously due to operational and technical reasons,
some of the remaining locations had to be excluded from the final analysis.
Within the preliminary studies in [Schro¨der et al., 2014], the temperatures under-
ground and at the surface were sampled continuously within their statistical distri-
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butions over the course of one year. In other words, a multitude of different climatic
conditions has been incorporated, while the sampling did not include any additional
constraints regarding the temporal coincidence of the surface and underground tem-
peratures. Now, the data analysis focusses on the temperature differences between
underground and surface. Regarding the latter, the emphasis is set on the upper
and lower extrema in order to find representative climatic conditions of one summer
and one winter case. Given this objective, a filter was applied to the datasets. In
this respect, the summer period was assumed from July to September and the winter
period from December to February. In additions to that, only recordings between
5:00 a.m. and 12:00 p.m. are included in the upcoming analyses.
In the following steps, the analysis workflow will briefly be presented concerning
the winter configuration for the U8 level. Figure 3.2 provides the time series of
the temperatures measured underground and at the surface as well as the resulting
temperature difference.
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Figure 3.2: Winter conditions: time series of underground (U8) and surface temper-
atures and corresponding differences for coincident data.
It becomes evident that the dataset effectively allows for the evaluation of only
two winter periods. Furthermore, the data proves the typical climate dynamics of
underground stations: while the surface temperature provides a remarkable spread
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between ± 15 ◦C (except outlier in 2010), the underground temperature varies in a
much smaller range between 10 ◦C and 20 ◦C. Moreover, a more microscopic view to
the data also revealed that there is a temporal delay between the individual courses
of underground and surface temperature. The corresponding temperature differences
consequently vary from −5 K to −30 K.
In the next step, the coincident data subset is analysed in more detail. For this
purpose, the distributions of the particular temperatures are derived as shown in
Figure 3.3.
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Figure 3.3: Winter conditions: distributions of underground (U8) and surface tem-
peratures and corresponding difference when data series have been coincident. The
dashed line illustrates the fifth percentile boundary, which has been applied to extract
the most distinct temperature differences between surface and underground.
The distribution plot clearly illustrates the distinct fluctuations amongst the sur-
face temperatures. In turn, the underground temperatures are distributed in more re-
fined intervals. The vertical temperature difference between surface and underground
is one of the key determinants of the underground climate. Hence, the ongoing anal-
ysis focusses on the distribution of the latter. In this respect, winter conditions are
represented by the lower bound of this distribution or in other words: situations with
maximal (negative) temperature differences between surface and underground.
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In the sense of choosing a reasonable extent for the winter case, the temperature
difference distribution is solely considered up to the fifth percentile from now on.
For the summer case the distribution is considered beginning from the ninety-fifth
percentile. Given these cut distributions, the underlying temperature components of
surface and underground temperatures have been determined as shown in Figure 3.4.
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Figure 3.4: Winter conditions: illustration of temperature difference distribution
bounded by the fifth percentile and the underlying components of underground (U8)
and surface temperature.
The visualisation of the latter reveals a bipartite separation of the data, which
looks like two separate distributions. This could be explained by two evaluated win-
ter periods. Obviously, the distributions of both surface and underground are very
similar and more or less shifted by the absolute value of the temperature difference.
A higher number of observations could allow for a more robust parametrisation of
these sub-distributions. With the given data however, the Gaussian mean and stan-
dard deviation have been derived in order to configure the climatic conditions. For
the winter case, the temperatures of surface and U8 constitute −9 ◦C and 15 ◦C re-
spectively. The presented workflow was applied to summer conditions and and to the
U9 level as well. The resulting configurations will be incorporated in the setup of the
fire simulation ensemble in Section 4.3.3 and are provided in Table 4.6.
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3.1.3 Results
The major objective of the presented modelling approach and data analysis was to
obtain typical airflow conditions as they can be observed in underground stations.
For both summer and winter case, Figure 3.5 visualises the velocity profiles that have
established in the U8 after the transient phase of 600 s.
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Figure 3.5: Horizontal slices of absolute velocities for summer and winter conditions.
The slices refer to the U8 level at a height of 1.95 m after 600 s. For the winter case,
velocities greater than 1 m s−1 have established in proximity to the tunnel portals and
upward staircases.
Whereas almost no air movements can be observed within the summer config-
uration, distinct airflows establish for the winter case. Besides the tunnel portals,
upward airflows especially form in proximity to the staircases. Moreover, almost the
entire platform area is covered with slight velocity fluctuations.
49
3.2. COUPLING OF FIRE AND EVACUATION SIMULATIONS
3.2 Coupling of Fire and Evacuation Simulations
Prescriptive regulations do usually not consider the presence of any fire effects in es-
cape routes. This is doubtlessly a reasonable requirement, which ensures a substantial
degree of safety and it should, wherever possible, be straightforwardly fulfilled.
However, for specific building designs and uses, there may be scenarios that can-
not exclude a spatiotemporal coincidence of building occupants and particular fire
effects in general. In these cases, it is necessary to evaluate the extent and possible
consequences of exposures and interactions. This task may include a multitude of
different effects, e.g. “deciding to enter and continue through smoke or turn back and
seek refuge, and on walking speed and wayfinding ability” [Purser and McAllister,
2016] or effects on an “evacuee’s initial response” [Ronchi et al., 2013]. Henceforth,
it requires a more conjunct analysis of the relevant subsystems.
The interactions between fire and evacuation dynamics are oftentimes reduced
to the engineering timeline model presented in Chapter 2. But already the very
beginning of the timeline requires a conjunction, e.g. when distinguishing between
detection times of a detection system or individual occupants. In terms of route
choice, fire modelling results and acceptance criteria are used to apply constraints
to the temporal availability of the escape route system. With the aim of proofing
tenability throughout an evacuation, this approach may be sufficient. But it assumes
no interactions at all until a particular acceptance criterion is exceeded. However,
there are interactions (e.g. re-routing due to smoke spread) that already may become
relevant before a certain acceptance criterion is exceeded.
Beyond that, a deterministic life safety analysis of an existing design is not nec-
essarily based on the principle that a coincidence of occupants and fire effects is
impossible. This fact requires additional considerations about potential interactions,
such as the reduction of walking speeds due to reduced visibility or impairment and
incapacitation by toxic fire eﬄuents.
The thoughts stated above were the cause for a number of submodels that have
been added to the JuPedSim framework. In that regard, this section concerns JPScore
– the simulation module of JuPedSim. Further information are provided in Sec-
tion 5.1.1. As shown in Figure 3.6, a well-structured assignment of the particular
submodels can be achieved in orientation to the hierarchy of motion.
Hierarchy of Motion Hoogendoorn [Hoogendoorn et al., 2002] proposed the hier-
archy of motion in order to structure the diversity of aspects when modelling pedes-
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trian dynamics as presented in Figure 3.6. It consists of the strategic, tactical, and
operational level. The following information about the particular levels is extracted
from the above-mentioned source.
Strategic level 
Tactical level 
Operational level 
Individual detection 
Route choice 
Walking speed reduction 
Fire hazard analysis 
JP
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Figure 3.6: Hierarchy of motion [Hoogendoorn et al., 2002] and the assignment of
relevant interactions between fire and pedestrian dynamics.
The strategic level concerns all aspects that are relevant prior to the movement
of a pedestrian. From the perspective of a pedestrian, this stage is usually associated
with no or incomplete information about conditions and alternatives. Beside the
planning of a particular route, this also covers the fundamental decision to leave a
building. This decision is the result of a complex process (see Section 1.3.2) and
is depending on different cues. Doubtlessly, one of the latter is the sight of smoke,
which is referred to as individual detection from now on. The latter represents the
first interface between fire and evacuation simulations.
The tactical level consists of short-term decisions that become effective through-
out the travel phase. These decisions are based on more detailed and localised in-
formation. In this respect, the potential effect of smoke spread on route choice is
investigated as well.
Finally, the operational level includes all model characteristics that are related
to the movement of pedestrians, e.g. the adoption of directions and walking speeds.
The belonging interface to fire simulation data mainly consist of two aspects. The
latter cover both reduced walking speeds in case of smoke obstruction as well as the
impairment or prevention of the travel phase by fire hazards.
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In the following sections, the extensions of the aforementioned levels are succes-
sively presented. The corresponding framework of these extensions is JPSfire, which
involves the four major aspects illustrated in Figure 3.6.
JPSfire JPSfire is the interface between JuPedSim and FDS and is organised in
two major levels: pre-processing of FDS data and incorporation by JPScore. The
basic workflow and the quantities employed within this study and their relevance for
the particular submodels are summarised in Figure 3.7.
FDS 
Pre-Processing 
JPScore 
E 
Selection 
Extraction 
ASCII conversion 
Grid generation 
Grid consolidation 
Storage 
SmokeSensor 
(Detection), route choice 
ToxicityAnalysis 
Fire hazard analysis 
WalkingSpeed 
Walking speed reduction 
Slicefiles, devices 
T CO CO2 HCN HCl 
Simulation	Pedestrian	FDSMeshStorage	
Figure 3.7: Overview of hierarchy and main functionalities of JPSfire, processed fire
simulation data, and supplied classes of JPScore.
The first level represents the pre-processing interface, which conducts the selec-
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tion, extraction, conversion, consolidation and storage of relevant fire simulation data.
Besides extinction coefficient (E) and temperature (T ), the gas concentrations of car-
bon monoxide (CO), carbon dioxide (CO2), hydrogen cyanide (HCN), and hydrogen
chloride (HCl) are evaluated. Once the relevant quantities and their evaluation loca-
tions are specified, information will either be gathered from FDS devices or slicefiles.
Since the latter are stored in binary format, their incorporation initially requires a
conversion to ASCII format. This is necessary in order to filter and consolidate the
data in a flexible fashion. In the next step, the datasets are reshaped to their original
spatial extends. In case of multi-mesh datasets, the latter are consolidated to single
objects. Finally, the datasets of all specified quantities and evaluation locations are
written out in order to make them accessible for JPScore, which sustains the second
level of JPSfire. With regards to the simulation core, three classes are generically
involved in the data incorporation. While the Simulation class controls the simula-
tion of pedestrians based on a certain model in a specific scenario, the Pedestrian
class hosts all relevant functions and parameters applicable to one particular pedes-
trian. Furthermore, the FDSMeshStorage class handles the inclusion and provision of
the pre-processing data which is supplied by the first stage of JPSfire. The further
implementations in JPScore depend on the particular submodels. Hence, these will
be addressed separately in the following sections.
3.2.1 Individual Detection
The individual detection of fire cues has not inherently been implemented to JPScore
yet. It will, however, be included within the design of experiment in Section 5.3.3. In
concrete terms, the datasets prepared for the SmokeSensor class are utilised in order
to determine the time, when smoke initially penetrates a particular subroom of the
simulation geometry. Thus, the individual detection time is subroom-based and not
agent-based currently.
3.2.2 Route Choice
Motivation Beside detecting a fire incident and engaging in a certain response, the
sight of smoke may also influence the route choice of pedestrians and thus is relevant
for the design of the tactical level. With regards to life safety analyses, these aspects
can potentially affect the exposure to certain fire effects but also the load distribution
in escape route systems and thus the location and extent of jam areas. If and why
building occupants avoid or traverse smoke is a sophisticated question that has to
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be assessed from a multi-disciplinary perspective. In principle, the initial question
is wether multiple options are available at all. However, even in case of multiple
options, occupants will move through smoke if there is a “good” reason for doing so
[Ku¨nzer and Hofinger, 2016]. Similar thoughts are stated by engineers in [Gwynnee
and Boyce, 2016, p. 2515]. According to Ku¨nzer and Hofinger, this decision however
depends on multiple aspects, e.g. personal knowledge, experience, motivation, pro-
vided information, and social relations. The same is applicable if familiar exits are
affected by smoke and alternatives are either unknown or subjectively less appealing.
Moreover, any kind of stress may impair reasonable decisions.
Empiricism A few studies directly address the route choice of building occupants
during fire incidents. In the year 1972, Wood conducted probably the most extensive
work [Wood, 1972]. The interview study enquired about 1000 fire incidents in resi-
dential and public buildings and revealed that 60 % of the subjects traversed smoke.
Further findings were that this number was in close relation to the familiarity with the
building. Almost similarly, Bryan determined 63 % out of 584 interviewed subjects
going through smoke during residential fires in the U.S. five years later [Bryan, 1977].
With an exclusive focus on a public occupancy, Fahy and Proulx provide numbers
that have been collected upon the fire evacuation after the terrorist attacks at the
World Trade Center in 1993 [Fahy and Proulx, 1997]. In this case, 94 % (Tower 1)
and 70 % (Tower 2) of the evacuees encountered and traversed smoke while clearing
the high-rises. Data related to underground systems can be derived from the incident
study conducted in the course of the Daegu subway fire [Jeon and Hong, 2009]. Here,
the authors found that more than 60 % of the subjects followed an evacuation route
they had planned in advance. Only 25 % of this group were able to complete their
planned passage, whereas the remaining 75 % deviated from their initial route. An-
other recent study was conducted by C¸akici Alp, who interviewed 17 people present
during a fire in a university building [C¸akici Alp and C¸agˇdas¸, 2014]. In the knowledge
that the number is small, the author found that approximately 30 % of the subjects
deviated from their planned route due to smoke, while 46 % passed through smoke.
Implementation Inspired by these thoughts and numbers, a comprehensive pro-
posal for a perception-based route choice algorithm has been presented in [Schro¨der
et al., 2015]. The following information is a condensed excerpt of this source. Due
to restrictions regarding the routing algorithms implemented in JuPedSim, the im-
plementation is only functional for convex geometries currently. For that reason, it
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will not be considered in the experimental design of the case study. Further work is
necessary here.
The implementation has been carried out using an artificial test case as illustrated
in Figures 3.8 and 3.9. It consists of a central assembly room, an adjacent room, and
a corridor. The intention of the test case is that an assumed fire in the adjacent room
yields increasing smoke spread into both the assembly room and the corridor. Initially,
the smoke propagation will affect the corridor’s upper exit due to the proximity to
the fire. Later on, the lower exit of the assembly hall is affected as well since the
smoke layer descends, when the ceiling jet reaches the lower wall.
In order to conjunct smoke dynamics and adaptive route choice, JuPedSim’s cog-
nitive map routing framework has been extended. The latter has initially been intro-
duced by [Haensel, 2014] and is continuously developed by Andresen [Andresen et al.,
2016a], [Andresen et al., 2016b], [Andresen et al., 2017]. The basic idea of this rout-
ing framework is that the route choice depends on two major aspects: knowledge and
perception. In terms of knowledge, every pedestrian has its individual, graph-based
representation of the built environment, which is called metric map. Perception is
represented by a set of so-called sensors which serve as individual input channels for
each pedestrian. The purpose of these sensors is to provide the metric map with
additional information, which is referred to as second order knowledge.
With regards to interdependences between fire and evacuation simulations, a
SmokeSensor class has been implemented, which is supplied by JPSfire. The ba-
sic operation within the latter is to evaluate the line of sight from a pedestrian’s
current position towards a particular exit as it is demonstrated in Figure 3.8. With
the help of spline interpolation of either optical density D or extinction coefficient E,
the emerging line is used to extract the spatial course of the smoke conditions from
the FDS field data. This process is conducted for all visible exits.
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Figure 3.8: Extraction of optical density from fire simulation data with the help of
spline interpolation.
In the subsequent step, the resulting data series are used to compute a weight
factor for each visible exit. The factors then are used to modify the cost calcula-
tion, which is run on the metric map of each pedestrian. This process is conducted
repetitively in order to account for the fire dynamics. For computational reasons,
the weight factors are pre-computed and stored in a grid, which then is accessed by
JPScore.
The functional verification of the introduced implementation reveals the route
choice patterns illustrated in Figure 3.9.
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Figure 3.9: Geometry and trajectory plots visualising the different route choice pat-
terns. Under normal conditions, exits E and F are equally used (Subfigure 3.9b). In
case of an assumed fire, exit F is increasingly avoided (Subfigure 3.9b).
It becomes apparent that the initial shortest path route choice (Subfigure 3.9b)
changes in dependence to the current smoke spread conditions (Subfigure 3.9d). More
precisely, the occupants increasingly use exit E, whereas exit F remains almost unused.
With regards to the assembly room, the dashed line in Subfigure 3.9b represents the
separation of the observed route choice due to the shortest path calculation under
normal conditions. Subfigure 3.9c visualises the smoke spread in the geometry 165
seconds after ignition. Subfigure 3.9d shows the resulting route choice patterns with
activated smoke sensor. With increasing smoke spread, the separation line relocates
towards exit A, which is increasingly affected by smoke.
With regards to the vast uncertainties about the risk perception of individual
pedestrians, the edge weighting routine has been added with certain randomness. The
corresponding model parameter has been denoted as risk tolerance, which additionally
modifies the cost calculation routine. A comprehensive sensitivity analysis about this
artificial parameter as well proposals for its calibration with regards to the available
empiricism have been conducted in [Hein, 2016].
3.2.3 Walking Speed Reduction
Motivation If there is a certain likelihood that smoke may spread into escape
routes, the evacuation dynamics will be influenced by that. In general, the presence
of smoke yields an increased extinction and, thus, obscures the sight of occupants.
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The extent of these effects is heavily dependent on a multitude of factors. The most
important aspects probably are the optical and chemical smoke characteristics, which
in turn depend on the fuels and fire dynamics. But also the layout of a particular
escape route system and lighting conditions will influence the visibility conditions. A
number of incident and laboratory studies have identified the reduction of walking
speeds as one of the major consequences of impaired visibility.
Empiricism In the past years, two major datasets have become available providing
empirical relations between extinction coefficients and walking speeds. The very first
was a Japanese study, which was conducted by Jin [Jin, 1978]. The second was
conducted in Sweden by Frantzich & Nilsson [Frantzich and Nilsson, 2003]. Since
the experimental conditions of both studies are slightly different from each other, the
application of the data needs some further considerations. In general, both studies
imply a reduction of walking speeds with increasing extinction coefficients. However,
the extends of this effect are rather different. Firstly, the extinction coefficients in
Jin’s data are in the range of 0 to 1 m−1, whereas the data collected by Frantzich
& Nilsson covers 2 to 7 m−1. Secondly, Jin predicts a more instant reduction than
Frantzich & Nilsson. The reasons for these differences may be manifold. One of the
most obvious factors, for instance, is the spatial configuration of the experiments. In
Jin’s experiment, the subjects were advised to traverse a corridor with a length of
20 m straight towards an emergency exit at its end. During the experiment conducted
by Frantzich & Nilsson, the subjects were requested to pass through a 37 m long
road tunnel including some obstacles. Furthermore, the obscuration of the sight was
induced differently. In order to provoke irritant and non-irritant smoke characteristics,
Jin used kerosene and wood grip fires. In contrast, Frantzich & Nilsson filled the
experimental space with theatric fog. In a fraction of the experimental runs, the
latter was additionally mixed with small amounts of acetic acid. Recently, additional
data was generated by Fridolf when conducting evacuation experiments in a 200 m
long rail tunnel [Fridolf et al., 2013b, 2015]. The objectives of the study were both the
effectivity of way-finding systems and walking speeds in smoke-filled environments.
Similarly to the study of Frantzich & Nilsson, smoke spread was simulated by theatric
fog, which was mixed with acetic acid. The achieved extinction coefficients range from
almost 0 to 2.2 m−1. Thus, the optical conditions in the experimental space were less
extensive but in turn represent a valuable addition to the dataset of Frantzich &
Nilsson. A graphical overview of the introduced datasets can be found in Figure 3.10.
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Figure 3.10: Experimental studies on the relation of extinction coefficient and walking
speed applicable to non-irritant smoke.
Interpretations The data presented above clearly implies uncertainties about the
physical performance of occupants forced to walk through smoke. In terms of fitting
the data to a certain model, Frantzich & Nilsson propose an approximation by utilising
a linear regression. Jin, on the other side, did not provide any recommendations for
fitting the data. Recently, a logarithmic fit has been proposed by Purser in [Purser
and McAllister, 2016]. In this work, he also discusses a consolidation and logarithmic
approximation of both presented datasets. Further considerations of how to interpret
the datasets have been made by Fridolf in [Fridolf et al., 2013a] by consolidating the
dataset by Frantzich & Nilsson and his dataset. In order to account for the scatter
of the data, he introduces a subdivision of the measurements into single classes that
can be incorporated by means of descriptive statistics.
Besides the statistical analysis of the particular studies, additional questions arise
when interpreting the data for the purpose of model implementation. One obvious
question may be the influence of individual occupant characteristics on these data
sets. Does reduced visibility uniformly decrease the current walking speed? Supposing
that it does not, what is the contribution of the individual desired walking speed of a
pedestrian? Another question is how to deal with the boundaries of the provided data
domain. What assumptions should be made in ranges where no data is provided?
Is there an absolute minimum speed? A well-structured and comprehensive study
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concerning these and other related questions can be found in [Ronchi et al., 2013].
Based on an artificial case study, this contribution provides an interesting comparison
of the mentioned datasets and interpretations. This work, in particular, addresses
the implementation of (variable) functional relations sourced from the datasets and
considers different interpretations of their corresponding boundaries.
Implementation For the analysis in this thesis, the dataset by Frantzich & Nilsson
has been chosen. This decision has been made focussing on the fact that the study
provides a wider coverage of extinction coefficients. In addition, it may be more
appropriate for the application in complex built environments since the experimental
setup was somewhat more demanding for the subjects in terms of avoiding obstacles
and way-finding. Further on, its validity is to some extend supported by the dataset
of Fridolf and both were conducted in the context of transportation infrastructure.
The implementation is carried out referring to interpretation number 2 in [Ronchi
et al., 2013]. This means that not a single desired walking speed is globally determined
by fitting the data but a normalised linear regression is utilised to recalculate the
desired walking speed of an agent. The corresponding coefficients are provided in
[Frantzich and Nilsson, 2003]. Since this regression could potentially yield in effective
walking speeds very close to or even less than zero, a global minimum walking speed
is set as shown in Equation 3.2.
v(E) = max
(
vmin, v0 · (1 + −0.057
0.706
· E)
)
(3.2)
where:
E is extinction coefficient in m−1,
v0 is desired walking speed in m s
−1,
vmin is minimal walking speed. Here: 0.3 m s
−1.
The walking speed reduction routine is triggered by the Pedestrian class when-
ever a desired walking speed is requested. The WalkingSpeed class itself accommo-
dates Equation 3.2 and conducts the recalculation of the desired walking speeds. For
this purpose, the FDSMeshStorage class is requested to deliver the optical conditions
for time and space of a particular pedestrian. The necessary fire simulation data is
prepared by JPSfire in advance.
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3.2.4 Fire Hazard Analysis
Motivation Fundamentally, the determination of ASET is carried out by evalu-
ating certain fire effects and their particular thresholds for tenability. This question
opens up a highly complex interface between FSE and multiple disciplines of classical
life sciences, e.g. physiology and toxicology.
Beginning with research on increasing fatalities in residential fires in the United
Kingdom, major work and knowledge has been achieved by Purser since the 1980s.
His most recent disquisitions on “Combustion Toxicity” and “Assessment of Hazards
to Occupants from Smoke, Toxic Gases, and Heat” can be found in [Purser, 2016a]
and [Purser and McAllister, 2016]. If not marked differently, the major contents of
this section are derived from these sources.
In principle, these analyses come along with a large degree of underlying uncer-
tainties. This covers both the FSE part in terms of determining the extent of fire
effects as well as the life science part in terms of estimating the impact on a human
being. Despite forensic studies that proved the proposed concept in general [Purser,
2016b], this drawback led to a very heterogenous acknowledgement and adoption of
these insights into building codes and FSE practice.
However, this approach is particularly beneficial for analyses or scenarios that
cannot solely be covered by prescriptive reasoning. In this respect, Purser rules out
potential exposures caused by “sprinklered enclosures due to downdrag and loss of
smoke buoyancy”, or by the fact “that a system may be rendered inoperable”. Finally,
he also emphasises the appropriateness of “estimating the risk of injury and death
throughout the life of the building [...] for a range of scenarios” [Purser, 2016a].
Relevant physiological processes for assessing life safety in the event of a fire
are, e.g. incapacitation, irritation, visibility, and thermal stress. Thus, fire-related
quantities of particular interest are gas concentrations, smoke densities, temperatures,
and radiation. Depending on the chosen approaches in terms of fire modelling and
data analysis, these quantities normally represent spatiotemporal data. They describe
a certain condition at a certain location for a certain duration. The conjunction of
these data with the occupants requires additional considerations. For this purpose,
the concepts of fractional effective concentrations (FEC ) and fractional effective doses
(FED) have been implemented within this thesis.
Fractional Effective Concentrations The FEC concept is supposed to process
information about a fire effect at a given time and space. This is especially appropriate
when considering exposures that have an immediate effect on occupants. In principle,
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an FEC term is simply composed by the fraction of a particular fire effect and the
belonging tenability criterion as shown in Equation 3.3.
FEC =
e
et
(3.3)
where:
FEC is fractional effective concentration,
e is effect of fire,
et is tenability criterion of fire effect.
This fraction allows for the evaluation of a particular system performance, while
unity represents the transition to untenability.
Fractional Effective Doses The FED concept extends the idea of FEC to the
time dimension. In particular, this is beneficial for the assessment of accumulating ex-
posures to fire effects. Its very basis is a general formulation of time-dose-relationships
for particular fire effects according to Equation 3.4.
D = e · te (3.4)
where:
D is dose,
e is effect of fire,
te is exposure time.
When considering the dynamics of fire-driven flows and crowd movements in built
environments, it, however, is very unlikely that the quantities of fire effects are time-
independent. In order to ensure an adequate representation of these spatiotemporal
dynamics, the dose can be represented by the integral term presented in Equation 3.5.
D(te) =
∫ te
0
e(t) dt (3.5)
Except for comparative analyses, this expression does not allow for any evaluation
up to now. Hence, the product of exposure and time has to be related to certain
doses that are known to represent the thresholds of tenability. This relation yields
the fractional effective dose as shown in Equation 3.6.
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FED =
D(te)
Dt
(3.6)
where:
FED is fractional effective dose,
Dt is dose representing the tenability threshold.
Again, unity represents the transition to untenability. In turn, the underlying
exposure time component then represents ASET – at least for the particular fire
effect.
With regards to an occupant’s evacuation, Purser distinguishes three different
modes of consequences to which the FEC respectively FED concepts may be applied:
impairment, prevention, and lethality. However, lethal time-dose-relationships only
play a minor role since lethality has to be considered as a consequence of impairing
and preventing exposures in advance. Hence, they will be excluded in the scope of
this thesis.
So far, the presented FED concept is applicable to multiple fire effects and different
consequence modes. The following paragraphs will now provide the derivation of
concrete performance measures. Purser used the knowledge about relevant physical
fire effects and gas components as well as their physiological effects in order to set
up predictive models for the above-mentioned modes of consequences. The data
mostly are derived from animal experiments and has been back-calculated to human
beings. Further reading about underlying methods, validation, interactions between
particular gas species, and limitations can be found in the literature referenced in
[Purser, 2016a].
Impairment by Irritation Besides asphyxiant gas components, smoke may con-
tain irritant components as well. This mostly is the case, when the present fuel
consists of halogen compounds, e.g. chlorine. In order to derive information about
irritation, the FEC concept can be applied to the expected irritant gas components
as shown in Equation 3.7 and 3.8. In the scope of this thesis, only HCl has been
implemented. Note: In accordance with the literature, the FEC is referred to as FIC
(fractional irritant concentration) for this application. As discussed in section 2.4.2,
the criteria for impairment and incapacitation are assumed to be 200 and 900 ppm
respectively. The escape of an occupant is considered as impaired or prevented if the
fraction exceeds unity.
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FIC Im =
σHCl
200 ppm
(3.7)
FIC In =
σHCl
900 ppm
(3.8)
where:
FIC Im is fractional irritant concentration for impairment by irritation,
FIC In is fractional irritant concentration for incapacitation by irritation,
σHCl is volume concentration of HCl in ppm.
Impairment by Visibility In terms of occupants’ potential exposure to smoke,
Purser states that “their exit choice and movement speed (and hence their travel time)
can be affected” [Purser, 2016a, p. 2316]. The empirical bases and the implementation
of these points have already been addressed comprehensively within this chapter.
However, there is still need for a particular measure that reports the spatiotemporal
coincidence of occupants and smoke. Again, this is achieved by employing the FEC
concept to the extinction coefficient. As presented in Section 2.4.2, the threshold
extinction coefficient is supposed to roughly represent visibility conditions below 20
metres. Hence, the escape of an occupant is considered to be (at least temporarily)
impaired while the fraction provided in Equation 3.9 exceeds unity.
FEC Smoke =
E
0.23 m−1
(3.9)
where:
FEC Smoke is fractional effective concentration for impairment by visibility,
E is extinction coefficient in m−1.
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Impairment by Heat The assessment of exposures to heat needs to account for
both the radiative as well as the convective impact from smoke present in an oc-
cupant’s environment. For the derivation of tenability times representing tolerable
conditions, Purser proposes an empirical relation that utilises the smoke temperature.
If the smoke temperature is derived from a time series, the thermal impact can be
expressed as a function of time. The integrated reciprocal of this empirical relation
yields the fractional effective dose for heat as shown in Equation 3.10.
FEDHeat(te) =
∫ te
0
1
2 · 1031 · T (t)−16.963 + 4 · 108 · T (t)−3.7561 dt (3.10)
where:
FEDHeat is fractional effective dose for tolerable heat conditions,
T is smoke temperature in ◦C.
Prevention by Incapacitation On the basis of an extensive literature review,
Purser identified incapacitation as the “key determinant” for fatalities during fires.
In principle, the incapacitation of humans is mainly driven by asphyxiation. In gen-
eral, smoke is a complex mixture of numerous chemical compounds. Its composition
strongly depends on the present fuels, fire dynamics, ventilation conditions and many
other factors. In this respect, the fire effects mentioned above represent gas con-
centrations. In order to account for varying toxicological potentials of particular
smoke components, Equations 3.5 and 3.6 can be expressed as summation of gas
concentration time series and corresponding tenability doses. This conjunction yields
Equation 3.11.
FED In(te) =
∫ te
0
n∑
i=1
σi(t)
Dt,i
dt (3.11)
where:
FED In is fractional effective dose for incapacitation,
σi is volume concentration of gas component i,
Dt,i is dose representing tenability applicable to gas component i.
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So far, this expression is conceptual and its application requires the introduction
of concrete gas components and the corresponding threshold doses. In terms of as-
phyxiation, Purser identified carbon monoxide (CO) and hydrogen cyanide (HCN)
as the two major gas components. While CO will occur in almost all combustion
processes, the presence of HCN is dependent on the nitrogen content of the fuels.
Since the physiological effects of both gases are very different, a separated consid-
eration of both is inevitable. For instance, incapacitation by CO can be accurately
predicted by a simple dose relationship as shown in Equation 3.4, while the Carboxy-
hemoglobin (COHb) concentration causing incapacitation is applied. COHb is the
complex, which is formed by haemoglobin and CO in the blood of an exposed person.
On the contrary, the incapacitation process by HCN is extremely non-linear. Here,
concentrations smaller than 80 ppm result in a tenability of about one hour. In con-
trast, an increase of up to 180 ppm will decrease the tenability times to approximately
two minutes [Purser, 2016a, p. 2359]. Furthermore, the concentrations of both oxy-
gen (O2) and carbon dioxide (CO2) are relevant for the respiration of a human being.
In principle, decreased O2 concentrations induce hypoxia. The impact of CO2 is more
ambivalent: on the one hand, moderately increased concentrations result in higher
respiration rates, which in turn cause an overall increased inhalation. On the other
hand, very high concentrations inherently decrease the O2 concentrations and result
in hypoxia as well. The incapacitation of an occupant can be predicted according to
Equation 3.12.
FED In(te) =
∫ te
0
((
3.317 · σCO(t)1.036
D · 10−5 +
σHCN(t)
2.36
2.43 · 107
)
· V˙R · exp
(
σCO2(t)
5
)
+
1
exp (8.13− 0.54 · (20.9− σO2(t)))
)
dt
(3.12)
where:
σCO2 is volume concentration of carbon dioxide in Vol%,
σCO is volume concentration of carbon monoxide in ppm,
σHCN is volume concentration of hydrogen cyanide in ppm,
σO2 is volume concentration of oxygen in Vol%,
D is % COHb causing incapacitation. Here: 20 %,
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FED In is fractional effective dose for incapacitation,
V˙R is respiration rate. Here: 50 l min
−1.
It should be noted that additional terms, e.g. for nitrogen oxides (NOx) may
be incorporated into this concept. However, according to the recommendations by
Purser, these can be omitted “without significant error” when assessing asphyxia
[Purser, 2016a, p. 2372]. Furthermore, additional terms for lethal doses are excluded
as argued above.
The specification of the respiration rate V˙R and the COHb concentrations yield-
ing incapacitation D deviate from the “default” parameter recommendations. In the
scope of this thesis, the parametrisation shown in Equation 3.12 is supposed to ac-
count for the higher physical efforts during the evacuation of the underground station,
i.e. when moving up stairs.
Implementation Based on the recommendations by Purser, the hazard analysis
is triggered in “successive short periods (< 1 min) at the breathing zone” of build-
ing occupants [Purser, 2016a, p. 2318]. Hence, the data extraction is conducted
at 1.95 m above the ground. Assuming an average breathing rate of 20 min−1, the
ToxcityAnalysis class is called by the Simulation class every three seconds of simu-
lation time for each pedestrian object. The conduction of the hazard analysis routine
is thus timed in an appropriate order of magnitude. Within the ToxcityAnalysis
class, all relevant variables for the calculation of the afore-mentioned FED and FEC
values are initialised. For a pedestrian’s global time and position in the domain, the
relevant fire simulation data are requested from the FDSMeshStorage class. Having
a pedestrian’s data available for a given time and space, the FED and FEC val-
ues are then computed and – where applicable – transferred to the pedestrian class.
Finally, the results of the hazard analysis are consecutively written out in XML for-
mat. Compared to pure text-based formats, the tree structure of XML will allow
for a more efficient exploration of the extensive data amounts during the subsequent
post-processing.
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Fire Simulation
In this chapter, the subsystem Fire is addressed. Firstly, a brief documentation
of numerical and computational aspects for the application of the Fire Dynamics
Simulator is given. In the next step, relevant auxiliary specifications regarding the
built environment, combustibles, and fire sources are discussed. An important part of
this chapter is the setup of the simulation ensemble, which constitutes comprehensive
considerations of fire locations, design fires, and climatic conditions. Followed by that,
the simulation ensemble is examined in a first stand-alone analysis, which focusses
on ASET. For this purpose, an advanced methodology for the assessment of multiple
performance criteria in spacious domains is introduced.
4.1 Fire Model and Computation
Fire Model One of this study’s components is the computation of a simulation en-
semble of selected fire scenarios inside the station. For this purpose, the CFD model
Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS ), Version 6.3.2 has been utilised. The Fortran-code
has been developed at NIST since the late 1990s and is predominantly designated for
the simulation of fire-driven flows in built environments. Several submodels allow for
assessing a variety of relevant questions in fire safety engineering. The Navier-Stokes
equations are solved via the finite difference method, while the applicability of the
solution is limited to flow regimes with low Mach numbers. The spatial discretisation
is based on a structured, uniform grid. With regards to FSE analyses, turbulences
are usually resolved with the LES model. However, a DNS implementation is avail-
able as well. The distinctive feature in comparison to conventional CFD codes is
the incorporation of “source terms and boundary conditions that describe the turbu-
lent combustion of gaseous fuel and oxygen, [and] the transport of thermal radiation
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through hot, soot-laden gases” [McGrattan et al., 2015a]. In the course of the develop-
ment, the code has been parallelised for both OpenMP and MPI. The aforementioned
features as well as the open-source distribution increased the popularity of FDS in
both research and application during the past years.
Computation After a grid sensitivity study had been performed, a grid resolution
of dx = 15 cm was chosen throughout the entire geometry. This is in accordance with
the expected magnitudes of heat release and the characteristic fire diameter discussed
in [McGrattan et al., 2015c] and [McGrattan et al., 2015b]. Furthermore, it allows for
an adequate representation of filigree geometry components, which may be relevant
in terms of the occurring fluid dynamics, e.g. stairs, lintels, or beams.
As illustrated in Figure 4.1, the domain has been decomposed into twelve meshes
with a total number of approximately 26 million grid points. On the basis of the
general principles postulated in [McGrattan et al., 2015c] and preliminary studies, the
arrangement of the meshes has been optimised in terms of three additional criteria.
Firstly, staircases are not intersected by any mesh transitions. The second principle
is that the spatial extends of the mesh transitions were attempted to be minimised.
In order to avoid slicing of the plume areas, the fire locations have been incorporated
for the placement of the mesh transitions as well.
Figure 4.1: Decomposition of the computational domain into 12 meshes.
The high computational effort is distributed with the aid of a hybrid parallelisation
strategy using both MPI and OpenMP. In concrete terms, each of the 12 meshes is
assigned to one particular MPI task, which itself is divided into four OpenMP threads.
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Hence, a total number of 48 cores per simulation is utilised. These resources can be
provided by two compute nodes on the JURECA system at the Ju¨lich Supercomputing
Centre [Krause, 2015].
4.2 Auxiliary Specifications
4.2.1 Built Environment
Geometry The station layout and its representation as a generic geometry format
has already been presented in Section 1.2.3. Here, the focus is set on the preparation
of the geometry in order to conduct CFD simulations. For FSE tasks, especially, one
of the most basic requirements is a “waterproof” representation of the model without
unintended leakages. For this purpose, a mass balance analysis across all openings
has been carried out in advance.
Additional considerations were necessary regarding the spatial discretisation’s im-
pact on the representation of the geometry. Since FDS solves the conservation equa-
tions on a structured grid, the representation of filigree building elements may imply
weaknesses. This applies to all structural components that are slanted in the domain,
e.g. staircases or non-orthogonal walls. In orientation to the V+V framework pro-
posed by [Mu¨nch, 2013], simplified test cases were set up to cover these concerns.
In terms of mass and heat transport, the results of these studies did not remarkably
yield deviating results.
Thermal Properties In FDS, the conjunction of geometry elements and thermal
properties is realised by defining materials, which are assigned to surfaces. In order to
represent the structure and relevant interiors of the station, five major materials have
been specified and assigned to four surfaces. In this respect, surfaces are specified
by their thickness d and – if applicable – by their composition of multiple materials.
Relevant material parameters are specific heat cp, thermal conductivity λ, and den-
sity ρ. An overview of the configuration is given in Table 4.1. The applied values
have been gathered from [Schneider, 2012].
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Table 4.1: Overview of defined surfaces, materials including their particular proper-
ties, and major examples of their application.
Surfaces Materials Application
SURF_CONCRETE
d = 0.3 m
CONCRETE
λ = 2.5 W m−1 K−1
ρ = 2400 kg m−3
cp = 1.0 kJ kg
−1 K−1
structural components
SURF_STEEL
d = 0.003 m
STEEL
λ = 50 W m−1 K−1
ρ = 7800 kg m−3
cp = 0.45 kJ kg
−1 K−1
railcar undercarriage
SURF_ALU_SANDWICH
compound:
ALU+INSU+ALU
d = 0.003+0.1+0.003 m
ALU
λ = 160 W m−1 K−1
ρ = 2800 kg m−3
cp = 0.88 kJ kg
−1 K−1
sandwich compound
railcar body
INSU
λ = 0.4 W m−1 K−1
ρ = 100 kg m−3
cp = 1.03 kJ kg
−1 K−1
SURF_GLAS
d = 0.01 m
GLAS
λ = 1 W m−1 K−1
ρ = 2500 kg m−3
cp = 0.75 kJ kg
−1 K−1
railcar glazing
glass segments shopping area
Openings A number of studies has shown that both fire and combustion dynamics
strongly depend on the ventilation conditions that are provided by a built environment
[Carvel and Beard, 2005], [Ingason, 2005], [Purser and Purser, 2008].
Across its three levels, the station model comprises 13 openings. Eight of them
represent the tunnel portals of U8 and U9, which serve as interfaces to the adjacent
tunnel system. The remaining five openings are the staircases connecting the con-
course level with the surface. Throughout the entire station, a total cross-sectional
area of about 180 m2 is available for inlet and outlet airflows. Moreover, two trains
are considered on both U8 tracks and another one on the incoming U9 track. Addi-
tional considerations on smaller scales are necessary in order to specify the ventilation
conditions inside the rail cars and shopping units.
Regarding the trains, the following assumptions were made. Firstly, all of the
18 carriage doors towards the platform are considered to be open. The different
train models, which are operated by BVG on U8 and U9 and their expected effect
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on ventilation conditions, are incorporated as well. Hence, both a trainset with six
separate cars and a trainset with six continuously accessible cars will be examined.
In this respect, the six car trainset yields a remarkable, but rather punctual release of
heat and smoke with good thermal buoyancy. In case of the continuously accessible
trainset, the smoke and heat release is expected to be less localised and, thus, less
buoyant.
Finally, the performance of the carriage glassing needs to be addressed. In this
respect, the integrity does not only depend on the glass type but also on its mounting
[Bulk, 2015] – and of course on the fire scenario. In orientation to [Wilk, 2012], the
windows of the affected carriage are assumed to collapse consecutively within a period
of 720 to 1020 seconds after ignition. The structure of the car body is assumed to
remain intact.
With regards to fire scenarios in the shopping units, some basic considerations
about the ventilation conditions during compartment fires are necessary. The shop-
ping units and concourse area are separated from each other by glass segments and
glass doors without a qualified fire resistance. It is assumed that the doors are opened
and that the glass segments remain intact. Depending on the fire scenario and the
number and width of doors, the expected fire dynamics may thus be limited by the
resulting cross-sections of the openings.
Smoke and Heat Extraction System The retail units inside the concourse level
are equipped with a smoke and heat extraction system (SHE ), whose ventilation
ducts are wall-mounted. The control logic is triggered by the fire detection system
and closes all vents except the ones in the compartment where a fire is detected.
The system is assumed to operate fully one minute after detection. Depending on the
floor space of the shopping units, the number of vents differs from one to five. Their
effective area accounts to 0.076 m2. The volume flow of each retail unit has been ex-
cerpted from measurements, which were recorded after the installation [Eichelberger,
1998]. The technical specifications for the considered compartments are summarised
in Table 4.2. The three locations associated to the particular retail units are taken
up in Section 4.3.1.
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Table 4.2: Technical specifications of the SHE system.
Retail Unit Openings / Aeff in m
2 V˙SHE in m
3 h−1
5 (location 1) 2 / 0.152 2539
17 (location 2) 5 / 0.380 4712
9 (location 3) 4 / 0.304 8313
4.2.2 Combustibles
In this section, the design fires, which are going to be introduced in Section 4.3.2, are
assigned with combustibles. This specification is an influential part for the outcome
of any FSE analysis. Initially, a representative fuel for a particular building use and
a corresponding fire scenario has to be identified. In the next step, the production
rates (yields) for the particular components to which the fuel is decomposed during
the combustion process have to be specified.
In order to reduce the complexity of the entire simulation setup, two major fuels
will be considered within this study. These are polyurethane (PUR) for the fire
scenarios related to rolling stock and polyvinyl chloride (PVC) for the luggage and
retail fire scenarios. Table 4.3 provides a brief overview of the conjunction of the
design fires and the appurtenant fuels.
Table 4.3: Overview of design fires and assigned combustibles.
Design Fire PUR PVC
BR F x
BR H x
TR16 x
Retail x
Luggage x
TRIn x
Polyurethane In orientation to TRStrab BS [TRStrab BS, 2014], polyurethane is
assumed to be the major representative fuel whenever a fire scenario is related to
rolling stock. Further on, the technical rule states CO, CO2, and soot as relevant
combustion products and provides the corresponding yields as shown in Table 4.4.
It is notable that the extent of soot release is subdivided into two different stages.
This is supposed to consider the worsening ventilation, respectively the incomplete
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combustion conditions while HRR increases. Another major combustion product of
PUR is HCN, which is, however, not considered. Henceforth, the fuel definition has
been extended by HCN as fourth product species. Usually, a rough 1:13 relation
based on the CO-yield is proposed for this purpose, e.g. in [vfdb, 2013]. However,
this approach is only valid for very small nitrogen contents, which in turn may not
be appropriate for PUR. Hence, the appurtenant production rate has been chosen
in orientation to [Purser and Purser, 2008] and [Purser, 2016a] for well-ventilated
conditions. Nevertheless, one of Purser’s major findings is that the HCN-yield may
significantly depend on the ventilation conditions. However, since the yields of CO
and CO2 are assumed to be constant, the same is assumed to be the case for HCN.
Please note that these assumptions may involve significant uncertainties. In reality,
each vehicle generation is likely to provide different fuel characteristics. In the frame
of this work, however, the presented fuel configuration will be assigned to all rail car
design fires without further differentiation.
Table 4.4: Overview of polyurethane fuel characteristics based on [TRStrab BS, 2014]
and [Purser and Purser, 2008; Purser, 2016a].
Reaction Product Yield Time
Carbon monoxide γCO = 0.122 g g
−1 constant
Carbon dioxide γCO2 = 1.274 g g
−1 constant
Hydrogen cyanide γHCN = 0.070 g g
−1 constant
Soot γSoot = 0.056 g g
−1 t ≤ 600 s
Soot γSoot = 0.129 g g
−1 t > 600 s
The temporal subdivision of the soot release has been achieved by defining a dual
reaction scheme. This means that one particular reaction is assigned to two differen-
tiated combustion phases that incorporate the above-mentioned configurations. The
transition between the two phases is controlled by ramping the fuel mass fluxes of
the particular reaction. For this purpose and in accordance to TRStrab BS, the mean
heat of combustion has been chosen as ∆Hc =18 770 kJ kg
−1.
Polyvinyl Chloride The design fires covering the luggage and the retail unit fires
are assigned with polyvinyl chloride as major representative fuel. With regards to the
variety of different materials which can be expected for both luggage or retail units,
this assumption is doubtlessly a notable simplification. The configuration of the fuel
characteristics has been extracted from an example presented in the FDS User’s
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Guide [McGrattan et al., 2015c] and is summarised in Table 4.5. In contrast to PUR,
the combustion characteristics of PVC are assumed to remain constant throughout
the entire observation time, which of course is an additional simplification.
Table 4.5: Overview of polyvinyl chloride fuel characteristics based on [McGrattan
et al., 2015c].
Reaction Product Yield Time
Carbon monoxide γCO = 0.063 g g
−1 constant
Carbon dioxide γCO2 = 0.676 g g
−1 constant
Hydrogen chloride γHCl = 0.583 g g
−1 constant
Soot γSoot = 0.172 g g
−1 constant
4.2.3 Fire Sources
The derivation of design fires in Section 4.3.2 is not going to account for pyrolysis
and flame spread modelling. However, by means of an adequate plume formation
during the early stages of a fire, it is necessary to conjunct the explicitly defined
heat release rates with a certain fire spread. For this purpose, the fire sources have
been modelled with the help of the FDSgeogen framework, which is described in
Section 4.4 in more detail. One of its convenient functionalities is the representation
of fire spread across a rectangular surface. In concrete terms, the surface is discretised
in finite elements, which are successively ignited. This process can be triggered by
both common parameterised models, e.g. αt2, but also by arbitrary HRR time series.
The latter feature, especially, goes beyond the functionalities currently implemented
in FDS. The outlined approach has been applied to the design fires presented above.
An exemplary time series of the fire spread and the corresponding heat release rates
applicable to the BR F design fire is illustrated in Figure 4.2.
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t = 300 s 
t = 600 s 
t = 900 s 
t = 1200 s 
HRR ≈ 0.2 MW 
HRR ≈ 0.6 MW 
HRR ≈ 2.5 MW 
HRR ≈ 6.3 MW 
Figure 4.2: Top view of time, flame spread, and corresponding heat release rate in a
carriage applicable to the design fire BR F.
In case of high-energetic rail car fires, the fire surfaces have been placed inside the
car bodies with a total size of 14.4 m × 2.4 m. The surfaces have been subdivided into
384 subelements, whereas each subelement has an edge length of 0.3 m. In order to
account for a proper plume formation, this edge length has been reduced to 0.15 m for
the medium- and low-energetic fires. For the retail units, surfaces with a size of 2.1 m
× 2.1 m have been implemented. For the sprinklered design fire, this complies quite
well with the HRRPUA of 250 kW m−2 given by [DIN EN 1991-1-2/NA, 2015]. The
luggage fire surface is represented by a simple rectangular box, whose top surface has
an extent of 0.45 m × 0.60 m. The sideward surfaces of this idealised luggage item are
not considered as fire surfaces. Finally, the self-extinguishing rail car fire is assumed
to spread over a maximum area of 0.60 m × 0.60 m.
4.3 Fire Scenarios
In this study, the term “fire scenario” is supposed to unify the initial and boundary
conditions applicable to fire locations, design fires, and climatic conditions. In the first
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instance, the relevance of potential fire events are considered in general. With regards
to the station and its use(s), three different fire events have been identified. These are
a carriage fire, a retail unit fire, and a luggage fire. In the following paragraphs, these
events are supplemented with additional, qualitative considerations and the expected
potentials for challenging the achievement of the protection goals.
Carriage Fire With regards to underground stations, the fire of a carriage is sup-
posed to be a severe fire scenario in manifold ways. Inevitably, a carriage consists of
numerous combustibles that may contribute to a fire. In the past years, the fire per-
formance of rolling stock vehicles has remarkably been improved, e.g. by advancing
and harmonising standards such as EN 45545. However, recent incidents have proven
that even state of the art vehicles still may burst into a fully developed fire [dpa,
2016], [EUB, 2016]. Within the METRO full-scale tests (see Section 1.3.3), ignition
sources and interior material performance have been identified as the key answers to
the question if a fire will spread or not [Ingason et al., 2012]. Unfortunately, these
two factors are slightly diffuse. Firstly, many transportation companies obtain new
vehicles more or less continuously. This results in diverse fleets with varying ages
and product performances. Secondly, the standardised ignition models applicable to
many interior components are intended to cover minor arson. More intense events,
e.g. severe arson, luggage fires, or high-voltage failures, may exceed the performance
level assured by the standards.
On the basis of the arguments stated above, four major fire scenarios have been
identified as subsets of carriage fires. First of all, the two major generations of BVG
vehicles serving on U8 and U9 will be incorporated. Hence, the models BR F and
BR H, which represent varying operation times between approximately 10 and 30
years, are considered. Further on, a generalised fire scenario is utilised. The latter is
supposed to represent a multitude of different train models, e.g. if no insights into
the fire performance of a particular vehicle are available. Finally, a self-extinguishing
fire scenario will be examined in order to account for either low ignition initials,
advantageous material performance, and/or staff intervention.
With regards to the protection goal life safety, the occurrence of a fully developed
fire would yield extensive heat release rates and fuel mass fluxes accordingly. The
latter may result in a remarkable release of soot and toxic eﬄuents, which are likely
to affect the entire station. However, also a self-extinguishing fire may be challenging
for the design. Since the lower heat release will result in a less buoyant hot gas layer,
it may impede the formation of smoke-free layers.
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Moreover, a fully developed car fire also challenges the structural integrity of the
built environment. This problem will, however, not be addressed in this study.
Luggage Fire In the field of rail transport, luggage fires are associated with a
considerable risk. For instance, they are considered as one of five designated ignition
models during the design phase of rail vehicles [DIN EN 45545-1, 2013]. Consequently,
luggage fires ought to be considered for the assessment of infrastructures as well.
Studies on amounts of luggage in underground stations have been conducted in the
frame of the METRO project (see Section 1.3.3). It has been found that 82 % of
all passengers carried some sort of luggage. Depending on the weekday, the luggage
weight per passenger varied between 3.5 and 4.5 kg. The most frequent contents were
textiles, paper, and electronic devices [Ingason et al., 2012, pp. 28-30], while latter
may represent a potential ignition source. The moderate heat and smoke release is
supposed to represent the lower boundary of the overall scenario set. However, the
work of Bulk showed that luggage fires may emit remarkable amounts of toxic and/or
irritant eﬄuents [Bulk, 2015]. Finally, another particularity is the fact that a luggage
fire may effectively occur throughout the entire station.
With the goal of assessing life safety, the challenging characteristics of this scenario
subset are mainly the limited stratification of a stable hot gas layer as well as the
emission of irritant fire eﬄuents. The impact on the structure is, however, expected
to be negligible.
Retail Unit Fire Since the concourse level hosts multiple retail units, a corre-
sponding fire has been considered as an additional fire scenario. Retail spaces, in
particular, are characterised by high fuel loads and comparatively high fire growth
rates. In order to cope with these characteristics, a number of safety measures has
been implemented over the station’s service time. The latter are considered for the
configuration of this scenario subset as well. Firstly, an automatic fire suppression
system is installed throughout all retail spaces. Secondly, the conventional ventilation
system serves as smoke and heat extraction system once triggered by the fire detection
system. The relevant technical specifications of both systems have been presented in
this section as well as in Section 1.2.3. For the upcoming analyses, a proper operation
of the sprinkler system is assumed. Moreover, the upcoming quantitative risk analysis
as well as investigations concerning structural integrity will utilise an additional sce-
nario subset without sprinkler intervention. This scenario will, however, be excluded
within this study.
78
CHAPTER 4. FIRE SIMULATION
The intended challenges induced by the sprinklered scenario are manifold. For
sure, the impact on the lower levels will be marginal. However, in spatial terms, the
concourse level has a very strategic meaning since it unifies all means of escape. In
this respect, a sprinklered scenario will yield moderate but remarkable heat and smoke
spread into the concourse area. The latter provides a rather non-convex geometry,
which is frequently obscured by massive pillars. With regards to the Daegu incident
study (see Section 1.2.2), these circumstances may impact occupant-related processes,
e.g. way-finding, or recognition of evacuation cues.
4.3.1 Fire Locations
Because of the spacious built environment and the non-trivial escape route system,
an important role has been assigned to the locations that correspond to the afore-
mentioned fire scenarios. A couple of studies support this focus. For instance, Chen
et al. conducted numerical studies on the formation of stack effects during fire events
in subway stations [Chen et al., 2003]. Their results imply that the propagation
of smoke may distinctively depend on the question which opening is reached first.
In other words, once a certain flow regime has established, the system may remain
in equilibrium as long as further conditions only change marginally. Hence, labile
systems may be prone to minor changes. In temporal terms, these kind of changes
may be induced, e.g. by time-dependent heat release rates or background airflows.
However, with respect to the spatial conditions, asymmetries may influence the smoke
dynamics. The results of numerical studies on mechanical smoke extraction systems
in [Schmidt, 2015] and [Schro¨der et al., 2016] back these thoughts. Similar findings
of the importance of fire locations in connection to expected occupant scenarios are
discussed in [Nilsson and Fahy, 2016].
Given the insights stated above, nine fire locations throughout the entire station
have been defined. In this respect, each level is subdivided into three single locations.
In case of the platform levels, they are – as far as possible – evenly distributed
along one particular track. Hence, no further variations among the tracks of one
platform level are made. To varying degrees, the final positions along the tracks were
indicated by operational aspects (e.g. stopping points), the carriage dimensions, and
mesh alignment limitations. Finally, three different locations have been distributed
across the concourse level as well. Aiming at a reasonable placement of the luggage
fire, the positions were slightly adjusted towards the platforms and concourse areas.
A graphical overview of the nine fire locations is given in Figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.3: Distribution of nine fire locations across the station.
4.3.2 Design Fires
In order to quantify the fire scenarios verbally defined above, six different design
fires have been selected. In principle, they can be grouped into fires with high,
medium, and low heat releases. Obviously, the high-energetic fires comprise the
fully developed rail car fires, whereas a medium heat release is represented by the
sprinklered retail unit fire. Finally, low-energetic fires incorporate both a luggage fire
and a self-extinguishing fire inside a rail car.
High-energetic Fires In general, a fully developed rail car fire yields multiple
magnitudes of MW heat release. However, the development of heat release and/or
other related quantities over time significantly depends on multiple factors, such as
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ignition initials, material performance, or ventilation amongst many others. In order
to cover a maximum variety concerning these questions, a set of three design fires
has been agreed upon. Contrary to preliminary works, e.g. [Schro¨der et al., 2014]
or [Schmidt, 2015], this study refrains from a t-squared approach for the formulation
of a time-dependent heat release. Instead, existing studies of the fire performance of
BVG rolling stock as well as a regulatory design fires are utilised.
Firstly, the operating rolling stock of BVG is considered. Both lines U8 and U9
are served by the vehicle generations BR F and BR H. A comprehensive study of
the fire performance of the latter has been conducted in [Wilk, 2010]. The presented
data for these two vehicles is extracted from this report.
BR F especially has successively been delivered and redesigned over a period of
21 years from 1973 to 1994 [BVG, 2007]. Since the retirement of the very first BR F
vehicles is already ongoing, the F 84 generation has been chosen as a representative
with intermediate age. Depending on the daytime, BR F can be operated in two-car,
four-car and six-car configurations. Each single carriage is a separate unit with a
length of approximately 16 m and has three doors per side. The design fire curve of
BR F starts with an almost linear increase of HRR to roughly 500 kW within the first
10 minutes. In the period between the tenth and twentieth minute, HRR increases
exponentially to 6.5 MW. The maximum HRR of approximately 16.5 MW is reached
after about 25 minutes and lasts until the end of the observation time.
BR H has been delivered since 1995 and represents the most recent generation of
BVG rolling stock. In contrast to BR F, it is exclusively operated as an inseparable
six-car trainset with a total length of 98 m. The trainset is entirely accessible and
provides a total number of 18 doors per side. Identical to BR F, HRR is initially
predicted to increase to 500 kW within the first 10 minutes. Contrary to BR F, the
HRR remains on this level for another five minutes but then also increases to 6.5 MW
after 20 minutes. Beginning at that time, HRR advances exponentially up to 45 MW
until 30 minutes after ignition.
In the sense of comparable and transferable results, the regulatory design fire
agreed in TRStrab BS is considered as well [TRStrab BS, 2014]. The technical rule
postulates the application of a generalised design fire if no other knowledge about
the fire performance of a particular vehicle is available. Hence, the design fire is
supposed to envelope the variety of different tram and underground vehicles operated
in Germany. In general, it is determined by the length of a constructionally separated
unit, which means that the plateau and decay phase are dependent on the length of
one unit. Based on a single 16 m long BR F carriage, the corresponding curve has
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been derived as follows. In comparison to the BVG curves, the TRStrab BS design
fire initially yields a lower heat release rate. However, beginning at the second minute
after ignition, a remarkably higher heat release is assumed, which results in an HRR
of about 5.5 MW after 10 minutes. Finally, HRR reaches its maximum of 22 MW
19 minutes after ignition and starts decaying after 23 minutes.
Figure 4.4 provides an overview of the introduced design fires. Please note that
both the time and the HRR axes have been subdivided in order to assure a better
differentiation between the development and fully-developed fire phases.
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Figure 4.4: High-energetic design fires including BVG vehicle generations BR F,
BR H, and the generalised TR16 envelope curve.
Medium-energetic Fires The transition to medium heat release rates is repre-
sented by a design fire that serves for the fire scenarios in the retail units located in
the concourse level, where an operating sprinkler system has been assumed. For this
purpose, a quadratic formulation is applied in order to describe the dynamic devel-
opment of heat release. For the parametrisation of the latter, the recommendations
applicable to retail spaces given in [DIN EN 1991-1-2/NA, 2015] and [vfdb, 2013] are
used. The expected fast fire growth is specified by α = 0.047 kW s−2. Accordingly, the
heat release rate per unit area is assumed to be 250 kW m−2. In order to represent the
intended intervention by the sprinkler system, it is important to consider the techni-
cal specifications of both the sprinkler system and the SHE system, which have been
presented in Section 1.2.3. For the given geometries of all three retail unit locations
(see Figure 4.3), preliminary studies revealed a maximum sprinkler activation time of
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about 150 seconds. Referring to the squared fire growth, this yields an HRR of about
1 MW after activation. Regarding the sprinkler system, this result is based on the
following specifications: TActivation = 68
◦C and RTI = 200 m1/2s1/2. Normal response
sprinklers generally cover RTI s ranging from 80 to 200 m1/2s1/2 and assuming lower
RTI s would yield lower activation times. Unfortunately, the manufacturer could not
provide more detailed information. Thus, in the sense of conservatism, the upper
bound has been applied in this situation. In addition to that, varied activation times
of the SHE system have been found to be negligible for the determination of the sprin-
kler activation time. This insight can obviously be attributed to the comparatively
low volume flows of the SHE system.
Once the sprinkler system has been activated, the fire is suppressed or extin-
guished. Representing a proper sprinkler intervention is an advanced topic that can
be assessed in different ways. For instance, FDS includes a sprinkler model that di-
rectly interacts with the conservation equations and the combustion model. Another
alternative is to describe the sprinkler intervention by empirical relations. For this
purpose, a variety of different recommendations is available [VDI, 2006a; vfdb, 2013].
The ORPHEUS project agreed on the following approach. After activation, HRR
remains constant for 300 seconds and than decays linearly down to zero for another
300 seconds. The constant phase especially may be considered as very conservative
since some studies show a rather more effective suppression. However, in order to
account for other uncertainties, e.g. shadowing effects, the constant phase appears
to be appropriate. Nevertheless, the empirical approach implies some limitations.
For instance, the disruption of a stratified hot gas layer will not be considered. This
effect will surely be significant inside the considered compartment, but the ceiling
jet entering the concourse area should already be less affected by that. In addition,
vaporisation effects are neglected, which could have an influence on visibility or irri-
tancy conditions inside the concourse area. The derived design fire for the sprinklered
retail unit fire is visualised in Figure 4.5.
83
4.3. FIRE SCENARIOS
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
t in min
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
H
R
R
 i
n
 M
W
Retail
Figure 4.5: Medium-energetic design fire represented by a sprinklered retail unit fire
(Retail).
Low-energetic Fires Finally, the low orders of heat release are represented by
the design fires belonging to scenarios for a luggage fire on the platform and a self-
extinguishing fire inside a rail car. Both are presented in Figure 4.6.
A number of studies on the fire behaviour of luggage items has been conducted
throughout the past years [Ingason et al., 2012; Bulk, 2015]. In addition to that,
standards such as [DIN EN 45545-1, 2013] provide ignition models that are supposed
to cover these orders of magnitudes as well. The studies of Bulk probably provide
the most reliable statistics in terms of experimentation. He tested a total number of
eight different luggage types, which have been packed in order to represent a variety of
different passenger types and travel purposes. According to the experimental results,
the development phase has been approximated with an αt2 approach, whereas the fire
growth has been determined as α = 0.002 931 kW s−2. The maximum HRR adds up
to 120 kW and is reached after 200 seconds. This HRR is maintained for a duration of
18 minutes after ignition. Between the 20th and 60th minute, HRR linearly decreases
to zero.
A rail car fire that does not advance to the full developed phase appears to be
reasonable to cover variable outcomes once an ignition has taken place. However, the
quantification of this scenario is a demanding task. Once again, the fire dynamics may
be drastically influenced by ignition initial, vehicle performance, or extend and time
of intervention. In order to ensure comparability and transferability of the results,
the initial design fire postulated in TRStrab BS has been chosen [TRStrab BS, 2014].
Given this design fire, the development phase is represented by a linear increase
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of HRR up to 120 kW within the first five minutes. The short-term peak HRR of
150 kW is reached after eight minutes. Beginning from that time HRR linearly decays
to zero within the next 22 minutes. This design fire is intended to be the initial for
the assessment of the ignition behaviour of a rail car’s interior materials. In other
words, its straight-forward application is based on the assumption that the interior
materials will not contribute to the combustion process. In practice, however, this will
be the case to some extend but the proper quantification of the underlying pyrolysis
processes is a very sophisticated task, which has been excluded here. Further reading
on underlying difficulties can be found in [Meunders et al., 2014]. The application in
rail vehicles has been investigated in further works, e.g. [Camillo, 2013], [Bansemer,
2015], and [Bulk, 2015].
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Figure 4.6: Low-energetic design fires representing a burning luggage item (Luggage)
and a self-extinguishing fire inside a rail car (TRIn).
4.3.3 Climatic Conditions
One of the major objectives of this study is a more specific consideration of cli-
matic conditions in the frame of FSE analyses. Hence, the definition of initial and
boundary conditions plays an important role. A comprehensive summary of the data
basis and the developed approach to implement climatic conditions has been pre-
sented in Chapter 3.1. Based on the assumption that the climate is predominantly
temperature-driven, both summer and winter conditions shall be incorporated. In
order to investigate possible differences to normal conditions, a default simulation
configuration is included as well. Beside the definitions of global ambient conditions,
the climate model consists of two additional components. Firstly, all openings are
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endued with vents that are set on a specific gas temperature. Secondly, initial zones
with the mean temperatures of the adjacent vents are placed on all three major lev-
els. Moreover, the inner temperature of all concrete building elements is considered
as well. For this purpose, a functional relation between the mean temperatures of all
three initial zones and the inside wall temperatures has been derived from field mea-
surements. The introduced configurations are summarised in Table 4.6. All remaining
parameter specifications are kept unchanged.
Table 4.6: Overview of considered climatic conditions and subsequent definition of
initial and boundary conditions.
Configuration Summer Winter Default
Ambient conditions
Tamb in
◦C 25 -9 20
Initial and boundary conditions
TU8 in
◦C 24 15 20
TU9 in
◦C 29 15 20
TCL in
◦C 27 3 20
Twall in
◦C 24 12 20
4.4 Sampling
All relevant elements for the generation of multiple fire scenarios are now prepared.
As discussed in Chapter 2, a bottom-up approach for life safety analysis in case of fire
shall be conducted. Henceforth, no initial (risk-based) selection process is applied to
the set of fire scenarios in advance. In other words, a full-factorial sampling approach
that incorporates all discrete combinations of climatic conditions, fire locations, and
design fires has been performed. In total, this approach yields 108 fire scenarios. In
order to structure the experimental design, the fire simulation ensemble has been spilt
up into three sub-ensembles each of them representing one of the three levels, U8,
U9, and concourse. The corresponding matrices are provided in Appendix A.1.
The entire simulation setup was conducted with the help of FDSgeogen, which
is a Python framework for the automated setup and processing of FDS simulations.
The necessary inputs are provided in hierarchical XML format. This combination
allows for a very convenient and powerful utilisation of conditional statements and
constraints that shall be incorporated into the design of experiment. It has already
been successfully applied during the preliminary studies in [Schro¨der et al., 2014] and
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[Schmidt, 2015]. Additional reading – with a focus on optimisation problems – can
be found in [Meunders et al., 2014].
The parametrisation conducted by FDSgeogen covers the implementation of the
described design fires, fire locations, and all relevant initial and boundary conditions
in order to represent climatic aspects. In addition to that, an extensive write-out of
data needs to be set up for the upcoming post-processing. The built environment itself
has been incorporated into the workflow as plain FDS input, utilising the third party
software PyroSim. Once all relevant parametrisation tasks have been completed,
FDSgeogen runs over all scenario specifications and builds the FDS input file for
each scenario.
4.5 Preliminary Analysis
As soon as all simulations have been set up and computed, the focus can be set on
the data analysis, which is probably the most challenging task. However, first of all,
the basic requirements and needs for this task shall be reconsidered. With regards to
the spatial extend of the built environment and the complexity of the introduced
parameter space, the data analysis has to be advanced accordingly. Firstly, the
analysis has to account for the spatial distribution of the fire simulation output data
as discussed in Section 2.4.3. Secondly, an appropriate method is necessary to explore
the responses of the simulation ensemble finally and derive generalisable information
from the data.
Data Basis FDS provides spatiotemporal data of multiple physical quantities,
which can be written out in a number of different ways. An overview of quanti-
ties that will be included in the upcoming analysis has been provided in Table 2.1.
In this study, time series of planar slices throughout the computational domain are
mainly utilised. This choice provides a two-dimensional coverage of all domain areas,
which are aligned to the floor. Since the spatial discretisation of FDS does not allow
for slanted slices, additional sensors (referred to as devices in FDS ) provide time series
of a certain quantity at a given place. This is particularly necessary for monitoring
the staircase areas.
In FSE practice, data analysis is usually driven by the question if and when a
certain threshold of an arbitrary quantity is exceeded. Hence, the analysis depends
on certain numbers, which are referred to as tenability or acceptance criteria. The
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ORPHEUS project has agreed upon a set of these criteria, which have been discussed
in Section 2.4.2.
Challenges As introduced in Section 2.4, ASET is determined by evaluating the
time series of a particular performance criterion at a given space. The violation of
a corresponding threshold then represents ASET. This straightforward analysis was
conducted in the frame of preliminary studies, e.g. [Schro¨der et al., 2014; Schmidt,
2015; Schro¨der et al., 2016].
However, the data exploration becomes more elaborate with increasing numbers
of quantities that shall be included into the analysis, e.g. for the simultaneous as-
sessment of optical conditions, temperatures, gas concentrations and so on. Conse-
quently, the analysis then yields a set of different times, whose minimum is supposed
to represent ASET. A generalised example of this understanding with two imaginary
quantities a and b is illustrated in Figure 4.7.
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Figure 4.7: Schematic times series of two arbitrary quantities exceeding their corre-
sponding thresholds.
Another challenge is the fact that the information retrieval is solely valid for one
given location (x0, y0, z0). In compartmentalised environments, this approach may
provide a sufficient coverage of the spatiotemporal fire dynamics. However, in spacious
environments, it may potentially result in both underestimations or overestimations.
In particular, the case study of this work provides open-plan compartment areas of
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multiple thousands square metres. Henceforth, the data analysis shall be conducted
in a way that accounts for the spacious domain.
4.5.1 ASET Maps
In order to cope with the above-mentioned challenges, a map representation of ASET
is introduced in order to get a better understanding of the spatiotemporal dynamics
and the multi-criterial characteristics of this number. For demonstration purposes,
the fire scenario f001 is utilised, which represents a carriage fire in the U8 level as
shown in Figure 4.8.
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Figure 4.8: Top view on the U8 level. Four staircases connect the platform with the
U9 level. Both tracks are occupied by a six-car trainset. The seat of fire is assumed
in the carriage marked red.
The proposed method utilises the FDS slice files of the quantities introduced in
Section 2.4.2. These two-dimensional time series provide a higher information content
throughout the domain. An exemplary sequence of slices is provided in Figure 4.9
visualising the extinction coefficient inside the U8 level throughout the analysis time.
The slices are aligned with the floor at a height of 1.95 m. Here, the intention
of the proposed approach becomes apparent. The asymmetric configuration of this
particular scenario yields a spatial distribution of the optical conditions along the
platform.
With the help of a corresponding tenability criterion serving as threshold, it is
possible to distinguish between areas with acceptable and unacceptable conditions.
This insight, however, still relies on the actual time point which is evaluated. In other
words: the introduced data format has to be extended by the time dimension. Prior
to that, some discretisation aspects regarding time and space have to be considered.
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Figure 4.9: Two-dimensional slices through the U8 level aligned with the floor and
visualising the state of extinction over a period of 20 minutes. Red areas indicate
extinction coefficients greater than 0.23 m−1.
What time interval appears to be appropriate for determining ASET ? For numerical
reasons and depending on the specified dump times, FDS can provide enormous
amounts of data resolved on a scale of split seconds. However, for the most engineering
questions, coarser resolutions are sufficient, but what time scales are appropriate for
assessing life safety in case of fire? seconds? minutes? The same applies to extents
of safety and/or error margins. In terms of these questions, talking about minutes
appears to be reasonable. Moreover, the spatial resolution of the analysis needs to
be addressed. Since it is obviously not reasonable to decide about tenability within
discretisation scales required by means of numerical accuracy, the latter is chosen as
dx = 60 cm. Larger scales may be prone to disregarding filigree building components.
With these conventions being established, a three-dimensional stack consisting of
the two-dimensional slices can now be set up. The necessary data preparation is
conducted by the JPSfire framework. In this respect, the stack’s third dimension
represents time. As discussed above, a time step of one minute results in a stack
length of 21 slices in order to cover the overall analysis time of 20 minutes. Hence,
the entire spatiotemporal dynamics of one particular quantity have been aggregated
into one object. In the next step, the analysis routine iterates over every single control
element and time step within this object. Based on the tenability criteria introduced
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in Table 2.1, it can be decided for each iteration step if the evaluated value represents
tenable or untenable conditions. In the latter case, the current iteration time step
then represents ASET for a given location. If no tenability criterion is exceeded,
ASET is assigned to a time of 21 minutes. The output of this process step is a time
map representing the spatial distribution of ASET related to one particular quantity.
In the next instance, this algorithm is applied to the entire set of quantities relevant
for the upcoming life safety analysis. Three of the resulting ASET maps applicable to
extinction coefficient, temperature, and carbon monoxide are exemplarily illustrated
in Figure 4.10.
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Figure 4.10: Single ASET maps exemplarily generated for extinction coefficient, tem-
perature, and carbon monoxide. The colour map has been discretised into intervals
of three minutes. Grey fields represent areas obstructed by the built environment.
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Once all relevant single maps have been computed, the global minima out of all
control elements and quantities are determined and stored in a consolidated ASET
map. This final step yields a two-dimensional object describing the overall ASET for
a set of locations in the domain. An exemplary map of the U8 level is illustrated in
Figure 4.11. The basic logic of this routine is presented in Appendix B.1.
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Figure 4.11: Consolidated ASET map derived from the entire set of incorporated
quantities. Applicable for the U8 level and the fire scenario f001.
In comparison to the single ASET maps (see Figure 4.10), it can be concluded
that ASET is predominantly determined by the extinction. For this particular fire
scenario, it becomes evident that there is a spatial distribution of ASET throughout
the platform level. In close proximity to the seat of fire (top left), untenable condi-
tions establish within less than two minutes. More distant areas remain available for
durations of up to 18 minutes.
Once a map representing ASET has been set up, it is possible to determine the
distribution of ASET as shown in Figure 4.12. Technically, this conversion reduces
the two-dimensional maps to a one-dimensional data series. However, the absolute
number of control elements provides information on the spatial frequency of a partic-
ular ASET. In order to maintain this information, the distributions are intentionally
visualised and handled non-normalised.
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Figure 4.12: Histogram showing the frequencies of ASET in the U8 level applicable
for the fire scenario f001.
The distribution clearly illustrates the wide range of ASET s that may occur for
this particular scenario. The left bars of the distribution are control elements, where
tenability thresholds have been exceeded rather immediately. The bars on the right
side represent control elements, where tenability is maintained for up to 20 minutes.
In contrast to other works, e.g. [Schro¨der et al., 2014], [Albrecht, 2012] or [Kong
et al., 2016], this distribution does not yet account for the variability induced by
a set of fire scenarios but for the spatiotemporal dynamics of one fire scenario. In
the next instance, the ASET distribution itself has to be understood as a function
of every single sample within the design space. This data representation then truly
accounts for the challenges discussed in Chapter 2.4.3. In order to obtain a better
understanding of the distributions of ASET and the underlying impact of the design
of experiment, a correlation analysis will be conducted.
4.5.2 Correlation Analysis
A correlation analysis requires a certain measure that allows for the comparison of the
particular samples within the fire simulation ensemble. This measure will be derived
from the comparison of distributions. For this purpose, a huge variety of distance
metrics is available [Myatt, 2007]. However, not solely the similarity of distributions
but also their proximity to the initial state shall be addressed. This state is repre-
sented by the histogram of an ASET map, whose control elements are entirely greater
than 20 minutes (here: 21 minutes). The counterpart is the histogram of an ASET
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map representing a particular fire scenario. Given these two distributions, a distance
metric inspired by the earth mover’s distance (EMD) has been applied [Pele and Wer-
man, 2008, 2009]. It represents the effort which is necessary to transform the ASET
map of the fire scenario to the ASET map representing the initial state. In contrast
to conventional FSE analyses, this measure does not have a direct physical meaning.
It basically represents the cumulative product of a particular time difference between
ASET and the initial state and its number of occurrences. Since each observation
corresponds to an area (0.36 m2 per control element of the map in this case), it may
also be understood as time × area, which is necessary to recover the initial state of a
particular control element. Based on the ASET map of the U8 level, the basic idea
is illustrated in Figure 4.13.
EMD 
Figure 4.13: ASET map histograms of fire scenario f001 (red) and initial state (green)
in the U8 level. The frequency of control elements with an ASET less than and equal
21 minutes is illustrated. The EMD-inspired metric represents the necessary effort to
transform f001 to the initial state.
In order to facilitate the multivariate analysis of a multitude of scenarios, a scalar
score is necessary to capture the development of ASET within the entire station.
For this purpose, the EMDs of all three levels are summed up to a global score
EMDASET=21 min. In this respect, a high score corresponds to a high effort in order to
recover the initial state (ASET is 21 minutes). Figure 4.14 provides a first overview
of the impact of the particular fire scenario parameters. For this purpose, all three
locations, six design fires, and three climate conditions are plotted against the intro-
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duced distance metric. The sequence of the design fires corresponds to the total heat
release and the colouring visualises at which level a fire was assumed.
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Figure 4.14: Scatter matrix illustrating the impact of the fire scenario parameters
location, design fire, and climate on the EMD. Design fires are ordered by total heat
release.
In principle, it becomes evident that the EMDs remarkably scatter in a range from
almost zero up to 2.5×105. In other words, there are severe fire scenarios but also
ones with minor consequences. In contrast to the outer scatter plots, the emerging
structure illustrated in the central scatter plot demonstrates that the development of
ASET is predominantly driven by the design fires. This fact is not surprising and
generally acknowledged in the field of FSE. However, there are distinct fluctuations
within the single design fires, which imply that both location and climate appear
to be influential inside these scenario subsets. Another observation is that the most
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severe TR16 fire occurs in the lowest level (U8). Interestingly, this effect seems to
vanish for the BR F and BR H fires. The same applies to the low-energetic fires,
i.e. TRIn and Luggage. In this respect, the luggage fire yields remarkably variable
impacts on ASET throughout the station. In comparison to the latter, the Retail fire
yields comparable consequences.
In order to gather more insights into the impact of the fire location and climatic
conditions, the correlation analysis has been separated based on the insight that the
system is predominantly driven by the design fire. For this purpose, the classifi-
cation into high-, medium-, and low-energetic fires, which has been introduced in
Section 4.3.2, is applied. Figure 4.15 provides the associated results applicable to the
high-energetic design fires, which exclusively occur in the platform levels.
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Figure 4.15: Separated analysis of high-energetic design fires regarding the impact of
fire locations and climatic conditions on the EMD.
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The differentiated analysis reveals additional insights into the impact of both fire
locations and climatic conditions. For all three design fires, it becomes apparent that
a fire in the centre of the U8 level (location 2) yields the most adverse impact on
ASET. Contrary to that, the centred fire in the U9 level results in a more advanta-
geous development of ASET. This finding only weakly applies to BR H fire since the
inter-accessible trainset yields a less punctual emission of smoke and fire eﬄuents.
Moreover, a fire at location 3 on the U8 level appears to swap the observed hierar-
chy between the levels. This observation may be explained by the winding staircase
towards the surface and the comparatively high hot gas layer temperatures in front
of the latter. Finally, distinct climatic influences are observable for scenarios, where
winter conditions have been set.
Figure 4.16 provides the correlation plots corresponding to the medium-energetic
fire scenarios. Note that the latter only occur in the concourse level.
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Figure 4.16: Separated analysis of medium-energetic design fires regarding the impact
of fire locations and climatic conditions on the EMD.
Once again, the variations of fire location and climate lead to remarkably different
results. With regards to the placement of the fire, location 2 yields the lowest ASET s
throughout the concourse. In addition to that, a significant impact of the climatic
conditions has been revealed. Winter conditions consequently result in less adverse
developments of ASET than summer and default conditions. In conjunction with a
fire located in close proximity to a staircase towards the surface, the majority of fire
eﬄuents is literally flushed out of the concourse.
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Figure 4.17 comprises the correlation plots corresponding to the low-energetic fire
scenarios. Here, the Luggage fires may occur throughout the entire station. The
TRIn scenario is solely assumed in the platform levels.
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Figure 4.17: Separated analysis of low-energetic design fires regarding the impact of
fire locations and climatic conditions on the EMD.
The low-energetic fire scenarios provide extremely fluctuating results regarding
the development of ASET. With regards to the TRIn scenarios, the fire location
yields rather similar findings as for to the high-energetic fires. A centred placement
in the platform levels results in the most adverse effects. However, the most distinct
influence is again caused by the climate since all scenarios configured with winter
conditions are limited to very localised decreases of ASET. This observation can be
explained by dilution, which is caused by the established air movements inside the
station. Moreover, in case of summer and default climate conditions, the fires in
the lowest level (U8) are slightly more severe. Regarding the Luggage scenarios, the
development of ASET becomes more complex. For instance, the fires placed on the
platform levels correspond to remarkable influences caused by the particular locations.
Location 1 on both U8 and U9 especially yields comparatively severe consequences. In
addition, no systematic differences between the fires either on U8 or U9 are observable.
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Moreover, the fires occurring on the concourse yield slightly less severe consequences.
Nevertheless, these findings again depend on the climatic conditions. The winter
case, for instance, reveals the expected hierarchy between the levels. Obviously,
this effect does, however, not apply to summer and default conditions. There may
be multiple explanations for the observations stated above. On the one hand, the
Luggage scenarios are assigned with different combustible characteristics. On the
other hand, the source term may potentially be too extensive for dilution but still
too marginal to affect three levels simultaneously. This probably is the reason for
the higher consequences of the fires placed on U9 since they definitively affect the
spacious concourse as well, which does not necessarily apply to fires in the U8 level.
In addition to these thoughts, the low heat release implies a labile hot gas layer
stratification and, thus, causes faster smoke spread into the staircases. In case of the
platform levels, this mechanism may be an explanation for the increased importance
of the fire locations.
4.6 Summary
The fire scenario ensemble has been set up with the aim to introduce certain variabil-
ities to the subsystem. For this purpose, three main parameters have been varied:
design fire, fire location and climatic conditions. The latter have been incorporated by
a full-factorial sampling, which yielded 108 fire scenarios. For quantifying the conse-
quences of all samples, multiple quantities have been utilised to compute ASET maps
for each level of the station. Inspired by a commonly used distance metric (EMD),
the effort to transform the ASET maps of a particular scenario to an initial state has
been computed. This scalar score describes the development of ASET throughout
the entire station and represents the consequences corresponding to a particular fire
scenario.
The subsequent correlation analysis revealed distinct margins of consequences
within the fire scenario ensemble. As expected, the design fires have been identified
as the key determinant for that. In concrete terms, the consequences of the design
fires can be ranked as follows: TR16, BR F, Luggage, BR H, Retail, and finally
TRIn. It is notable here that both Luggage and Retail fires may yield upper margins
of consequences, which are comparable to the BVG carriage fires. Additionally, these
design fires correspond to highly variable consequences. In order to gain a better
understanding of these variabilities, the correlation analysis has been separated based
upon the particular design fires.
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This analysis step revealed interesting insights concerning the impact of the fire
locations. For instance, the impact of the level at which a fire is occurring is more
complex than initially assumed. Only in case of the TR16 scenarios, a fire on the
lowest level (U8) yields the most adverse consequences with regards to the entire
station. In case of the remaining two carriage fires as well as the low-energetic fires,
this effect, however, seems to be superposed by additional influences. The latter are,
for instance, the varied locations within one level. Here, it has been found that a
centred location in U8 and the outer ones in U9 yield the most severe consequences.
For the Retail fire, the opposite observations were made. In this case, the fire location
most remote from any staircase causes the most adverse conditions. In other words,
the proximity to upward staircases obtains an important role.
Besides these spatial aspects, also the climatic conditions have been found to affect
the development of ASET. With regards to high-energetic fires on the U8 level, winter
conditions yield more severe developments of ASET. In these cases, the established
airflows obviously abet the smoke spread into more remote areas. However, this does
not equally apply to similar fires on the U9 level. In case of both medium- and low-
energetic fires, opposite observations were made. In concrete terms, winter conditions
induce higher ASET s throughout the station. These findings can mainly be explained
by two observed effects. On the one hand, the airflows within the station dilute the
smoke eﬄuents and on the other hand, the established air movements additionally
support the natural ventilation towards the surface.
Up to now, the analysis has been based on the spatial and temporal extent of
ASET throughout the station. However, this summarised view does not yet account
for the relations to the subsystem Evacuation. In other words, the globally most
adverse development of ASET may not necessarily provide the most challenging con-
ditions for a certain set of evacuation scenarios. The development of the latter will
therefor be addressed in the following chapter.
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Evacuation Simulation
This chapter covers the subsystem Evacuation. Firstly, a brief summary of the applied
software framework and computational aspects is given. In the following section, the
geometrical representation of Osloer Straße is discussed. One of the chapter’s centre-
pieces is the configuration of the occupant scenario ensemble. The basic components
of the latter are subdivided into built environment, safety measures, occupancy &
occupants as well as hazard. The consolidation of these components as occupant
scenarios is discussed within the design of experiment section. Finally, a preliminary
analysis of the reference evacuation ensemble is presented. The latter is based on an
extended approach utilising maps for the representation of RSET.
5.1 Evacuation Model and Computation
5.1.1 Evacuation Model
Besides ensemble simulations for multiple fire scenarios, another ensemble is set up
for the subsystem Evacuation. For the computation of the latter, the Ju¨lich Pedes-
trian Simulator (JuPedSim) version 0.8 has been utilised [Kemloh et al., 2016]. The
software framework covers the simulation, analysis, and visualisation of pedestrian dy-
namics and is developed at Forschungszentrum Ju¨lich. It arose from the OpenPedSim
framework [Kemloh Wagoum et al., 2014] in 2013 and has been developed continu-
ously in the frame of multiple research projects. The framework consists of four major
components: JPScore, JPSvis, JPSreport, and JPSeditor. The JPScore module per-
forms the microscopic computation of the pedestrian’s trajectories. JPSvis can be
used for the visualisation of the geometry and the trajectories. JPSreport provides
multiple methods for analysing pedestrians’ trajectories and JPSeditor, finally, allows
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for the setup of geometries. Further reading can be found in [Kemloh Wagoum et al.,
2015].
The primary purpose of JuPedSim is academic use. It is supposed to equip re-
searchers with a convenient software framework which provides major features for
investigating pedestrian dynamics. In turn, the focus is exclusively set on particu-
lar research interests. As a consequence of this philosophy, JuPedSim or especially
JPScore involves a variety of implementations throughout all model levels. In this
respect, model levels refer to the hierarchy of motion as introduced in Section 1.3.1.
The submodels, which have been applied within this thesis are summarised in the
following paragraphs.
Operational Level This level covers the modelling of the pedestrian’s movement
within the computational domain, which is represented in continuous space. Amongst
others, a velocity-based model introduced by Tordeux [Tordeux et al., 2016] is avail-
able and applied in this thesis. It represents a collision-free, first-order model, which
consists of two submodels. The first submodel computes an optimal velocity depend-
ing on the minimum spacing in front of a given pedestrian. The computation of the
movement direction is covered by the second submodel. Moreover, the model assumes
a pedestrian as a symmetrical circle, whose diameter represents the shoulder width.
Tactical Level JPScore provides a multitude of different route choice models. In
principle, every route choice algorithm is based on a navigation graph, which is gen-
erated out of the specified geometry. Moreover, variable algorithms can be applied to
the navigation graph resulting in varying route choice patterns such as local shortest,
global shortest, or quickest path. A comprehensive summary of the different imple-
mentations can be found in [Kemloh Wagoum, 2013]. In the frame of this thesis, the
global shortest path router is applied.
5.1.2 Computation
Since the computational effort of evacuation simulations is moderate in comparison
to the CFD-based fire simulations, a serial computation strategy has been chosen for
each simulation run. Pedestrian simulation models usually utilise a randomised ini-
tialisation, which is controlled by a so-called seed value. The purpose of this approach
is to introduce a certain variability of selected criteria such as initial agent positions,
distributions for walking speeds, or pre-movement times amongst others. Having said
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that, a particular simulation setup requires multiple computational realisations in
order to achieve converging results.
Convergence of Results General or minimum recommendations for a sufficient
number of realisations are rarely provided, e.g. in the German RiMEA guideline,
which states a minimum of ten realisations [RiMEA, 2016]. A more specific estimate
can be made with the help of a convergence analysis. However, determining the
convergence of evacuation simulations is a rather sophisticated task which heavily
depends on the utilised model, the scenario specifications, and finally the evaluated
convergence criteria. A potential approach utilising the differences between the evac-
uation curves (time t vs. number of occupants N) has been proposed by Lovreglio
[Lovreglio et al., 2014]. One limitation of this approach is that these curves can solely
be derived for one particular exit.
In order to capture the spatiotemporal dynamics of the evacuation process, the
utilisation of the raw simulation output may be valuable, namely the pedestrians’
trajectories. However, determining the difference of trajectories is computationally
demanding and may probably yield no convergence at all. In this study, a new method
is introduced, which is based on a map representation of the pedestrian dynamics. In
concrete terms, the pedestrians’ trajectories are used to map the maximum clearing
time corresponding to each discrete map element. These so-called RSET maps are
further described in Section 5.5.1.
The basic idea of the convergence analysis is the following: given the RSET maps
for two realisations of a scenario, another map representing the ninety-fifth percentile
of the two latter is calculated. After that, the number of realisations is increased
and the ninety-fifth percentile maps are continuously determined. At a certain point
the ninety-fifth percentile maps will not change anymore if additional realisations are
incorporated to the analysis. Having said that, an appropriate metric for quantify-
ing the difference of two maps or distributions is necessary. For this purpose, the
Kullback–Leibler divergence has been utilised [Kullback and Leibler, 1951]. For a
variety of different scenario characteristics, it has been found that a total number
of 15 realisations yields converging results throughout all three building levels. This
separated analysis on the basis of all three building levels is a convenient benefit of
the above-mentioned RSET map generation. Figure 5.1 exemplarily demonstrates
the decreasing divergence and a simultaneously increasing number of realisations.
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Figure 5.1: Development of Kullback-Leibler Divergence for RSET probability den-
sity functions with increasing numbers of realisations.
Given the above-mentioned number of 15 realisations per scenario, the compu-
tation of the evacuation ensemble basically represents a high throughput computing
problem. In order to cope with these circumstances, a general purpose cluster oper-
ated at the Ju¨lich Supercomputing Centre (JSC) has been used. The cluster was set
up during the HERMES project especially for the purpose of large scale pedestrian
simulations [Kemloh Wagoum, 2013, p. 30].
5.2 Geometry
In JuPedSim, a building is represented by an agglomeration of rooms and subrooms,
with each of them being defined by an arbitrary set of vertices. Since the com-
putational domain is represented by continuous space, the vertices can be set with
arbitrary accuracy. The necessary data has been aggregated from floor plans and
supplementary field measurements conducted in [Osterkamp, 2015]. The representa-
tion of the built environment is based on the convention that a room either represents
an entire level or a staircase. Given that, a (set of) subroom(s) is supposed to refine
a particular room. The connection between rooms is realised by transitions, while
subrooms are linked by crossings. Subrooms may also be specified as inclined stairs
in order to connect different levels. Additional building elements, such as pillars,
benches, or vending machines are included as obstacles. A top view on the geometry
representation of Osloer Straße is provided in Figure 5.2.
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CL 
Trains 
U9 
U8 
Figure 5.2: Vertex-based geometry of Osloer Straße including the levels U8, U9, CL,
and three trains. Magenta lines illustrate transitions between rooms and green lines
represent crossings between subrooms.
5.3 Occupant Scenarios
Beside the static geometry, the subsystem Evacuation is essentially composed by
occupant scenarios. In common literature and guidelines, a multitude of different
classifications for all relevant degrees of freedom are available [Nilsson and Fahy,
2016], [ISO/TS 29761, 2015], [RiMEA, 2016]. A comprehensive summary of available
documents has been given by [Konrad, 2014]. In this respect, it appears to be a
tremendous task to account for all requirements, theories, and scientific insights when
defining occupant scenarios.
However, according to the current work on DIN 18009–2 [Ja¨ger and Schro¨der,
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2016] the occupant scenarios within this study will be specified based on the four
major components shown in Figure 5.3. The entire process has to understood as
an iterative process, whose steps are not necessarily sequential since many specifica-
tions are interdependent. Firstly, potential influences by the built environment will
be discussed. In the next step, relevant considerations about safety measures and
organisational aspects are included. Subsequently, the broad topic area related to
occupancy and occupants is presented. Finally, the incorporation of potential (fire)
hazards over the course of the evacuation is addressed. The above-mentioned com-
ponents are extended in the following sections in order to vitalise the engineering
timeline that has been introduced in Section 2.4. Having said that, the main ob-
jective is to account for the multitude of scenarios that may be associated with the
subsystem Evacuation in real life.
Built Environment Safety Measures 
Hazard 
Occupant  
Scenarios 
Occupancy & Occupants 
Figure 5.3: Major components for the specification of occupant scenarios.
In the frame of preliminary works, a comprehensive study on multivariate occupant
scenarios applied to Osloer Straße has been conducted in [Axnich, 2016]. Beside the
technical proof-of-concept, the major purpose of this work was to establish a well-
informed understanding of the occurring pedestrian dynamics such as total evacuation
times or jam formation amongst others.
5.3.1 Built Environment
In contrast to other sources, such as [Nilsson and Fahy, 2016] or [ISO/TS 29761, 2015],
the following considerations of the built environment will have a less distinct reference
to the subsystem Fire since those aspects have been addressed in Section 2.5.1 and
are included in Section 5.3.4. Therefore, the focus is set on additional characteristics
that may be relevant for the simulated pedestrian dynamics.
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Technical Building Equipment The retail units in the concourse and all duty
rooms are monitored by a fire detection system, which automatically triggers an
evacuation siren in this area. Moreover, Osloer Straße is equipped with a personal
announcement (PA) system, which is assumed to be functional throughout the entire
station.
Egress Paths Regarding the egress paths of the station, a number of assumptions
are made. Besides all stairs, escalators leading to the surface are assumed to be used
by the occupants as well. Despite the emergency task to stop escalators towards
lower levels in order to provide additional capacity, the latter are not considered as
egress path. The same applies to the two elevators of the station. The width of
all conventional staircases is shortened by the dimensions of handrails. Moreover
all emergency exits which require traversing the tunnel system are excluded from
the analysis. Finally, the trains that are assumed in the station are represented by
subrooms as part of the built environment. In this respect, two six-car trainsets are
placed on the U8 level and one on the U9 level. For every individual trainset, all 18
doors towards the platform are assumed open.
5.3.2 Safety Measures
Procedural Detection Before the BVG control centre is able to raise an evacua-
tion alarm, a fire needs to be detected, confirmed, and reported. This process may
involve multiple bodies and conditions inducing different outcomes. Besides installed
technical systems, a fire can be detected either by BVG staff or by customers. In
case of a detection by staff – most probably a driver – the detection procedure will
be rather short. Once a potential risk is identified, she or he will immediately inform
the control centre. If a fire is detected by a customer, she or he will most probably
inform the public fire service, which in turn will report the fire to the BVG control
centre.
In orientation to [TRStrab BS, 2014], an assumed train fire requires the consid-
eration of an additional component: the maximum travel time into the station. For
Osloer Straße, this number ranges between one and two minutes. The guideline also
assumes an additional time period of one minute for exploring and reporting fire inci-
dent since the driver has to carry out a variety of different tasks in a very short period
of time. With these numbers in mind, the procedural detection time is expected to
range between 120 seconds and and 180 seconds.
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Evacuation Alarm Once the BVG control centre is informed about a fire incident,
the emergency routine is initiated. This is assumed to happen instantaneously if the
confirmed fire is reported by a driver. In case of an incident reported by a third party,
the situation is likely to be confirmed before any further action is undertaken. The
same may apply to an emergency call forwarded by the fire service. Thus, the alarm
times are assumed ranging between 0 and 120 seconds.
If the fire is confirmed, the evacuation alarm via the PA system is triggered by
the control centre. For the further analysis the detection and alarm times yield the
pre-alarm time. It is assumed to end when the evacuation alarm is activated by the
control centre via the PA system. Given that, potential preceding instructions via
the train-mounted PA systems are only considered to have a local effect.
Regarding the presented thoughts and numbers about potential detection and
alarm sequences, the pre-alarm time is expected to range between 120 and 300 seconds
and will become a variable in the design of experiment.
Staff Intervention During normal operations, no permanent BVG staff is present
at Osloer Straße. In the event of a fire, mobile security services can be dispatched
to the station. Moreover, a maximum number of three trains can be present at the
station for operational reasons. Except the corresponding number of train drivers, no
further staff intervention is assumed. The only exception are the retail areas, where
the presence of salespersons is incorporated into the analysis by means of adapted
pre-movement times.
5.3.3 Occupancy and Occupants
An essential part of the setup of occupant scenarios is the specification of occupan-
cies and corresponding occupant characteristics. While occupancy is understood as
one or multiple building use(s), occupant characteristics are seen as a set of versatile
attributes that may be relevant for the purpose of an evacuation analysis. Both com-
ponents are oftentimes conjunct by defining “standard populations” as proposed in
[RiMEA, 2016]. A step forward is proposed in [ISO/TS 29761, 2015], where a so-called
“occupant characteristics matrix” is requested. Moreover, [ISO/TR 13387, 1999] ac-
counts for “seasonal variations” when estimating population numbers. However, no
further advice is provided on generating a population out of particular occupant
groups. With regards to the eleventh behavioural fact (see Section 1.3.1), heteroge-
nous populations are thus insufficiently covered. In order to account for multiple
building uses, temporal dynamics, heterogeneity and uncertainty when composing
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a particular simulation population, this study utilises an alternate approach, which
is inspired by the so-called persona method. Its conception has been proposed by
[Scha¨fer et al., 2014] for the purpose of an evacuation analysis. A first practical im-
plementation using JuPedSim has been conducted in [Zinke et al., 2017]. Originally,
the persona method has been introduced by [Cooper et al., 2007] and represents a
product design tool for describing the needs and habits of costumers. Using the ex-
ample Osloer Straße, the basic idea of the method is as follows. The focus is set
on fictional characters (personas) with varying premises and demands by means of a
safe evacuation out of the station. In the end, a persona represents a “close narrative
description of [a] real-world user or a cluster of users based on valid observations”
[Scha¨fer et al., 2014]. Given these thoughts, the setup of an appropriate methodologi-
cal framework as well as the relevant persona attributes are addressed in the following
paragraphs.
Setting up Personas In order to cover the expected variety of building occupants,
a set of seven personas has been created. In principle, they are distinguished by their
current goals of activity and their ages. The different activities consist of travelling,
shopping, or working in the station. The expected margins of different ages have
been aggregated to youth, adult, and elderly. Of course, there are a multitude of
additional characteristics that my be influential, e.g. group affiliation, gender, and so
forth. However, the above-mentioned personas shall serve as a starting point and are
finally listed in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: overview of specified personas.
Passenger Shopper Salesperson
Youth x x -
Adult x x x
Elderly x x -
In the next instance, the personas have to be specified in detail. Initially, the
qualitative (narrative) description of selected persona features has to be conducted.
Once a persona is set up qualitatively, the specifications have to be prepared for
the upcoming population generation. In this study, an XML-based container is used
as interface. Using the example of adult passengers, this process is illustrated in
Figure 5.4.
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<persona	name="Persona	B">	
			<description	spec="pax	adult"/>	
			<age	spec="14,	60"/>	
			<shoulder	spec="0.42"/>	
			<velocity	spec="1.48,	0.3"/>	
			<velocity_stair_up	spec="0.80,	0.26"/>	
			<number	spec="62"	/>	
			<density	spec="0.11"	/>	
			<room	spec="0,6,9"/>	
			<subroom	spec="{		
						0:[-1],		
						6:[0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11],		
						9:[0,1,2,3,4]	}"/>	
			<reaction	spec="60,180"/>	
</persona>	
XML	
  An adult passenger is … 
 
•  mid-aged 
•  in good physical shape 
•  a commuter 
•  having obligations 
•  frequently travelling 
alone 
•  present in the entire 
station 
Figure 5.4: Exemplary translation of narrative persona characteristics into numeric
values.
The quantitative characteristics of each persona are stored in the XML container
and can be interpreted with Python. This allows for utilising a number of different
data types for the persona specification. In this respect, single values are directly
adopted, while a pair of values is used to describe a certain attribute by means of a
distribution. Moreover, key-value pairs (dictionaries) are used in order to distribute a
persona over particular rooms or subrooms. The parametrisation of common physio-
logical parameters such as shoulder width, velocity and velocity stair up aims
at the realistic representation of the movement characteristics. The attributes number
and density can be tuned in order to establish the occupant load of the entire sta-
tion and the attribute reaction specifies the pre-movement time (distribution) of
a given persona. The parametrisation of the above-mentioned attributes and the
corresponding empiricism is discussed in the following paragraphs.
Physiological Characteristics The physiological occupant characteristics cover
movement speed when walking on the plain and up stairs as well as the pedestrians’
shoulder width. Regarding the desired movement speeds, the data has been chosen in
orientation to the Weidmann data as it is provided in [RiMEA, 2016]. The shoulder
widths have been set using the literature reviewed in [Weidmann, 1994]. For the three
different age classes, Table 5.2 provides an overview of the specified parameters.
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Table 5.2: overview of physiological occupant characteristics. The distribution pa-
rameters µ and σ are incorporated refer to a Gaussian distribution.
Youth Adult Elderly
v0, plain in m s
−1 µ = 1.60
σ = 0.3
µ = 1.48
σ = 0.3
µ = 1.07
σ = 0.2
v0, stair up in m s
−1 µ = 0.86
σ = 0.26
µ = 0.80
σ = 0.26
µ = 0.58
σ = 0.25
lshoulder in m 0.30 0.42 0.38
In orientation to [Holl and Seyfried, 2010], the above-mentioned parameter sets
have been investigated using simplified test cases. The plausibility of the obtained
results was checked on the basis of experimental data [Seyfried et al., 2009] as well as
hand calculation methods provided in the NFPA 130 guideline [NFPA, 2014].
Individual Detection Apart from one global detection time, the process of de-
tecting a fire may not necessarily have the procedural character as discussed in Sec-
tion 5.3.2. In anticipation of Figure 5.5, the sight of smoke may for instance serve as
initial cue for an occupant prior to any official report to the control centre. In order
to account for this mechanism – which is also discussed in [ISO/TR 16738, 2009] –
the fire simulation data is processed regarding the question if and when an occupied
room or subroom is affected by smoke. The associated time represents the individual
detection time for a given position of an occupant.
Pre-movement Time Besides the pedestrians’ physiological characteristics, nu-
merous works identified the pre-movement time as one of the key determinants of
evacuation processes [Zhang et al., 2008], [Albrecht et al., 2010], [Rogsch et al., 2015].
The pre-movement phase itself consists of recognition and response. Unfortunately,
the quantification of these processes is a tremendous task with enormous underlying
uncertainties. The pre-movement time is also referred to as reaction time in [RiMEA,
2016] and is occasionally mixed up with preceding time fractions such as detection or
alarm times. Recapitulating the engineering time line introduced in Section 2.4, this
paragraph will exclusively account for the pre-movement time.
In order to obtain a more informed understanding of the occupant recognition and
response, it is inevitable to understand the latter as the result of an entire decision
making process. Comprehensive knowledge on that insight is provided by Kuligowski
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in terms of the protective active decision model (PADM ) in Section 1.3.2. According
to PADM, the bases of the decision making process are manifold. Besides current
activities and goals, it essentially depends on the cues and information, which are
provided to an individual or group. Moreover, “social context, personal characteris-
tics, past experience and hazard knowledge” are further key aspects of the outcome of
the decision making process. In terms of response behaviour, it is important to note
that insufficient or lacking information necessarily results in further “information-
seeking” instead of responding. In this respect, a so-called decomposition diagram
is a useful tool in order to point out the numerous ambiguities when modelling the
pre-movement phase. In orientation to [Kuligowski, 2016, p. 2094] and employing
the incident studies presented in Section 1.2.2, such a partial diagram has been set
up applicable to a passenger in Figure 5.5.
initial 
activity 
PA 
out of 
station 
smoke 
recognise / 
seek information   
misinterpret /  
not comprehend 
warn / help  
others 
respond 
other 
occupants 
emergency 
call 
staff 
initial  
cue 
6 7 
11 
4 
8 
9 
5 
3 
2 
1 
10 
Figure 5.5: Partial decomposition diagram applicable to a passenger.
From this perspective, it becomes apparent that modelling a population’s response
behaviour requires reasonable fluctuations. In order to explore the lower and upper
bounds of the latter, a brief review on available data is given in the following para-
graph. Moreover, this study investigates a facility that hosts multiple building uses
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simultaneously: transportation and retail. Hence, the data review has to be con-
ducted for both building uses.
On a generic basis, the selection of response times is addressed in multiple guide-
lines and standards. An application-oriented example is the German RiMEA guideline
[RiMEA, 2016], which in general distinguishes between three different cases. Initially,
a “rapid” response is represented by a detection time of zero. Although being useful
for the assessment of congestions, this specification is not further considered in this
study. In the next instance, a “speedy” response is assumed whereat the individual
response times are uniformly distributed between zero and one minute(s). Finally, the
response time is specified with respect to the infrastructural and organisational cir-
cumstances in case of a “slow” response. For this purpose, the application of Purser’s
empirical data collection [Purser, 2003] is proposed. The latter also provides data for
transportation structures ranging from one minute and a half to greater than 15 min-
utes. This data is excluded from the guideline due to a limited empirical basis. With
a subsequent restriction, the data is, however, provided for orientation purposes in
the standards [ISO/TR 16738, 2009] and [BSI 7974-6, 2004]. Moreover, the German
technical guideline for light rails [TRStrab BS, 2014] assumes a response time of one
minute without any additional specifications.
Notable research on the response behaviour in transportation facilities has been
conducted by Sime and Proulx in the 1990s. In [Proulx and Sime, 1991], a field study
on five different evacuation procedures was conducted at an underground station in
Newcastle. The different trials revealed remarkably different response times depend-
ing on the provided information. The incorporation of these insights into engineering
applications has been addressed in [Sime, 1995] later-on. Finally, further data on
response times in mercantile facilities is collected in [Gwynnee and Boyce, 2016]. For
this particular building use, the response times range from zero to approximately two
minutes.
The summary of the above-mentioned data about response behaviour is provided
for both building uses in Table 5.3
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Table 5.3: overview of relevant and applicable data concerning occupant’s pre-
movement times tpre. All values are in seconds.
Source tpre, min tpre, max Notes
General
[RiMEA, 2016] 0 60 “fast”
Retail
[RiMEA, 2016] 120 300 “slow”
category B M2 B3 A2
[Gwynnee and Boyce, 2016] 0 100 Siren used
Transport
[ISO/TR 16738, 2009] 90 240 category E M2 B3 A3
120 300 category E M3 B3 A3
[TRStrab BS, 2014] 60 - Fixed value
[Proulx and Sime, 1991] 495 540 Bell
135 180 2 staff
75 460 Non-directive PA
75 90 PA and staff
60 90 PA
Based on the data listed above, it becomes evident that the field studies to some
extend revealed lower response times than the enveloping numbers of the guidelines
and standards. Hence, the emphasis is slightly moved to the field data.
In the next step, ranges of pre-movement times have to be assigned to the intro-
duced personas. Without doubt, this is an arbitrary task, which depends on various
additional parameters and relations such as group behaviour or gender. However, in
the sense of composing variable populations, this challenge has been solved rather
straightforwardly. The basic assumptions of this conceptual demonstration are as
follows: Young occupants are likely to be more adventurous than adults and elderly
people. In turn, the latter may be impaired by sensory limitations. In the platform
areas an operated directive PA system but a temporarily delayed staff intervention is
assumed. The automatic fire detection system mounted in the retail areas triggers an
immediate but non-directive evacuation alarm in this part of the station. Finally, it is
assumed that salespersons will take care for clearing and securing their stores before
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they respond to the evacuation cue(s). Because of that, a positive staff interven-
tion can be expected in the retail areas. The resulting configurations are presented
in Table 5.4. It is to be noted that these ranges represent the bounds of the pre-
movement times and are not directly implemented into the upcoming simulations.
Further details are provided within the design of experiment in Section 5.4.
Table 5.4: overview of the personas and the assigned pre-movement time ranges. All
values are in seconds.
Persona tpre, min tpre, max Notes
Passenger Youth 90 240 adventurous
Passenger Adult 60 210
Passenger Elderly 90 180 sensory impairments
Shopper Youth 30 100 adventurous
Shopper Adult 0 100
Shopper Elderly 30 100 sensory impairments
Salesperson 100 180 clear and secure the store
In reference to the PADM, the assumptions presented above are intended for the
perception of aural evacuation cues given by the alarm and/or PA system. However,
another evacuation cue may be the perception of smoke, whose impact on the re-
sponse behaviour has not been sufficiently investigated yet. A literature review given
by Kuligowski revealed that a perceived cue “smoke” not necessarily yields immediate
responses by test subjects [Kuligowski, 2016, p. 2098]. However, with regards to the
high variability, which will be incorporated by the fire scenario ensemble (see Chap-
ter 4), a certain relation between smoke spread and response appears to be necessary.
In this respect, the following – rather simplistic – assumption has been made: the
perceived risk of an aural alarm is less than the one induced by the sight of smoke.
Hence, the assigned response time boundaries of an occupant are reduced by 50 % if
smoke is perceived.
Setting up the RSET Timeline In the preceding paragraphs, all relevant time
components for detection, alarm and occupant response have been discussed and
quantified. In order to set up the RSET part of the engineering timeline, the different
courses of events and the introduced time ranges are summarised in Figure 5.6. The
time ranges will be incorporated into the design of experiment in Section 5.4
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RSET 
alarm 
time 
occupant smoke? 
yes 
no 
procedural 
detection 
pre-
movement travel 
individual 
detection travel 
[120..300]	 [0..240]	
[0..120]	
2) 
2) 3) 
2) 
3) 
is smoke visible before procedural detection and alarm time? 
depending on applicable persona 
depending on the fire scenario 
1) 
1) 
pre-
movement 
Figure 5.6: Engineering timeline setup for RSET.
Route Choice In spacious structures, especially route choice can remarkably im-
pact the pedestrian dynamics. In turn, typical evacuation characteristics like travel
times or jam areas can then be closely correlated to an occupant’s spatiotemporal
exposure to fire effects. Route choice itself is again driven by a multitude of fac-
tors, such as available alternatives, behaviour of others, group affiliation, or received
instructions. Another question is an occupant’s knowledge of a certain built envi-
ronment. In this respect, the recent works of Andresen [Andresen et al., 2016a,b]
provide a promising framework in order to model differing degrees of knowledge as
well as a perception-based wayfinding. Moreover, incident studies such as [Jeon and
Hong, 2009] revealed that the built environment may drastically impair the wayfind-
ing abilities, e.g. because of massive pillars as they can also be found in the concourse
level.
In order to investigate these potential dynamics, the route choice of the popu-
lation has been varied in terms of three different strategies. For this purpose, the
five final exits connecting concourse and surface have been equipped with goals. The
first routing strategy assumes the entire population to use the local shortest path to-
wards the closest goal. In regard to the shape of the escape route system, this results
in movement patterns where exits F and J are almost solely used (see Figure 5.7).
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The second routing strategy explicitly assigns goals to particular occupants and in-
duces a uniform usage across all five exits. Moreover, a field study on exit choice in
Osloer Straße has been conducted in [Hofinger et al., 2016] and revealed interesting
imbalances regarding the particular exit usages. In concrete terms, exits leading to
connection services such as bus or tramway were used more frequently. In reference
to familiarity (see Section 1.3.1), occupants tend to use commonly used exits during
an evacuation. Given these insights, the third route choice strategy randomly assigns
goals to occupants according to the distributions gathered from field data. Figure 5.7
provides a qualitative illustration of the movement patterns that are induced by the
three route choice strategies inside the concourse.
local shortest (1) uniform (3) 
G 
H 
I 
J 
F 
field data (2) 
Figure 5.7: Major movement patterns of different route choice strategies. The width
of the arrows indicates how frequently a particular exit is chosen.
Population Generation At the beginning of this section, the persona method has
been introduced in order to capture the heterogeneity amongst occupants. Upon the
definition of seven representative personas, the considered degrees of freedom such
as physiological characteristics, individual detection, response, and route choice have
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been discussed. The subsequent step is to merge personas in order to obtain varying
populations regarding both composition and size. In the first instance, the population
generation will be addressed.
The population generation is supposed to address two different purposes. Firstly
the temporal fluctuations of the overall occupant load shall be covered. Secondly,
the variability in terms of different population compositions is incorporated. These
variations are of particular interest, e.g. in oder to facilitate subsequent probabilistic
analyses, where the occurrence of particular population characteristics have to be
conjunct with probabilities. In this respect, comprehensive data of the principal
characteristics of public transportation has been gathered by Weidmann [Weidmann,
1994]. In terms of quantifying the temporal fluctuations, he determined the relative
distribution of the traffic load in three German cities [Weidmann, 1994, p. 138].
Besides Hagen and Hannover, Hamburg is assumed to be the city, which is most
comparable to Berlin. The Hamburg data henceforth is used as representative for
the transport use. Similar statistical data is available for the course of shopping
activities during weekdays in Germany [GfK, 2013]. Please note that the original data
is resolved in two-hour bins and has been refined to one-hour intervals. Figure 5.8
provides a graphical overview of the afore-mentioned time series.
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Figure 5.8: Relative occupant loads for retail and transport use throughout a weekday.
The integrals of the curves equal 100 %.
Despite two double-peak structures, there are differences between the two utilised
datasets. While the transportation load reaches its maximum during the morning
from 5 to 7:30 am, the retail occupant load grows slowly and reaches its maximum in
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the late forenoon. In turn, the noon time represents the least frequented daytime for
the transport use. Furthermore, both peaks during the afternoon are rather similar.
Finally, retail use ceases in the late evening, whereas transportation maintains a
lower but constant level. Given these insights and numbers, it is possible to model
coinciding building uses with respect to a workday. Of course, additional variations
may emerge during other times, e.g. weekends or major events. These aspects are
not further considered in this study.
Moreover, the variability in terms of different population compositions consisting
of multiple personas is not incorporated yet. It is generally acknowledged that, e.g.
age or travel purpose vary remarkably throughout the day. For instance, Weidmann
qualitatively concluded that commuters dominate the scene during the morning hours,
whereas elderly people are increasingly present in the forenoon and pupils prevail at
noon. The afternoon hours again are characterised by elderly people and families.
Finally, the evening peak is dominated by commuters [Weidmann, 1994, p. 245]. Pre-
cise quantitative fractions could not be found in literature. However, these fractions
would heavily depend on many local factors such as demographics or the surrounding
infrastructure (education, commerce, business, transport, sights). In order to capture
this variability, a data-driven approach for generating representative populations has
been developed. The subsequent workflow is only demonstrated here for the passenger
subpopulation.
Initially, the given qualitative observations of Weidmann were used for defining
upper and lower percentage constraints for the fractions of a particular persona. Ta-
ble 5.5 provides an overview of the derived upper and lower constraints.
Table 5.5: Fractions of personas for population composition.
Daytime Youth Adult Elderly
min max min max min max
4:30 p.m. 0 10 90 100 0 0
8:00 a.m. 10 30 60 80 1 10
10:00 a.m. 1 10 1 20 60 90
12:00 a.m. 20 30 20 30 50 60
2:00 p.m. 20 30 20 30 60 70
5:00 p.m. 20 30 60 80 1 10
11:30 p.m. 0 10 80 100 0 10
In the next step, 5, 000 so-called candidate populations are generated using a ran-
domised Dirichlet distributor [MacKay, 2003]. In principle, this method yields three
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random numbers whose sum equals one and each of them describes the percentage
of one persona. Subsequently, all generated triples are checked for compliance with
the specified constraints of each persona. Once a total number of 50 compliant pop-
ulations is found, the generation routine is completed. Figure 5.9 illustrates the 50
randomly composed populations which in turn constitute the overall occupant load
introduced in Figure 5.8.
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Figure 5.9: Stack plot of 50 variable populations consisting of adult, youth, and
elderly people. The varying population compositions are illustrated by the blurred
overlaps of the curves.
It becomes apparent that the desired variability could successfully be introduced
to the populations. However, for conducting simulations, it is necessary to chose a set
of samples out of this agglomeration. One potential approach is a continuous sam-
pling along the time axis, whereat daytime would become the parameter determining
the population characteristics. However, a closer look at these time series reveals
daytimes with similar characteristics, e.g. during the early morning, forenoon, or late
evening. In contrast, high variabilities are expected during the peak times. Hence,
the computational effort shall be focussed on the most variable and busiest daytimes.
In order to achieve that, the parameter space containing the 50 populations is
explored using k-means clustering. The latter is a data analysis approach, which
iteratively forms optimised clusters based on the Euclidian distances between a set of
observations. It is a so-called supervised method since the desired number of clusters
is explicitly specified in advance. Further reading can be found in [Myatt, 2007]. In
this case, an observation is understood as a three-dimensional point comprising the
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following information: fraction of adults, fraction of youth, and fraction of elderly. In
the period from 4:30 a.m. to 11:30 p.m., the relative occupant loads are interpolated
by half-hour intervals which yields 38 observations. In conjunction with the 50 gener-
ated populations, a parameter space with 38× 50 = 1900 observations is set up. The
latter can now be clustered by means of very similar and very unique observations.
In order to emphasise the peak times, the weighting of the observations has been
modified. Therefore, a higher score has been applied to the relative occupant load
of the entire population which equals the sum of all three persona fractions. The
output of this analysis is a set of 15 clusters representing the 50 populations based
on optimised Euclidian distances between the persona fractions. These clusters are
summarised in Table 5.6 and referred to as population clusters.
Table 5.6: Population clusters with corresponding relative occupant loads %dayload,
occupant numbers N , and represented daytimes. The derivation of the concrete
occupant numbers is taken up in the following paragraph.
Cluster %dayload N Daytimes
(transport/retail)
0 0.05 / 0.10 814 8:30, 19:00
1 0.04 / 0.24 707 10:30, 11:00, 11:30
2 0.01 / 0.00 99 4:30, 5:00, 20:30, 21:00, 21:30,
22:00, 22:30, 23:00, 23:30
3 0.11 / 0.03 1567 6:30, 7:00
4 0.11 / 0.17 1672 16:30, 17:00, 17:30
5 0.06 / 0.17 916 9:30, 12:30, 13:00, 13:30, 14:00,
14:30, 15:00
6 0.03 / 0.05 450 19:30, 20:00, 20:30
7 0.10 / 0.08 1532 8:00
8 0.04 / 0.19 697 10:00
9 0.08 / 0.14 1284 17:30, 18:00, 18:30
10 0.05 / 0.02 762 5:30, 6:00
11 0.04 / 0.21 700 11:30, 12:00, 12:30
12 0.05 / 0.14 773 9:00, 15:00
13 0.08 / 0.16 1237 15:30, 16:00
14 0.12 / 0.05 1785 7:30
It becomes evident that the k-means algorithm aggregated daytimes with fewer
variability and overall load to single clusters, e.g. cluster 2. This means that many
daytimes with similar characteristics in terms of occupant load and population com-
position are unified to one cluster. In turn, daytimes with high occupant loads and/or
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expected variabilities in terms of population characteristics are represented more ex-
clusively, e.g. clusters 7 and 14. Finally, the population cluster ID is going to become
the single design parameter determining both the relative occupant load and the
population composition.
Population Size In the preceding paragraph, the data-driven generation of popula-
tions has been introduced. So far, only the relative occupant loads have been utilised
for that. In order to quantify the population size(s), these percentages are trans-
formed to absolute numbers or densities respectively. The population size represents
a crucial factor for evacuation analyses. Aiming at severe but reasonable boundaries
for that, several recommendations and data have been utilised. Moreover, the multi-
purpose use of the station requires the assessment of both retail and transport use.
In this respect, [ISO/TR 16738, 2009] qualitatively specifies both uses to have “high”
occupant densities without giving further advice.
The retail use in the concourse has been quantified based on a variety of common
standards and guidelines. In this respect, it is important to consider the particular
retail units as well as the floor plan of the concourse in more detail. The concourse
provides a total area of approximately 3000 m2 whereof two-thirds serve as traffic area,
which will additionally be occupied by passengers. The retail units offer different
goods and services and their areas range from 10 to 120 m2. In common guidelines,
the proposed occupant densities for different store types are in range from 0.1 to 0.36
persons per m2 [RiMEA, 2016], [vfdb, 2013].
In terms of transportation, initially, the passenger capacities of the six-car-trainsets
are addressed. Both BR F and BR H can carry approximately 750 passengers, while
the fraction of standing passengers is higher in case of BR H. Having this number, the
applicable German technical guideline for light rail [TRStrab BS, 2014] allows for two
principal approaches. Firstly, the maximum occupancies inside the trains plus thirty
additional percent on the platforms is assumed throughout the entire station. This
requirement applies to new stations. If available and applicable to stations in service,
the occupancy can be estimated based upon counting data. In this case the average
across the peak hour is supposed to cover the expected traffic load. In this study,
the second approach has been chosen based on Berlin’s recent transportation report
[Stadt Berlin, 2014] as well as own field studies conducted in Osloer Straße [Hofinger
et al., 2016]. Over the course of an average weekday, the transportation report states
a total number of approximately 90, 000 passengers using the U8 and U9 services
[Stadt Berlin, 2014, p. 54]. According to this source, this number is divided up into
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roughly 55, 000 passengers in U8 and 35, 000 in U9. In this respect, it is important
to recapitulate that the U9 platform serves as final stop. Moreover, field studies were
conducted during rush hour on a Monday evening in January 2016 [Hofinger et al.,
2016]. In this study, the occupant loads on all three departure platforms have been
recorded shortly before the arrival of a train. The collected occupant numbers range
from 30 to 230 per single track.
The data discussed above shall serve as basis for a reasonable estimate of the
population sizes. All information and recommendations are briefly summarised in
Table 5.7.
Table 5.7: Information for estimation of population size.
Source N D in m−2 Notes
Retail
[RiMEA, 2016] - 0.18 – 0.36 Stores
[vfdb, 2013] - 0.3 General stores
- 0.1 Convenient stores
[ISO/TR 16738, 2009] - High Category B1
[Hofinger et al., 2016] 35 – 65 - Field data (1 h, weekday)
Transport
[TRStrab BS, 2014] 750 - maximum train capacity
per track
225 30 % train capacity
on platform per track
[Stadt Berlin, 2014] ≈ 90, 000 - Through traffic on U8 and U9
(entire weekday)
[ISO/TR 16738, 2009] - High Category E
[Hofinger et al., 2016] 30 – 230 - Single Platform
Field data (1 h, weekday)
[BVG, 2007] 216 / 534 - / 4.0 BR F (seats / stances)
168 / 580 - / 4.0 BR H (seats / stances)
Regarding the retail use, a maximum occupant density of 0.1 m−2 has been chosen
as design value. This rather low value corresponds to the gross areas of the retail
units, which does not account for installed obstructions, e.g. furniture. Moreover, the
resulting numbers of approximately 100 shoppers would be in good but conservative
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agreement with the data collected in the field studies. Finally, salespersons are dis-
tributed with a very low occupant density of 0.02 m−2 in order to account for smaller
and larger retail units. However, the distribution routine will at least allocate one
single agent.
Aiming at a simplified incorporation of the counting data provided in [Stadt Berlin,
2014], a total load of 30, 000 passengers is assumed per track, while U9 is only occupied
by one train. It is important to reconsider that these numbers cover the passengers
occupying the trains. Moreover, this number has been increased by 20 % for several
reasons. Firstly, the data basis of the transportation report was gathered back in 2007,
while the overall transportation performance by BVG increases constantly [Stadt
Berlin, 2014, p. 53]. Finally, the numbers represent averaged values for weekdays
which may underestimate temporal peaks, e.g. during non-vacation periods. These
thoughts yield a total number of 36, 000 passengers per track throughout one day.
The breakup of this number for the specification of short-termed occupant scenarios
can be achieved by combining the temporal course of the occupant load presented in
Figure 5.8 and operational aspects. The assumption that approximately 12.5 % of the
daily load emerges in the peak hour during the morning yields 4, 500 passengers per
track. Given the applicable operation interval of 12 rotations per hour, a maximum
number of about 375 passengers is assumed per train. Moreover, the occupant load
on the platforms is estimated to be 30 % of the persons inside the trains. For this
purpose, the maximum occupant density for the transport use has been tuned to
0.11 m−2.
Finally, the question may arise if it is reasonable to quantify the population size by
only half of the maximum train capacity. However, this approach utilises all available
data and appears to represent the station’s regular operation based on own observa-
tions. In addition to that, Osloer Straße is a rather remote station in Berlin’s under-
ground network. This results in commuter traffic either inbound from or outbound
to the city centre, which has been proved by the field studies presented in [Hofinger
et al., 2016]. Moreover, the platform countings of this study correspond well with the
30 % assumption applied to the specified occupant load of 375 passengers per train.
The final configuration of the population sizes as well as the distribution across the
geometry are summarised in Table 5.8.
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Table 5.8: Population size and distribution.
Persona N D in m−2  U8  U9  CL Notes
Retail
Shopper - 0.10 - - x retail units,
concourse
Salesperson (1) 0.02 - - x retail units
Transport
Passenger - 0.11 x x x platforms,
concourse
Passenger 6 × 63 - x x - per six-car
trainset
The design values provided above correspond with the maximum total occupant
load during the morning peak as introduced in Figure 5.8. In case of less frequented
daytimes, the design values are reduced accordingly. This mechanism is triggered by
the population clusters.
5.3.4 Hazard
According to [Ja¨ger and Schro¨der, 2016], the consideration of hazards over the course
of an occupant’s evacuation is supposed to have multiple aspects. This study only
accounts for fire hazards and their subsequent impact on the evacuation dynamics.
Initially, traces of fire may serve as evacuation cue, which has already been addressed
in terms of individual detection times in Section 5.3.3. For multiple reasons, the spa-
tiotemporal data induced by a particular fire scenario is an essential input variable
for each occupant scenario. The presence of smoke, for instance, yields a reduction
of walking speeds as discussed in Section 3.2.3. On the other hand, physiological
effects of potential coincidences between occupants and fire eﬄuents are monitored
according to the model implementations presented in Section 3.2.4. Consequently,
each occupant scenario requires a conjunction with all specified fire scenarios. These
aspects are revisited within the consolidated ensemble introduced in Chapter 6. How-
ever, the further procedure within this chapter corresponds to a so-called reference
evacuation ensemble which is initially set up without considering a fire scenario.
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5.4 Sampling
In this section all specifications discussed earlier are unified in order to generate an
ensemble of occupant scenarios. The relevant design parameters are the following:
pre-alarm time, pre-movement time, route choice, and population cluster. Hence, a
four-dimensional parameter space has to be set up. As introduced in Section 2.6.1, a
Latin Hypercube Sampling (LHS ) has been applied. Based on a downsampling study,
the occupant scenario ensemble here is specified by 80 samples. Technically, an LHS
design yields a matrix with n rows and k columns, whereat n represents the number
of samples and k the dimensionality. Hence, the LHS matrix of the occupant scenario
ensemble has a shape of 80× 4. Within the design space, each sample point consists
of its four coordinates, which range from zero to one. In this respect, it is important
to note that the design includes both continuous and discrete parameters. While the
continuous parameters (pre-alarm time, pre-movement time) are directly incorporated
into the design, the discrete parameters (route choice, population cluster) are assigned
based on rounding operations. Moreover, the pre-movement time distributions require
additional explanation. The latter are unique for each persona (see Table 5.4). In
this respect, only the upper bound of an assumed uniform distribution is affected
by the sampling. In concrete terms, a sample close to zero percent yields a narrow
pre-movement time distribution around tpre, min. In turn, a sample in proximity to
one hundred percent results in a wide distribution between tpre, min and tpre, max. The
stated parameters as well as their corresponding ranges are summarised in Figure 5.10.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
pre-alarm time 
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pre-movement time 
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route choice 
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Figure 5.10: Design of experiment occupant scenario ensemble.
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5.5 Preliminary Analysis
In order to obtain a principal understanding of the subsystem Evacuation, a reference
ensemble is specified based on the method presented in Section 5.4. As stated above,
the reference ensemble does not yet incorporate any fire hazards throughout the
evacuation process. In preparation of this, the basic data analysis workflow is briefly
discussed.
Data Basis The application of microscopic pedestrian models is based on the move-
ment of individuals (agents) constituting the overall evacuation process. The move-
ment of an agent can be described by a trajectory – the agent’s path through space
and time. JPScore computes a set of three-dimensional trajectories, which can be
enriched by any additional data. In contrast to solely time-based analyses, this for-
mat can yield large amounts of data. The data extent especially depends on the
population size, the temporal resolution, and the extent of further information,
Challenges The interpretation of computer-simulated evacuation processes is com-
monly reduced to local information, such as the clearing time of a particular space.
As long as these analyses are sufficiently refined, the evacuation dynamics may be
covered appropriately. However, information remains rather discrete and the analyses
may have limitations with increasing numbers of evaluation points. Likewise, the sub-
sequent conjunction with other spatiotemporal information like fire simulation data
evolves to a more and more complex task.
Inspired by the ASET maps introduced in Section 4.5.1, a unified data format
with an improved spatiotemporal resolution of the evacuation dynamics is utilised for
the ongoing analyses.
5.5.1 RSET Maps
Once again, this data format is a map representing the spatial distribution of the
required safe egress time (RSET ) in this case. The generation of these maps is
conducted as follows. Firstly, the three-dimensional trajectories are filtered by the
z-elevation, i.e. a particular building level. This is achieved by a grid, which slices
the trajectories. It has a grid resolution of dx = 0.6 m and is initialised with NaN
(not a number) values. In the next instance, the routine determines the time, when a
cell has been traversed by an agent for the last time. The corresponding grid element
then is set to this time. If a grid elements has not been traversed at all, its value
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will remain NaN. This approach is illustrated in Figure 5.11 using a simple corridor
which is traversed by one single pedestrian over a period of 60 seconds.
trajectory 
RSET map 
0	 4	 8	 11	 15	 19	 NaN	 NaN	 NaN	 NaN	 NaN	 NaN	 NaN	 NaN	 NaN	 NaN	 NaN	
NaN	 NaN	 NaN	 NaN	 NaN	 NaN	 23	 26	 30	 34	 38	 41	 45	 49	 53	 56	 60	
NaN	 NaN	 NaN	 NaN	 NaN	 NaN	 NaN	 NaN	 NaN	 NaN	 NaN	 NaN	 NaN	 NaN	 NaN	 NaN	 NaN	
NaN	 NaN	 NaN	 NaN	 NaN	 NaN	 NaN	 NaN	 NaN	 NaN	 NaN	 NaN	 NaN	 NaN	 NaN	 NaN	 NaN	
0s	
30s	 60s	
Figure 5.11: RSET map generation on the basis of a pedestrian’s trajectory.
As stated above, the necessary information is provided by the trajectories of ev-
ery realisation computed for one occupant scenario. In order to account for the
randomness of the latter, all maps are stacked and the RSET map representing the
ninety-fifth percentile is determined. Since non-occupied areas within the map re-
main NaN, they are excluded from the percentile calculation. Finally, this process is
repeated for every level of the station. The corresponding analysis routine is provided
in Appendix B.2. An exemplary RSET map derived for the occupant scenario e013
in the U8 level is provided in Figure 5.12.
The RSET map provides comprehensive information about the evacuation dy-
namics of the exemplary occupant scenario. In principle, the U8 level is cleared in
less than 11 minutes and it becomes apparent that two major jam areas are forming
in front of the staircases towards the concourse level.
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Figure 5.12: Exemplary map illustrating the ninety-fifth percentile of RSET in the
U8 level. The colour map has been discretised into intervals of two minutes. Grey
fields represent areas that are obstructed by the built environment. White areas have
not been traversed at all.
Recapitulating the discussions conducted in Section 2.4, it again is possible to
transform the RSET map to a distribution applicable to the relevant occupant sce-
nario. The derivation of these distributions only accounts for areas within the domain
which have been occupied by agents. Moreover, obstructed areas are excluded as well.
The corresponding RSET distribution is provided in Figure 5.13.
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Figure 5.13: Distribution of the ninety-fifth percentile of RSET in the U8 level.
This exemplary case reveals a remarkable offset along the time axis which is in-
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duced by the specified pre-alarm and pre-movement times. Moreover, the shape of
these distributions will heavily depend on the interaction amongst fire and occupant
scenarios. Similar to the distributions derived for ASET (see Section 4.5.1), it is
again possible to source additional information from this data format. For instance,
the frequencies of the higher RSET s within the map allow for deductions of the spatial
extend of jam areas.
5.5.2 Correlation Analysis
Given the data analysis introduced above, it is possible to apply a correlation analysis
to the reference occupant scenario ensemble. As discussed in Section 5.4, the latter
consists of 80 scenarios, whereat four parameters are varied. These were pre-alarm
time, pre-movement-time, route choice, and population cluster. The major purpose
of this preliminary analysis is to establish a general understanding of the occurring
evacuation dynamics. This covers the orders of magnitudes in terms of total evac-
uation times and it also aims at investigating the impact of the particular design
parameters.
The ultimate quantity for the description of evacuation processes is time, e.g.
evacuation times. In this respect, it is usually impossible to refer to exact numbers
since these processes have underlying uncertainties. The design of experiment as well
as the data preparation presented above are supposed to account for these aspects.
Hence, the evacuation times have to be represented as margins. In this respect, the
station’s total evacuation time can be determined as the maximum value stored in the
RSET map of the concourse level. The conjunction of this value with the occupant
numbers corresponding to the population clusters yields the correlation plot shown
in Figure 5.14.
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Figure 5.14: Reference occupant scenario ensemble: correlation of occupant number
and RSET. The light green polygon illustrates the margin in which RSET is expected
to range.
As expected, an increasing relationship between occupant numbers and total evac-
uation time has been determined. In concrete terms, the station’s total RSET ranges
from six up to 15 minutes. However, apart from the occupant numbers, the design
of experiment obviously induces further fluctuations in the subsystem Evacuation. It
becomes apparent that the RSET margins of the single design populations spread
between three and five minutes. These margins are obviously affected by the remain-
ing parameters. As shown in Figure 5.15, the pre-alarm time has been found to have
remarkable influence, too.
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Figure 5.15: Reference occupant scenario ensemble: impact of pre-alarm time on
RSET.
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The pre-alarm corresponds to an increasing relation with RSET. Moreover, this
relation is additionally shifted depending on the population size. These insights may
be redundant when solely considering the pedestrian dynamics. However, for the up-
coming consolidation of fire and occupant scenarios this mechanism will potentially
influence the coincidence of occupants and fire eﬄuents and the associated interac-
tions.
Similar observations have been made regarding the population’s route choice strat-
egy. Figure 5.16 provides the corresponding correlation plot.
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Figure 5.16: Reference occupant scenario ensemble: impact of route choice on RSET.
It becomes evident that route choice mode 1 (global shortest) consequently yields
the lowest evacuation times. In turn, the route choice modes 2 and 3 (uniform and field
data) cause higher evacuation times. This observation can be explained by the longer
passages inside the concourse associated with these modes. However, no distinct
separation between the latter is observable. So far, the specified pre-movement times
have only minor influences on the overall evacuation time of the reference ensemble.
5.6 Summary
The occupant scenario ensemble has been set up with the aim to add certain vari-
abilities to the subsystem. For this purpose, the following four parameters have been
varied: pre-alarm time, pre-movement time, route choice, and population composi-
tion. The latter have been varied inspired by the persona method in conjunction
with an automated agent distribution routine. The subsequent design of experiment
consists of 80 occupant scenarios which have been generated with an LHS sampling.
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Inspired by the map-based analysis of the fire scenarios within Chapter 4, the
observed pedestrian dynamics are assessed with a similar approach: RSET maps. For
every grid cell of the latter, the computed three-dimensional pedestrian trajectories
are used to determine the time, when a cell has been traversed for the last time. Once
repeated for every level of the station, the resulting two-dimensional maps provide
comprehensive information about the evacuation process.
The preliminary analysis is based on a reference occupant scenario ensemble which
does not consider any interdependences to a fire scenario. The outcome of the partic-
ular occupant scenarios has been assessed with a correlation analysis which is based
on the above-mentioned RSET maps. The focus of the preliminary analysis was ex-
clusively set on the station’s total evacuation time. The analysis revealed RSET s
expected in a margin from six to 15 minutes. As expected, the occupant number sig-
nificantly correlates with RSET as it is demonstrated by the linear increasing relation
of these numbers. Nevertheless, also pre-alarm time, route choice, and the varied pop-
ulation compositions incorporate remarkable variabilities resulting in a wide margin
of RSET s.
These preliminary findings are intended to provide a principal overview of the
simulation of the subsystem Evacuation. In other words, fire scenario-related inter-
dependences, such as accelerated detection times or reduced walking speeds are not
considered. The latter steps as well as the conjunction of both ASET and RSET
maps will subsequently be conducted in the following chapter.
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Life Safety Analysis
In this chapter, the subsystems Fire and Evacuation are combined to one ensemble.
After the demonstration of the corresponding workflow, the ensemble is initially as-
sessed with a semi-macroscopic analysis which is based on difference maps derived
from the introduced ASET and RSET maps. The negative fractions of the difference
map distributions are used to compute the consequences of a particular combination
of a fire scenario and an occupant scenario. In the next step, the Euclidean distances
between the consequences of all scenario combinations are computed and stored in a
distance matrix. The latter then is reassembled by an agglomerative clustering rou-
tine which allows for grouping similar observations to scenario clusters. Afterwards,
these clusters are assessed in the frame of an enrichment analysis which is supposed to
determine the main contributing design parameters. Furthermore, the combinatoric
relations within the clusters are investigated. In the subsequent step, the scenario
clusters are analysed based on the microscopic scale. The purpose of this analysis is to
supplement the scenario clusters with an alternative measure of consequences, which
is the concept of fractional effective doses (FED). In this case, the consequences are
derived from the individual exposure of occupants to toxic smoke eﬄuents. Finally,
the correspondence of the two utilised consequence measures is investigated.
6.1 Ensemble Combination
According to Nilsson and Fahy’s findings, a deterministic life safety analysis has
to be understood as a “process of finding combined scenarios, i.e. combined fire
and occupant scenarios, which challenge the [...] fire safety design” [Nilsson and
Fahy, 2016, p. 2048]. The authors, moreover, state that the proper selection of
combined design scenarios is “not necessarily intuitive” since the complexity of the
overall system increases with a growing number of degrees of freedom.
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Based on the formation of subsystems, the preceding two chapters addressed the
design of experiment of the fire and occupant scenario ensembles. Now both sub-
systems are combined in order to conduct the overall life safety analysis. For the
combination of fire and occupant scenarios, potential interactions between the latter
(e.g. building use-related fire scenarios or occupant intervention) may play a certain
role. In the frame of this study, however, none of these dependencies are considered.
Henceforth, a full-factorial combination of the introduced fire and occupant sce-
narios has been conducted as illustrated in Figure 6.1. Given that the fire ensemble
consists of 108 fire scenarios and each of the underlying occupant ensemble includes
80 scenarios, a total ensemble size of 8, 640 combinations is analysed.
Combined ensemble 
n=8640	
f001	
e000	
e001	
e079	
f002	
e000	
e001	
e079	
f117	
e000	
e001	
e079	
Figure 6.1: Principal structure of the combined ensemble for the life safety analysis.
As illustrated in Figure 6.1, fire scenarios are denoted by a preceding f and oc-
cupant scenarios by a preceding e. Both denotations refer to the naming of the two
subsystems Fire and Evacuation and are followed by the particular scenario ID. It
is to be noted that the maximum fire scenario ID f117 is higher than the considered
ensemble size for the following reason. For the further work within the ORPHEUS
project, the ensemble comprises nine additional fire scenarios for questions regarding
structural fire safety. The latter are not included in the life safety analysis.
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6.2 Workflow
Assuming a completed fire scenario ensemble, the first stage of the overall workflow
is the processing of the fire simulation data. As presented in Chapter 3, the JPSfire
framework conducts a multitude of different operations. Firstly, FDS field data rep-
resenting the extinction coefficient is processed in order to supply the routines deter-
mining individual detection times and reduced walking speeds in smoke. In addition
to that, further life-safety relevant quantities such as temperatures and gas concen-
trations are prepared for the import by JPScore. Moreover, the above-mentioned
data is utilised for the computation of the ASET maps introduced in Chapter 4.
Once these steps are completed for a particular fire scenario, the underlying occupant
ensemble is generated according to Chapter 5. In the following stage, the occupant
scenarios are computed. After all trajectories have been computed, an intermediate
post-processing routine calculates the RSET maps of each occupant scenario as pre-
sented in Chapter 5. Upon completion of one computational realisation (8, 640 × 15
in total), the generated output data is successively compressed and transferred to a
designated file storage system. The described workflow is illustrated in Figure 6.2.
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Figure 6.2: Pre-processing, setup, and computation of combined ensemble.
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The workflow yields the following outputs: semi-macroscopic maps resolving ASET
and RSET spatially as well as agent-based (microscopic) data, such as trajectories
and fire hazard logs. In principle, the life safety analysis is conducted on the semi-
macroscopic level and on the microscopic level.
6.3 Semi-macroscopic Analysis
The semi-macroscopic analysis aims at resolving the ASET -RSET concept in space
based on the entire evacuation process. For this purpose, the previously introduced
ASET and RSET maps are subtracted from each other. This operation yields a
difference map which is supposed to quantify the comparison of ASET and RSET in
space. With regard to [Purser, 2016a], this kind of analysis allows for the conclusion,
if and to which extent the dynamics of an occupant scenario may be impaired by a
certain fire scenario. Moreover, this approach is extended by a cluster analysis in order
to group similar observations throughout the extensive ensemble. The parametric
origins and relations found in the identified clusters then are investigated in the
frame of an enrichment analysis.
6.3.1 Difference Maps
Assuming both maps of ASET and RSET as three-dimensional surfaces with the
dimensions x, y, and time, the basic idea of the upcoming analysis is the following. A
scenario combination complies with the ASET -RSET concept, if the ASET surface is
above the RSET surface (in terms of time) and if the two do not intersect each other.
The distances between these surfaces are a measure for quantifying the safety margin.
If both surfaces intersect each other, the area, where the difference of ASET -RSET is
less than zero, allows for localising and quantifying the failure. This comprehension is
captured by a map representing the subtraction of ASET and RSET, which is com-
puted for each level of the station. This process step facilitates the spatial resolution
of the central question if ASET is greater than RSET. The corresponding analysis
routine is provided in Appendix B.3. An exemplary difference map applicable to the
U8 level is illustrated in Figure 6.3. It refers to the combination of fire scenario f001
and occupant scenario e013. Both were presented in the two preceding chapters.
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Figure 6.3: Exemplary difference map unifying ASET and RSET. The colour map
has been discretised into intervals of four minutes. Grey fields represent areas that
are obstructed by the built environment. White areas have not been traversed at all.
The difference map introduced above clearly indicates that the ASET -RSET re-
quirement is not entirely fulfilled for this scenario combination. In particular, this
applies to regions in close proximity to the seat of fire and jam areas in front of the
staircases. Here, the acceptance criteria have been exceeded for up to eight minutes.
In turn, the more distant areas provide a sufficient time difference of more than eight
minutes. These conclusions illustrate that this analysis is able to capture the spatial
distribution of the safety margin. For this purpose, the map representation can again
be transformed to a distribution as illustrated in Figure 6.4.
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Figure 6.4: ASET -RSET difference map distribution.
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In principle, the distribution allows for distinguishing between failure and fulfil-
ment of the ASET -RSET concept. If the distribution of a subtraction map is entirely
located on a range greater than zero, a particular scenario combination fulfils the
ASET -RSET requirement. In engineering practice, this state should, of course, rely
on a sufficient safety margin. However, for the ongoing analysis, ASET−RSET = 0
will serve as limiting state.
Quantification of Consequences The next step is to derive a measure from these
maps in order to quantify the consequences of a particular scenario combination and
to facilitate the comparison between the latter. Also in this case, it is possible to
determine the effort which is necessary to recover a certain state of the system. The
corresponding measure can be computed similarly to the EMD-inspired metric, which
has been applied to the ASET distributions analysed in Chapter 4. With regard to
the difference map distribution, the limiting state ASET−RSET = 0 is used. With
this in mind, the measure is determined by consecutively summarising the bin-wise
products of frequency and time difference throughout the histogram fraction less than
zero as illustrated in Figure 6.5.
Figure 6.5: Quantification of consequences based on ASET -RSET difference map
distribution applicable to the U8 level.
The introduced consequence measure is denoted as c and is either zero or increases
negatively the more ASET−RSET exceeds the limiting state. In order to capture
the entire station, the consequences of all three station levels are summed up to the
total consequences ctotal. This measure is supposed to represent the consequence
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corresponding to a particular combination of a fire and an occupant scenario. Since
this approach incorporates spatiotemporal distributions, it is important to note that
both c and ctotal are artificial scores but they do not represent intuitive quantities,
such as a time or an area. It is the product of time differences derived from ASET -
RSET and the underlying frequencies instead. A meaning which probably is more
comprehensible can be obtained as follows. With regards to the frequency, each single
observation corresponds to one control element of the difference map. While every
control element has an area of 0.36 m2, the introduced consequence measure can also
be understood as exceeding time per area. However, for the ongoing analyses, c and
ctotal are exclusively treated as a dimensionless scores.
Frequency of Consequences With regards to the entire simulation ensemble, it
is valuable to investigate the frequency of the total consequences. For this purpose,
the consequences of all 8, 640 scenario combinations are initially represented by a
histogram as demonstrated in Figure 6.6.
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Figure 6.6: Histogram illustrating the frequency of consequences.
The total consequences range from −72 to −32, 540. However, it turns out that
more than 95 % of all scenario combinations yield consequences less severe than 50 %
of the maximal observed consequences. Of course, this insight may depend on the
experimental design and it may not be misinterpreted in terms of probabilities.
In addition to this summarised view, it is also possible to evaluate the consequences
of each level separately. In order to gain a more refined understanding of the system’s
140
CHAPTER 6. LIFE SAFETY ANALYSIS
response, Figure 6.7 opposes the total consequences and the particular consequences
per level.
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Figure 6.7: Single consequences observed on the levels U8, U9, CL, and the resulting
total consequences. Scatter points represent scenario combinations and grey crosses
illustrate their projection to the plains for better spatial comprehension. The dashed
enclosures demonstrate the influence of the level where a fire is assumed. Note: z-axis
is not to scale.
The scatter plot consists of three axes which represent the calculated consequences
for all three levels of the station. Since every data point represents one combination of
a fire scenario and an occupant scenario, a total number of 8, 640 points is illustrated.
The fourth dimension is covered by the colouring of the data points and represents the
summarised total consequences. In terms of a better spatial comprehension, the grey
crosses illustrate the design points’ projection to the particular plains of the plot. The
illustration reveals first qualitative insights into the system behaviour. In principle, a
141
6.3. SEMI-MACROSCOPIC ANALYSIS
comparatively large agglomeration of data points represent only minor consequences,
while higher consequences can be observed less frequently but on all three levels. In
principle, the formation of three subdomains comes into view. These subdomains are
illustrated by the dashed enclosures in Figure 6.7 and correspond to the level, where
a fire was assumed. With this in mind, it becomes apparent that the consequences
in the platform levels provide remarkable fluctuations. This especially applies to the
observed consequences on U9, which are increasingly influenced by severe fires on
U8. Consequently, the enclosure involving fires on the U8 level spans a wide space.
Furthermore, fires on the U9 level induce a less extensive plain in the domain since
these scenarios predominantly affect two levels. The concourse level obviously obtains
a superordinate role. This is also applicable by means of quantitative comparison. It
may be affected by up to c = −30, 000, whereas the maximum consequences observed
on the platform levels only range up to c = −10, 000. This observation can be
explained by two different perspectives. On the one hand, the concourse is more
spacious than the platform levels. On the other hand, it is the final component of
the escape route system, which inherently yields the highest RSET s throughout the
station.
This (visual) data exploration reveals first patterns within the output of the sim-
ulation ensemble. For a more detailed analysis, the generated scenario combinations
are grouped into scenario clusters based on their similarity.
6.3.2 Cluster Identification
Distance Metric The formation of scenario clusters requires a certain distance
metric which is applied to all scenario combinations. In order to account for the
ASET -RSET relation throughout all three levels of the station, the corresponding
consequence measures are summarised to one scalar value, i.e. ctotal. For a set of
two scenario combinations i and j, the pairwise Euclidean distance between these
two scalars is computed according to Equation 6.1. The distance then is stored in a
distance matrix.
d(i, j) =
√
((cU8,i + cU9,i + cCL,i)− (cU8,j + cU9,j + cCL,j))2 (6.1)
where:
d is Euclidean distance,
c is consequences.
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Distance Matrix The distance matrix has a shape of 8, 640 × 8, 640 = 72, 649, 600
elements and is symmetrical. Hence, only one diagonal set of combinations needs to
be processed. The resulting diagonal matrix is illustrated in Figure 6.8.
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Figure 6.8: Distance matrix of all 8, 640 scenario combinations.
So far, the matrix is ordered by the sequence of the labels corresponding to the
fire and occupant scenarios, i.e. f001/e001, f001/e002, and so forth. However,
the contrastive lines in Figure 6.8 indicate considerably different consequences of the
particular scenario combinations, which are investigated in more detail.
Agglomerative Clustering In the next instance, the distance matrix is processed
with an agglomerative clustering analysis, which represents a “hierarchical method
for grouping observations” [Myatt, 2007, p. 111]. With regards to the scenario
selection process, the method represents a bottom-up approach based on comparable
consequences of a particular scenario combination. This means that all observations
are initially considered as separate clusters. In the subsequent steps, these initial
clusters are consecutively merged to condensed clusters based on their distances. The
distances between a single observation and a cluster are determined with the help
of linkage rules, e.g. average, single, or complete. Further reading about these rules
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can be found in [Myatt, 2007, pp. 113]. The final result of the entire process is one
single cluster which then consists of all processed observations. The visualisation of
the cluster formation can be achieved by a dendrogram as presented in Figure 6.9.
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Figure 6.9: Dendrogram illustrating agglomerative clustering applied to the entire
simulation ensemble. Note: one of the small clusters is in close proximity to the
x-axis.
This illustration of the cluster tree can be understood as follows. The x-axis
represents the distance between single observations and/or clusters. Normally, the
observation labels of the particular scenario combinations are located on the y-axis.
For reasons of clearness, the latter are removed in this case. Therefore, it is important
to note that the sequence of these labels would now be adjusted according to the affil-
iation to a cluster. In general, the transition from all single observations towards one
final cluster is illustrated by traversing the tree from left to right. The vertical links
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mark the points where a cluster has been formed and the horizontal links represent
the distances which have to be bridged for that. These aspects are important for de-
termining a precise number of clusters, which is supposed to represent the variability
within the data. This is either achieved by setting a certain cut-off distance or by
defining an explicit number of clusters. In that regard, there is no golden rule for de-
termining an appropriate number of clusters since there are distinct interdependences
between the data, the applied distance metric, the linkage rules and so forth.
The formation of clusters is a trade-off between reducing the extent and conserving
the information of a particular problem. Thus, multiple configurations were investi-
gated over the course of this study. Finally, the cluster tree has been generated with
the complete linkage rule and a predefined number of ten clusters. The correspond-
ing threshold distance is approximately 3, 500 and is illustrated by the dotted line in
Figure 6.9. Table 6.1 provides an overview of the identified clusters, their total sizes,
the numbers of unique fire and occupant scenarios, and the observed consequences
inside the clusters. It is to be noted that the sequence of the cluster IDs does not
correspond to the rank of consequences. For this reason, additional cluster names
ranging from A to J are introduced which are consecutively assigned according to the
increase of consequences.
Table 6.1: Overview of identified scenario clusters.
Name ID Size Fire Occupant cmin cmax
Cluster A 2 3354 108 80 -72 -1832
Cluster B 1 3367 106 79 -1834 -4996
Cluster C 3 688 69 73 -5006 -7056
Cluster D 5 562 47 64 -7070 -10122
Cluster E 4 208 39 45 -10142 -12130
Cluster F 6 227 31 39 -12160 -15074
Cluster G 7 152 27 28 -15158 -19334
Cluster H 9 55 18 14 -19524 -22402
Cluster I 8 24 12 6 -22804 -27298
Cluster J 10 3 3 1 -28846 -32540
The cluster formation reveals rather heterogenous characteristics. The first two
clusters, namely A and B, involve over three quarters of all observations, while almost
all single fire and occupant scenarios occur at least once. In turn, with increasing
consequences, the cluster sizes decrease, while their characteristics become more and
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more unique. In this respect, unique means that the variability of the contributing
fire and occupant scenarios becomes less.
In addition to this summarised view, the characteristics of the individual clusters
are analysed in more detail in the next section.
6.3.3 Enrichment Analysis
The purpose of the enrichment analysis is to explore patterns in the parametrisation
of the identified clusters. In this respect, an essential question is if the consequences
are either driven by the fire scenarios or by the occupant scenarios.
For this purpose, radar plots are applied (e.g. Figure 6.10). Within a particular
cluster, these diagrams oppose the design of experiment of the two subsystems Fire
and Evacuation with the frequency of observations. In terms of a more meaningful
visualisation of the design fires and population clusters, the sequence of the frequency
bars has been sorted by the overall heat release and by the corresponding occupant
numbers. Moreover, the labels of the population cluster IDs are supplemented by the
occupant numbers.
In addition to the frequency of single observations, the parametric relations of the
particular scenarios may reveal further insights into the system’s behaviour. There-
fore, parallel coordinate plots are utilised in order to illustrate the combinatorics
inside one cluster (e.g. Figure 6.11). These plots are set up as follows: the upper
subplot represents the fire scenarios and the lower subplot describes the occupant
scenarios. Moreover, the upper subplot includes the linkage between a fire and an
occupant scenario, which is illustrated by a grey line. While the x-axes involve the
particular parameters of the two mentioned subsystems, the y-axes consist of the lev-
els of each parameter. For a particular combination of a fire and an occupant scenario,
a polyline consisting of eight vertices can be populated across the two subplots. In
order to visualise the formation of patterns, more frequent polylines are emphasised
by increased line widths and more intense colouring.
In the following paragraphs, an exemplary excerpt of four clusters is analysed in
more detail. These are the scenario clusters A, B, F, and J (see Table 6.1). The
sequence of the clusters represents the severity of the incorporated consequences.
The examination of the remaining clusters can be found in Appendix C. For a better
comprehension of the less intuitive parameter levels, especially fire locations and
design fires, it may be valuable to recapitulate Section 4.3.1 and Section 4.3.2 in
advance. Please note that some interpretations are not exclusively derived on the
basis of one cluster but also in reference to adjacent clusters.
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Scenario Cluster A Scenario cluster A represents the lowest margin of conse-
quences observed in the entire ensemble. The cluster has a total size of 3354 scenario
combinations, while every fire scenario and every occupant scenario occurs at least
once. The underlying design parameters are illustrated in Figure 6.10.
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Figure 6.10: Radar plot illustrating the parametric origin of cluster A.
With regards to the fire scenarios, the cluster is predominantly driven by the
design fires TRIn, BR F, and BR H, i.e. low-energetic and moderately increasing high-
energetic fires. Consequently, the fires placed in the platform levels clearly represent
the largest portion in the cluster. In terms of the occupant scenarios, the cluster
mainly accumulates populations with less or equal than one thousand occupants.
Moreover, it becomes evident that the lowest modes of both pre-alarm times and pre-
movement times obtain a superordinate role. The same applies to the route choice
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where shortest path configuration can be observed most frequently. A more specific
view on the relations between the subsystem’s parameters is provided in Figure 6.11.
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Figure 6.11: Parallel coordinate plot illustrating the parametric relations of cluster A.
It turns out that the few fires assumed in the concourse are predominantly located
at the more remote locations 1 and 3 (see Section 4.3.1). These cases are oftentimes
associated with Luggage fires, while the Retail fires play a subordinate role – if at
all in conjunction with winter conditions. With regards to the fires in the platform
levels, it becomes evident that the moderate consequences of the TRIn fire are almost
independent from the remaining parameters. Similar observations can be made for
the BR F fire. However, despite comparable initial heat releases, the BR H fire is
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found to be less adverse on the U9 level and in connection with winter conditions.
In terms of the climatic influences, contrary observations can be made for the TR16
fire which is more frequently associated with summer and default conditions in this
cluster.
With regards to the occupant scenarios, the accumulation of smaller populations
is emphasised by the grey linkage lines. The populations can be conjunct with the
specified pre-alarm times. Here, it is shown that this cluster involves a certain balance
between the population sizes and pre-alarm times in order to cope with worsening
conditions and to maintain the lowest margin of consequences simultaneously.
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Scenario Cluster B The subsequent margin of consequences is represented by
cluster B, whose size is almost similar in comparison to cluster A. Again, the radar
plot shown in Figure 6.12 provides the corresponding design parameters.
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Figure 6.12: Radar plot illustrating the parametric origin of cluster B.
At a glance, the parametrisation of the fire scenarios reveals patterns similar to
cluster A. However, the impact of the design fires is different since the relevance of the
Luggage fire increases. Moreover, the influence of the design fires BR H and TR16
becomes more distinct, while the importance of BR F decreases. The transition from
BR F to BR H is an unexpected response since the stand-alone analysis of the fire
simulation ensemble revealed that the development of ASET corresponding to BR H
is less adverse than in case of BR F. This can be explained by the inter-accessibility
of the BR H carriage which results in widespread smoke emission.
150
CHAPTER 6. LIFE SAFETY ANALYSIS
Simultaneously, the contributing occupant scenarios provide interesting trends.
For instance, population clusters with occupant numbers greater than one thousand
gain importance. Moreover, the time components set for the pre-alarm and pre-
movement phases start shaping up to their upper boundaries. In addition to the
frequency of observations, the connection between the particular parameter levels is
illustrated in Figure 6.13.
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Figure 6.13: Parallel coordinate plot illustrating the parametric relations of cluster B.
In this range of consequences, the visualisation emphasises the superordinate roles
of the Luggage and the BR H fires. For both of them, no distinct influence of the
remaining fire scenario parameters can be derived. In turn, the scenarios associated
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with the TR16 fire are composed differently. For instance, it turns out that the
U8 level is observed more frequently than the U9 level. Moreover, the climate param-
eters indicate that summer and default conditions correspond to minor consequences
in this case. With regards to cluster A, the predicted consequences of a BR F fire
are contrarily more severe on the U9 level compared to the U8 level. The few cases
when the TRIn fire yields higher consequences, correspond to default and summer
conditions, while the level is not influential. In reference to cluster A, the implication
that the consequences of the Retail fires are smaller during winter conditions persist
in cluster B as well.
The occupant scenarios reveal a rather uniform distribution of the particular pop-
ulations. Again, a balance between population sizes and pre-alarm times can be ob-
served. However, the spread of the linkages is wider compared to cluster A, which can
be explained by the distinct variability regarding the pre-movement times and route
choice. Between the latter two, only one pattern has formed: high pre-movement
times frequently correspond to local shortest path route choice.
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Scenario Cluster F An intermediate margin of consequences is covered by scenario
cluster F, which has a size of 227 observations. This comparatively small subset of
the design space consists of 31 different fire scenarios and 39 occupant scenarios. The
contributing design parameters are presented in Figure 6.14.
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Figure 6.14: Radar plot illustrating the parametric origin of cluster F.
Meanwhile, the relations between the parameters have changed and start pointing
the direction towards the scenario combinations with the most adverse consequences.
In terms of the fire scenarios, fire locations inside the concourse level have become
the superordinate design parameter within this cluster. Consequently, the Retail and
Luggage design fires are the most frequent observations. However, also the TR16 fire
persists in this cluster, which mainly represents the remaining fires placed in both U8
and U9. Moreover, it could be observed that the contribution of winter conditions
decreases, which may be explained by their advantageous effect on the ventilation of
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the concourse level. With regards to the occupant scenarios, the frequency of the
population clusters increasingly shifts towards higher occupant loads. However, some
fluctuations within the range of 450 to 800 occupants, i.e. daytimes with smaller
but more diverse populations, are observable. The parametrisation of the pre-alarm
time is now predominantly driven by the highest mode, i.e. 240 to 300 seconds.
Contrary to that, the pre-movement times are almost uniformly distributed. Finally,
the underlying route choice configurations are almost equally associated with uniform
exit usage and route choice derived from collected field data. In the next instance, the
relations between the parameter levels of cluster F are investigated using Figure 6.15.
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Figure 6.15: Parallel coordinate plot illustrating the parametric relations of cluster F.
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Within the intermediate margin of consequences, the Parallel coordinate plot of
cluster F starts diminishing. In concrete terms, only the design fires Luggage, Retail,
and TR16 remain in this cluster and two of the smaller populations are not repre-
sented anymore. The superordinate design fire is the Retail fire. Here, the impact
of the climatic conditions inverts since cluster F represents the transition, when the
more favourable winter conditions start being superposed by the more adverse de-
fault or summer conditions. Similar findings apply to the Luggage fire. In this case,
it turns out that the majority of the corresponding fire scenarios are located in the
concourse, while they are also most frequently conjunct either with default or summer
conditions. Contrary to these findings and in contrast to cluster B, the (intermediate)
consequences induced by the TR16 fire are increasingly related to winter conditions.
The linked occupant scenarios are dominated by larger populations. A notable
insight is that mid-sized populations frequently correspond to high pre-alarm times
paired with low pre-movement times. Finally, this constellation is oftentimes related
to route choice according to field data.
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Scenario Cluster J The tenth and final scenario cluster represents the most ad-
verse margin of consequences that has been observed throughout the entire design
space. In comparison to the aforementioned clusters, it is extremely small since it
only consists of three single observations. These observations are composed by three
unique fire scenarios and one single occupant scenario. A more detailed view of the
design parameters is provided in Figure 6.16.
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Figure 6.16: Radar plot illustrating the parametric origin of cluster J.
The three fire scenarios of this cluster cover two Retail fires placed in the concourse
level and one TR16 fire located in the U8 level. Moreover, it becomes apparent that
the cluster reveals the most critical placement in the two particular levels. This is
location 2 in both cases, which is either the centre of the U8 level or the large retail
unit on the concourse level closest to the staircases towards the underground. It
is notable that this scenario cluster involves all three climatic conditions, which is
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a vivid demonstration of the complex interdependences between the fire dynamics,
ambient temperatures, and background airflows.
At a glance, the single occupant scenario yields expected results, e.g. the maxi-
mum assigned times for both pre-alarm and pre-movement phase and an exit choice
that is based on field data. However, a noteworthy finding is that the cluster includ-
ing the most severe consequences does not include the globally largest population
(population cluster 14) but the second largest population (population cluster 4). A
more detailed view on the relations between the parameters of the three fire scenarios
is provided in Figure 6.17.
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Figure 6.17: Parallel coordinate plot illustrating the parametric relations of cluster J.
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In accordance with the conclusions drawn from the preceding clusters, the Parallel
coordinate plot reveals that the two Retail fires can be traced back to default and
summer conditions. These induce only limited capabilities of natural ventilation of
the concourse level. The opposite effect can be observed for the single TR16 fire in
the underground paired with winter conditions. Here, the propagation of heat and
smoke is adversely supported by the establishing temperature zones and airflows.
Moreover, the fact that only the second largest population corresponds with the
most severe consequences can be explained as follows. Population cluster 14 repre-
sents the morning peak which is the busiest daytime at all. However, during this
time, the population mainly consists of adults and young people and the building use
is predominantly transportation. Contrary to that, population cluster 4 is supposed
to cover the afternoon peak. In this case, the population is slightly smaller but its
composition is rather diverse, e.g. with a higher number of elderly people. Moreover,
this time of the day comes along with two overlapping building uses, i.e. transporta-
tion and shopping, which additionally affects the occupant distribution throughout
the station.
6.4 Microscopic Analysis
The semi-macroscopic analysis has aimed at structuring the big data problem based
on the similarity of the ASET -RSET relation involving all scenario combinations.
The main deliverable of an ASET -RSET analysis is whether and to which spatiotem-
poral extent the dynamics of an occupant scenario may be impaired by a certain fire
scenario, but it does not readily provide an answer to the question if the evacuation
process may be prevented at all [Purser, 2016a]. For this purpose, a microscopic anal-
ysis using fractional effective doses (FED), as introduced in Chapter 3, is utilised.
More precisely, this analysis is supposed to supplement the identified scenario clusters
with the FED applicable to incapacitation (FED In). Firstly, this step aims at pro-
viding the scenario clusters with more meaningful figures which are common in the
field of FSE. In addition to that, an essential question is if there is a correspondence
between the proposed ASET -RSET consequence measure and the FED analysis.
The FED In measure has been logged agent-wise throughout all scenario combi-
nations and computational realisations, which yields 129,600 fire hazard logs. For
a particular scenario cluster, the aforementioned fire hazard logs are transferred to
FED histograms as presented in the following paragraphs. This data transformation
covers the combination of all fire scenarios and occupant scenarios belonging to one
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cluster. The histograms allow for conclusions about the expected consequences cor-
responding to a scenario cluster. For this purpose, the FED In axis has been divided
into three different ranges which represent different extends of consequences. In this
regard, Purser and McAllister proposed design thresholds of FED In = 0.3 appropriate
for “the general population” and FED In = 0.1 applicable to “particularly sensitive
groups” [Purser and McAllister, 2016, p. 2343]. In the final instance, FED In = 1.0 im-
plies loss of consciousness. Across all scenarios combinations within a specific cluster,
the y-axis represents the mean number of occupants who are affected by a particular
range of consequences. The mean values have been chosen, in order to characterise
the consequences in a more global fashion rather than overestimating the impact of
single observations. Moreover, in contrast to a normed illustration of the histograms,
a concrete number is assumed to be more intuitive. In order to keep track of lower
occupant numbers, a logarithmic scale has been chosen.
Again, the four clusters discussed in Section 6.3 are examined in more detail,
while their sequence corresponds to the consequences determined within the semi-
macroscopic analysis. The investigation of the remaining clusters can be found in
Appendix C. In order to distinguish between the levels, where a fire was assumed,
the histograms are subdivided accordingly.
Scenario Cluster A In terms of ASET -RSET, scenario cluster A includes 3354 sce-
nario combinations and involves the most moderate consequences. The corresponding
FED histogram is provided in Figure 6.18.
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Figure 6.18: FED histogram of scenario cluster A.
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As discussed in Section 6.3.3, cluster A accumulates occupant scenarios with small
occupant numbers, which can be recognised by the limited extend of the histogram’s
bars. Further on, it becomes apparent that none of the scenarios in cluster A includes
occupants being observed with an FED In > 0.3. On average, only a small fraction
of less than 20 occupants exceeds the FED In = 0.1 threshold. In addition to these
findings, the system behaviour is rather similar to fires originating in both U8 and U9.
Contrary to that, scenario combinations associated with fires in the concourse level,
show different outcomes. Here, none of the corresponding scenarios even reached the
FED In = 0.1 threshold. This insight can be explained in terms of different aspects.
Firstly, the concourse level is the final means of escape, which results in small exposure
times in comparison to fires in the subjacent levels. Secondly, the underlying occupant
scenarios within cluster A predominantly imply a shortest path route choice strategy.
Moreover, the sprinkler-affected fires start decaying during the evacuation process.
On the one hand, this may yield small ASETs. On the other hand, the conditions may
improve in the later stages of the evacuation process which yields lower exposures to
fire effects. Finally, the fire scenarios in the concourse are exclusively assigned with
a PVC combustion reaction so that FED In is not additionally influenced by HCN in
these cases.
Scenario Cluster B The second scenario cluster involves 3367 scenario combi-
nations and represents the second margin of consequences. The associated FED
histogram is illustrated in Figure 6.19.
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Figure 6.19: FED histogram of scenario cluster B.
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Except for higher overall occupant numbers, the observed response is rather sim-
ilar to scenario cluster A. Again, none of the scenario combinations exceeds the
FED In > 0.3 threshold. However, the subset of observations in the range from
FED In = 0.1 to FED In = 0.3 has increased and starts shifting towards the upper
boundary. To a smaller extent, similar observations can be made for the scenario
combinations representing fires in the concourse, which increasingly result in doses
close to the FED In = 0.1 threshold. All in all, the latter cases remain less adverse
than the ones in the subjacent levels.
Scenario Cluster F An intermediate range of consequences is represented by sce-
nario cluster F, which consists of 227 scenario combinations. Figure 6.20 provides the
corresponding FED histogram.
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Figure 6.20: FED histogram of scenario cluster F.
Scenario cluster F reveals notable changes regarding the system’s response. At
first view, it becomes evident that the FED In = 0.3 threshold is now exceeded in
a number of observations, while the majority is represented by scenarios with a fire
assumed in the U8 level. Having said that, the aforementioned similarity of the
consequences of fires placed in the platform levels starts fading. With regards to fires
located in the concourse area, the analysis now also yields single occupants who have
exceeded the FED In = 0.1 threshold. In summary, a rather systematic stacking of
the single histograms (per level) has formed.
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Scenario Cluster J Finally, scenario cluster J involves the maximum consequences
determined with ASET -RSET. It is noteworthy that the uniqueness of the agglomer-
ated observations yields a very small cluster which only consists of three different fire
scenarios paired with one single occupant scenario. The appurtenant FED histogram
can be found in Figure 6.21.
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Figure 6.21: FED histogram of scenario cluster J.
At first sight, it becomes obvious that cluster J does not contain a fire scenario
associated with the U9 level. A clear separation between the histograms of the U8 level
and the concourse can be observed, too. With regards to the U8 level, on average, a
number of 300 occupants is expected to exceed the FED In = 0.3 threshold. The two
fire scenarios located in the concourse also reveal increasing numbers of occupants
above the FED In = 0.1 threshold, while FED In = 0.3 remains unaffected in all cases.
An understanding which probably is more comprehensive in terms of higher mar-
gins of consequences, including U9 scenarios, can be achieved by considering scenario
cluster I as well (see Appendix C). The analysis of the latter reveals that there may
also be scenario combinations where a few occupants were observed in close proximity
to the FED In = 1.0 threshold. This finding and the stacking patterns in the FED
histograms indicate that the most adverse consequences of ASET -RSET may not
necessarily imply corresponding responses in terms of an FED analysis. Having said
that, the relation between these two approaches finally is investigated in more detail.
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6.5 Comparison of Semi-macroscopic and Micro-
scopic Analysis
In order to compare the outcomes of ASET -RSET and FED, a correlation analysis
opposing these two approaches is conducted. For this purpose, the outputs of both
analyses have to be incorporated as scalars. Regarding the ASET -RSET approach,
the consequence measure introduced in this chapter is applied. Moreover, the FED
analysis is expressed by the average number of occupants which have been observed
exceeding the FED In thresholds introduced in the previous section. In the following
scatter plots, every data point represents one scenario combination. Once again, the
data points are separated based on the level, where a fire was assumed. In this respect,
Figure 6.22 provides the scatter plot corresponding to the range 0.1 < FEDIn < 0.3.
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Figure 6.22: Correspondence of ASET -RSET analysis and FED analysis applicable
to 0.1 < FEDIn < 0.3.
The plot presented above fulfils one of the initial expectations. To a small extent,
there is an increasing relation between the consequences determined with ASET -
RSET and FED. However, there are distinct fluctuations within the data, which
apparently have different origins. Also here, a clear separation between the different
levels comes into view since the consequences of the U8 scenario combinations are
above the U9 and CL cases. The maximum average number of occupants whose doses
are in the range of 0.1 < FEDIn < 0.3 is less than 400. With regards to the concourse
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fires, it becomes evident that there is a delay (c ≈ −5, 000) before doses exceeding
the FED In = 0.1 threshold respond to the violation of ASET -RSET. In contrast to
that, fires originating in U8 or U9 instantaneously yield a relation between violating
ASET -RSET and increasing effective doses. Another notable observation is that, in
case of U8 and CL fires, the maximum doses do not straightforwardly correspond to
the maximum consequences in terms of ASET -RSET. In case of the U8 level, this
is a singular observation (at c ≈ 11, 000, N ≈ 350), but a rather systematic one for
the concourse level (beginning from c ≈ 24, 000, N ≈ 100). In summary, it turns out
that even scenario clusters representing the lower third of consequences in terms of
ASET -RSET may approach the upper consequence boundaries in terms of fractional
effective doses.
In the next instance, a similar analysis is conducted using the number of occupants
whose doses correspond to FED In > 0.3 as shown in Figure 6.23.
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Figure 6.23: Correspondence of ASET -RSET analysis and FED analysis applicable
to FED In > 0.3.
The scatter plot applicable to FED In > 0.3 reveals similar patterns compared
to the preceding threshold. Once again, the FED In consequences determined for
the U8 scenario combinations are above the U9 cases. However, for this particular
threshold, the concourse scenarios equals zero almost entirely. Moreover, the average
number of affected occupants is far less than 150. Increasing relation between ASET-
RSET and FED can only be observed in isolated subdomains. For instance, fires
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in the U8 level instantaneously imply a correspondence between both consequence
measures. However, there are also delayed responses of FED in the range of higher
consequences (c > 10, 000) regarding ASET-RSET. Different observations can be
made for fires located at the U9 level. Here, the FED response forms a plateau up
to c = 10, 000 before a slightly increasing relation between the two consequences
measures becomes apparent.
6.6 Summary
The life safety analysis unified the two subsystems Fire and Evacuation. For this
purpose, a semi-macroscopic and a microscopic analysis were conducted, while these
two approaches were finally related to each other.
The semi-macroscopic analysis utilised the map representations of both ASET
und RSET as they were introduced in the preceding chapters. These maps were
used in order to compute a difference map which represents the spatial relation of
ASET and RSET for a combination of a fire and an occupant scenario. Having done
that, the fraction of the negative times in the difference map distribution can be used
to quantify the consequences inspired by the earth mover’s distance (EMD). This
measure has been used to calculate the Euclidean distance between all 8, 640 scenario
combinations. The resulting distance matrix serves as input for an agglomerative
clustering which revealed ten scenario clusters unifying similar observations. These
clusters then were assessed with the help of an enrichment analysis. The latter allows
for identifying patterns in the underlying parametrisation of the two subsystems Fire
and Evacuation.
Subsequently, the microscopic analysis has aimed at providing the identified clus-
ters with supplementary numbers which are more figurative and common in the field
of FSE. In concrete terms, the concept of fractional effective doses (FED) was applied
for this purpose. To some extent, a relationship between these two analyses has been
found. However, the conjunction of both outputs raised questions concerning partic-
ular fluctuations which have finally been discussed in a correlation analysis opposing
the results of both approaches. One of the main findings is that there is a non-trivial
dependency between both location and spatial extend of violating ASET and RSET
and the corresponding doses that are accumulated by the occupants.
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Closing Remarks
7.1 Conclusions
The main contribution of this study is the methodological extension of the life safety
assessment in case of fire. For this purpose, the underground station Osloer Straße
served as case study in the frame of the ORPHEUS project. In order to cope with
uncertainties, the analysis has been conducted in orientation to the principles of
multivariate analysis. In this regard, uncertainties may emerge from different levels,
e.g. input specification, model configuration but also from the analysis itself. Having
said that, the focus of this study was especially set on the specification of model
inputs, i.e. the definition of scenarios, and on the spatiotemporal resolution of a well-
established concept of analysing life safety in case of fire – the comparison of available
safe egress time (ASET ) and required safe egress time (RSET ).
The system formation, the definition of its subsystems, underlying elements, and
boundaries have been conducted inspired by the principles of Systems Engineering. In
this regard, the superordinate system Fire Incident during Operation is decomposed
to the subsystems Fire and Evacuation. In the first instance, the subsystems have
been concerned separately and were consolidated later on.
The methodological frame was set up in orientation to the performance-based de-
sign process, while the specification and evaluation of any protective measures have
been excluded from the scope of the study. The emphasis was set on the assessment
of the infinite scenario space associated with the two defined subsystems instead. In
practice, it is necessary to reduce this space to a few relevant scenarios, e.g. due to
limited resources in terms of computation but also by means of a feasible analysis
and visualisation of the generated output. This reduction usually is a trade-off con-
sideration of consequences and probabilities of a particular combination of fire and
occupant scenarios. In order to provide this process with an informed data basis, this
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study intentionally used a more refined view. In concrete terms, the scenario space
has been explored with a simulation ensemble consisting of 8,640 design points. The
latter has been composed of 108 fire scenarios × 80 occupant scenarios, which were
sampled with the help of systematic design of experiment (DoE ) strategies.
In the frame of preparative works, a data-driven approach for representing varying
climatic conditions in FDS simulations has been introduced. Moreover, the JuPedSim
framework has been extended in order to incorporate fire simulation data.
For the preliminary analysis of the fire simulation ensemble, a multi-criterial and
spatially resolved method for determining ASET has been introduced. The proposed
method computes ASET on a map and allows for the determination of a scalar
score which describes the consequences of a particular fire scenario. The subsequent
analysis identified the design fires as the system’s key determinants. However, the
remaining parameters such as level and location of an assumed fire induce remarkable
fluctuations within the particular design fire subsets. In this regard, the key factors are
the spatial extent of the affected areas as well as the temporal extent of ASET itself.
Moreover, it was found that varying climatic conditions may significantly influence
the development of the evaluated performance criteria throughout the station.
For each of the 108 fire scenarios, an underlying ensemble containing 80 occupant
scenarios has been computed. This full-factorial combination was necessary in order
to account for the dependencies between the fire scenarios and pedestrian dynamics,
e.g. individual detection, or decreased movement speeds in areas affected by smoke.
The stand-alone analysis of a reference scenario revealed that the most influential
parameters of these sub-ensembles were the population characteristics, the pre-alarm
time, and the route choice. With regard to the specification of occupant scenarios,
an alternative approach has been introduced that accounts for dynamic occupant
loads and varying population compositions. The application of the latter showed
that a particular RSET may correspond to multiple populations with diverse sizes
and characteristics.
The life safety analysis conjuncted all fire scenarios and occupant scenarios. Hav-
ing this conjunction, the aspired bottom-up approach has been conducted in order
to group the consequences of all scenario combinations, i.e. finding scenario clusters
with comparable consequences. It is noteworthy that this process has been conducted
deterministically, i.e. the probabilities of a particular outcome had not been consid-
ered so far. The consequences have been computed with the help of difference maps
derived from the subtraction of the introduced ASET and RSET maps. The clus-
ter formation was conducted for ten clusters whose parametric origins revealed that
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the relation between ASET and RSET has a certain trade-off character between the
severity of fire scenarios and the capability of occupant scenarios to cope with these
fire scenarios. The most severe consequences correspond to a small subset of scenario
combinations, which includes one single occupant scenario and three different fire
scenarios. Interestingly, the assigned simulation population accounts for 93 % of the
maximal assumed population size. This population is only the second largest but
a more heterogenous one. The fire scenarios include a single high-energetic carriage
fire at the centre of the station’s lowest level paired with winter climate conditions.
Moreover, the remaining two fire scenarios are sprinklered fires in different retail units
inside the concourse paired with summer and default climate conditions. Finally,
the consequences derived from the ASET -RSET subtraction were supplemented and
compared with an analysis using the concept of fractional effective doses (FED). This
analysis revealed interesting differences between the spatiotemporal development of
ASET -RSET and the microscopically tracked doses which inherently correlate with
the exposure times induced by the levels and locations, where a fire is assumed. In
other words: ASET -RSET is an appropriate concept to answer the question if and
to which extent an occupant scenario may be impaired by a fire scenario. However, in
case of a violation of ASET -RSET, the relation between the extent of the violation an
the corresponding exposures to fire effects, i.e. dose-time-relationships, is not trivial.
In these cases, the distinct dynamics of coincident fire and evacuation processes may
not be sufficiently represented by ASET -RSET.
7.2 Outlook
This study raised a number of tasks and questions which are worth investigating
in more detail. In terms of application, the introduced analysis steps need to be
supplemented with a more convenient data processing and have to be provided to the
community. This especially applies to the utilised maps representing ASET, RSET,
and the difference between these two measures.
With regards to the field of fire simulation, the modelling of fuel characteristics
may significantly impact the outcome of the analyses. The same applies to the design
fires, in the course of which the modelling of the sprinkler intervention may be a
crucial aspect. In this respect, the robustness of the analysis could be checked under
consideration of alternative approaches. Moreover, it may be valuable to conduct
the determination of ASET with alternative performance criteria thresholds and to
reassess the system’s response. In this study, commonly applied values for exposure
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times of up to 30 minutes have been applied. However, the estimations of RSET may
also allow for lower exposure times.
In terms of evacuation simulation, the response and route choice of occupants
require further research and model development. In this study, the detection time
has been distinguished into procedural and individual detection. In the same fashion,
pre-movement times were explicitly controlled by the experimental design. However,
a more inherent consideration of perceiving and agglomerating evacuation cues may
be a potential research topic. The same applies to the route choice of occupants,
which has been found to be very influential in built environments with large spatial
extents and complex escape route systems. This insight is a clear motivation for
further work on route choice modelling, e.g. considering individual knowledge or
perception (of smoke). Moreover, the generation of occupant scenarios utilised the
persona method which introduced simulation populations with variable sizes and
compositions. This approach may be extended by additional persona characteristics,
e.g. group affiliation, herding, or varying spatial knowledge. This also applies to
the definition of initial conditions which represent different activity stages inside a
building, e.g. ingress, circulation, or egress.
In regard to the life safety analysis, the map representation of ASET, RSET, and
their difference is an appropriate approach to capture the spatial distribution of these
measures. In order to facilitate the incorporation into probabilistic analyses, it is
necessary to discuss the quantification and interpretation of the introduced conse-
quence measure, but also alternative approaches. Moreover, agglomerative clustering
has been successfully applied to the field of fire safety engineering. It represents a
powerful tool for explorative data analysis and it may be valuable to investigate the
cluster formation with alternative approaches and/or configurations. With respect
to practice, its application may also be valuable for smaller design spaces consist-
ing of a full-factorial combination of a only a few fire and occupant scenarios. This
is, in particular, appropriate when multiple, different criteria shall be evaluated per
scenario combination. Beside ASET -RSET, the similarity calculation could then be
expanded by performance criteria addressing jams or even by probabilities. Concep-
tually, the inclusion of probabilities corresponding to a scenario combination would
then facilitate the agglomeration of scenarios which are similar in terms of both con-
sequences and probabilities. Irrespective of the underlying uncertainties in general,
the proposed analysis workflow would then be capable to deliver risk-based scenario
clusters as they were introduced in Section 2.5.3. Having said that, the conduction of
similar studies on other building types and corresponding building uses could provide
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a valuable knowledge base to many of the stakeholders within the performance-based
design process in FSE practice.
On the basis of ASET -RSET, a set of clusters has been formed successfully. Nev-
ertheless, the conjunction with an analysis based on fractional effective doses (FED)
revealed that there is only a limited correspondence between ASET -RSET and FED.
With this in mind, ASET -RSET is an appropriate indicator for the compliance and
violation of particular performance criteria. However, it has limitations in terms of
predicting the exposures associated with a particular violation. Further investigations
are necessary here, e.g. under consideration of other extensive escape route systems
or design fires that start decaying in a comparatively early stage.
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Design of Experiment
A.1 Fire Simulation
A.1.1 U8 Level
ID Location Design Fire Climate
 f001 1 BR F Summer
 f002 1 TRIn Default
 f003 3 TR16 Summer
 f004 2 BR H Default
 f005 3 Luggage Winter
 f006 2 BR H Summer
 f007 3 TR16 Winter
 f008 3 TR16 Default
 f009 2 TRIn Winter
 f010 2 Luggage Default
 f011 1 BR H Winter
 f012 3 BR F Winter
 f013 2 BR F Default
 f014 1 Luggage Default
 f015 1 BR H Summer
 f016 3 BR F Summer
 f017 2 BR F Winter
 f018 1 BR F Winter
 f019 3 Luggage Default
 f020 1 TR16 Summer
 f021 1 Luggage Summer
 f022 3 BR F Default
 f023 2 TR16 Summer
 f024 3 BR H Summer
 f025 3 BR H Default
 f026 3 TRIn Summer
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ID Location Design Fire Climate
 f027 2 TRIn Default
 f028 1 TR16 Winter
 f029 2 Luggage Summer
 f030 3 TRIn Default
 f031 3 Luggage Summer
 f032 1 TRIn Summer
 f033 3 BR H Winter
 f034 1 TRIn Winter
 f035 2 TR16 Winter
 f036 2 BR F Summer
 f037 2 BR H Winter
 f038 2 TRIn Summer
 f039 1 TR16 Default
 f040 1 Luggage Winter
 f041 1 BR H Default
 f042 2 TR16 Default
 f043 1 BR F Default
 f044 3 TRIn Winter
 f045 2 Luggage Winter
A.1.2 U9 Level
ID Location Design Fire Climate
 f046 1 BR F Summer
 f047 1 TRIn Default
 f048 3 TR16 Summer
 f049 2 BR H Default
 f050 3 Luggage Winter
 f051 2 BR H Summer
 f052 3 TR16 Winter
 f053 1 TR16 Default
 f054 2 TRIn Winter
 f055 2 Luggage Default
 f056 1 BR H Winter
 f057 3 BR F Winter
 f058 2 BR F Default
 f059 1 Luggage Default
 f060 1 BR H Summer
 f061 3 BR F Summer
 f062 2 BR F Winter
 f063 1 BR F Winter
 f064 3 Luggage Default
 f065 1 TR16 Summer
 f066 3 Luggage Summer
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ID Location Design Fire Climate
 f067 3 BR F Default
 f068 2 TR16 Summer
 f069 3 BR H Summer
 f070 3 BR H Default
 f071 3 TRIn Summer
 f072 2 TRIn Default
 f073 1 TR16 Winter
 f074 2 Luggage Summer
 f075 3 TRIn Default
 f076 1 Luggage Summer
 f077 1 TRIn Summer
 f078 3 BR H Winter
 f079 1 TRIn Winter
 f080 2 TR16 Winter
 f081 2 BR F Summer
 f082 2 BR H Winter
 f083 2 TRIn Summer
 f084 3 TR16 Default
 f085 1 Luggage Winter
 f086 1 BR H Default
 f087 2 TR16 Default
 f088 1 BR F Default
 f089 3 TRIn Winter
 f090 2 Luggage Winter
A.1.3 Concourse Level
ID Location Design Fire Climate
 f091 3 Retail no Spr. Winter
 f092 2 Luggage Summer
 f093 2 Retail no Spr. Summer
 f094 3 Retail Default
 f095 1 Retail no Spr. Default
 f096 2 Retail no Spr. Default
 f097 2 Retail Default
 f098 1 Luggage Default
 f099 3 Luggage Winter
 f100 3 Retail no Spr. Default
 f101 3 Luggage Default
 f102 2 Retail Summer
 f103 3 Retail no Spr. Summer
 f104 2 Luggage Default
 f105 1 Retail no Spr. Summer
 f106 2 Luggage Winter
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ID Location Design Fire Climate
 f107 1 Luggage Summer
 f108 2 Retail no Spr. Winter
 f109 1 Luggage Winter
 f110 2 Retail Winter
 f111 3 Luggage Summer
 f112 1 Retail Winter
 f113 1 Retail Default
 f114 1 Retail no Spr. Winter
 f115 3 Retail Winter
 f116 1 Retail Summer
 f117 3 Retail Summer
A.2 Evacuation Simulation
ID Pre-Alarm Pre-Movement Route Choice Population Cluster
e000 204 s 81.9 % Uniform 4
e001 213 s 45.6 % Global Shortest 5
e002 240 s 50.6 % Field Data 1
e003 222 s 60.6 % Uniform 12
e004 297 s 14.4 % Field Data 5
e005 249 s 84.4 % Global Shortest 12
e006 123 s 11.9 % Field Data 1
e007 173 s 53.1 % Uniform 13
e008 175 s 65.6 % Field Data 9
e009 135 s 64.4 % Global Shortest 3
e010 144 s 44.4 % Uniform 11
e011 128 s 15.6 % Field Data 8
e012 227 s 1.9 % Field Data 5
e013 180 s 76.9 % Global Shortest 7
e014 229 s 48.1 % Global Shortest 4
e015 267 s 8.1 % Uniform 0
e016 274 s 39.4 % Field Data 8
e017 186 s 51.9 % Field Data 3
e018 261 s 38.1 % Field Data 10
e019 195 s 86.9 % Global Shortest 14
e020 139 s 69.4 % Global Shortest 4
e021 245 s 54.4 % Field Data 6
e022 276 s 49.4 % Uniform 8
e023 290 s 16.9 % Uniform 3
e024 164 s 31.9 % Field Data 7
e025 283 s 18.1 % Field Data 13
e026 294 s 40.6 % Uniform 7
e027 216 s 0.6 % Uniform 13
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ID Pre-Alarm Pre-Movement Route Choice Population Cluster
e028 184 s 30.6 % Global Shortest 3
e029 159 s 29.4 % Uniform 1
e030 285 s 90.6 % Field Data 2
e031 130 s 89.4 % Field Data 10
e032 189 s 41.9 % Uniform 10
e033 299 s 99.4 % Field Data 4
e034 218 s 74.4 % Uniform 2
e035 279 s 35.6 % Field Data 12
e036 157 s 94.4 % Uniform 7
e037 263 s 73.1 % Field Data 2
e038 132 s 85.6 % Global Shortest 0
e039 191 s 36.9 % Global Shortest 1
e040 209 s 78.1 % Uniform 0
e041 177 s 88.1 % Field Data 14
e042 270 s 58.1 % Uniform 6
e043 254 s 21.9 % Field Data 7
e044 265 s 68.1 % Global Shortest 4
e045 236 s 63.1 % Global Shortest 12
e046 231 s 93.1 % Uniform 3
e047 141 s 95.6 % Field Data 6
e048 200 s 33.1 % Global Shortest 6
e049 243 s 56.9 % Global Shortest 9
e050 238 s 9.4 % Global Shortest 5
e051 256 s 5.6 % Global Shortest 2
e052 182 s 79.4 % Global Shortest 0
e053 193 s 28.1 % Global Shortest 7
e054 292 s 25.6 % Field Data 5
e055 272 s 66.9 % Field Data 10
e056 155 s 96.9 % Uniform 13
e057 252 s 70.6 % Global Shortest 12
e058 137 s 26.9 % Global Shortest 2
e059 148 s 4.4 % Field Data 11
e060 166 s 61.9 % Global Shortest 9
e061 126 s 3.1 % Global Shortest 1
e062 234 s 98.1 % Uniform 10
e063 171 s 75.6 % Uniform 8
e064 247 s 43.1 % Uniform 14
e065 168 s 71.9 % Field Data 11
e066 281 s 19.4 % Field Data 13
e067 150 s 91.9 % Uniform 4
e068 202 s 6.9 % Uniform 11
e069 207 s 34.4 % Uniform 14
e070 220 s 24.4 % Global Shortest 0
e071 121 s 10.6 % Field Data 11
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ID Pre-Alarm Pre-Movement Route Choice Population Cluster
e072 153 s 20.6 % Global Shortest 1
e073 225 s 59.4 % Uniform 8
e074 211 s 13.1 % Global Shortest 10
e075 258 s 80.6 % Uniform 9
e076 146 s 83.1 % Global Shortest 13
e077 288 s 23.1 % Uniform 6
e078 162 s 55.6 % Global Shortest 14
e079 198 s 46.9 % Uniform 9
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Data Analysis Routines
Note: The following Python code snippets are not readily working since they depend
on pre-computed data and specific file paths. However, they are supposed to provide
the basic logic for applying the ASET -RSET concept with the help of maps.
B.1 ASET Map Generation
Listing B.1: ASET map generation routine
’’’This script computes the ASET maps based on the specified
quantities incorporated from an FDS fire simulation.’’’
import argparse
import os
import glob
import numpy as np
#----------------------------------------------
#--------------- Functions --------------------
def pull_JPSfire_data(q, l):
’’’This function collects the spatiotemporal data provided
by JPSfire for a given quantity and returns a single 3
D-stacked array ’’’
raws_path = ’C_toxicity_analysis /2 _toxicity_grids /%s/%s/’
%(q, l)
raws = glob.glob(raws_path+’t_*.csv’)
raws = sorted(raws , key=lambda name: int(name[ name.rfind(
’_’)+1 : -11]))
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stack_tuple = ()
for raw in raws:
stack_tuple += (np.loadtxt(raw , skiprows=3, delimiter=
’,’) ,)
quantity_stack = np.dstack(stack_tuple)
r = open(raw)
header = r.readlines ()[2][: -1]
r.close()
return quantity_stack , header
def determine_exceedance_times(q, l, quantity_stack ,
all_aset_tuple):
’’’This function determines the particular exceedance
times for all considered fire effects. For that purpose
, it sets up an equally shaped array with exceedance
times of 21 minutes. Then , it moves the time axis to
axis 0 and iterates over the latter. For each time it
is checked if the acceptance criteria are met. If yes ,
the belonging indices are used to set the exceedance
time ’’’
#array with temporary exceedance times
temp = np.ones(np.shape(quantity_stack)[0:2]) *21
#bring time axis to pos 0
quantity_stack = np.moveaxis(quantity_stack , -1, 0)
#iterate over t and identify exceedance times
for i, cond_at_time in enumerate(quantity_stack):
exceed = np.where(cond_at_time >acceptance_criteria[q])
temp[exceed] = i
#determine minimum ASET at a given space
exceedance_times = np.minimum(exceedance_times , temp)
#fill tuple with exceedance_times arrays for all
quantities
all_aset_tuple += (exceedance_times , )
return exceedance_times , all_aset_tuple
def determine_all_aset(all_aset_tuple , l):
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’’’This function grabs all exceedance_times arrays for all
quantities in one level and determines the particular
minimum exceedance times. These than yield the overall
ASET irrespective of the quantities. Finally , the ASET
2D arrays are stacked level -wise and saved ’’’
# load dummy aset map with obsts = -1 and open space = 22
all_aset = np.loadtxt(’%s/obsts/obst_%s.csv’%( script_path ,
l), delimiter=’,’)
for q in all_aset_tuple:
all_aset = np.minimum(all_aset , q)
np.savetxt(’0ASET/ASET_%s.txt’%(l), all_aset , header=
header)
return all_aset
#-----------------------------------------------
#-------------- Main Program -------------------
# z-levels to be analysed
levels = [’Z_28 .950000 ’, ’Z_33 .750000 ’, ’Z_37 .050000 ’]
# list of FSE relevant quantities
quantities = [
’SOOT_EXTINCTION_COEFFICIENT ’,
’CARBON_MONOXIDE_VOLUME_FRACTION ’,
’HYDROGEN_CHLORIDE_VOLUME_FRACTION ’,
’HYDROGEN_CYANIDE_VOLUME_FRACTION ’,
’CARBON_DIOXIDE_VOLUME_FRACTION ’,
’TEMPERATURE ’]
# dictionary containing the thresholds of FSE relevant
quantities
acceptance_criteria = {
’SOOT_EXTINCTION_COEFFICIENT ’:0.23,
’TEMPERATURE ’:45,
’CARBON_MONOXIDE_VOLUME_FRACTION ’:0.0001 ,
’CARBON_DIOXIDE_VOLUME_FRACTION ’:0.01,
’HYDROGEN_CYANIDE_VOLUME_FRACTION ’:0.000008 ,
’HYDROGEN_CHLORIDE_VOLUME_FRACTION ’:0.00020}
try:
print(firesim_id)
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os.chdir(firesim_id)
if not os.path.exists(’0ASET’):
os.makedirs(’0ASET’)
for l in levels:
all_aset_tuple = ()
for q in quantities:
print(l, q)
if q in os.listdir(’C_toxicity_analysis /2
_toxicity_grids/’):
#-> FUNCTION CALL
quantity_stack , header = pull_JPSfire_data(q,l
)
else:
# continue if a quantity has not been computed
(e.g. HCl)
print(q, ’skipped ’)
continue
header_content = [float(i) for i in header.split(’
,’)]
dim1 = np.arange(header_content [2], header_content
[3], header_content [0])
dim2 = np.arange(header_content [4], header_content
[5], header_content [1])
#-> FUNCTION CALL
exceedance_times , all_aset_tuple =
determine_exceedance_times(q, l, quantity_stack
, all_aset_tuple)
#-> FUNCTION CALL
all_aset = determine_all_aset(all_aset_tuple , l)
except:
print(’ ‘-> contains no or corrupt JPSfire data -> skipped
’)
pass
#--------------- DONE ------------------
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B.2 RSET Map Generation
Listing B.2: RSET map generation routine
’’’This script computes the RSET maps based on the specified
trajectory files incorporated from a JuPedSim pedestrian
simulation.’’’
import os
import glob
import argparse
import zipfile
import numpy as np
import xml.etree.ElementTree as ET
#--------------- FUNCTIONS --------------------
def determine_dimensions(traj_root , level):
’’’Determine the spatial minima and maxima of the
trajectories.’’’
x_min = y_min = float("inf")
x_max = y_max = -float("inf")
for step in traj_root.findall(’./ frame/agent’):
#print( float(step.attrib[’x ’]) )
if float(step.attrib[’z’]) == level:
x_min = min(x_min , float(step.attrib[’x’]) )
y_min = min(y_min , float(step.attrib[’y’]) )
x_max = max(x_max , float(step.attrib[’x’]) )
y_max = max(y_max , float(step.attrib[’y’]) )
return round(x_min ,0), round(x_max ,0), round(y_min ,0),
round(y_max ,0)
def setup_rset_map(x, y):
’’’Setup of a dummy RSET map filled with NaNs ’’’
rset_map = np.zeros ((len(y), len(x)))
rset_map [:] = np.nan
return x,y,rset_map
def determine_rsets(traj_root , level , x,y, rset_map):
’’’Iterate over all frames in the trajectory root. (Re -)
write the traversal times for all x and y coordinates
of an agent to the RSET map. ’’’
181
B.2. RSET MAP GENERATION
for frame in traj_root.findall(’./ frame’):
frame_id = int( frame.attrib[’ID’] )
for agent in frame.findall(’agent’):
if float(agent.attrib[’z’]) >= level -0.1 and float
(agent.attrib[’z’]) <= level +0.1:
agent_x , agent_y = float(agent.attrib[’x’]),
float(agent.attrib[’y’])
#determine the belonging indeces to access
rset_map
ix = (np.abs(x-agent_x)).argmin ()
iy = (np.abs(y-agent_y)).argmin ()
rset_map[iy,ix] = frame_id*fps/60
return rset_map
def process_rset_maps(level , percentile):
’’’Collect the rset_maps of all seeds in a tuple. The
latter is converted to a 3D stack. Then , it calculates
the nth percentile of RSET for each control element and
sets them to a major map. The seed maps are than
deleted ’’’
raws = sorted(glob.glob(’1RSET/RSET_*_%.2f.txt’%level))
if len(raws)==0:
print(’No raw RSET maps found!’)
rset_maps = ()
for raw in raws:
print(raw)
rset_maps += (np.loadtxt(raw , skiprows =1) ,)
# delete raw data of single seeds (may be disc quota
consuming otherwise)
os.remove(raw)
rset_stack = np.dstack(rset_maps)
rset_percentiles = np.zeros((np.shape(rset_stack)[0], np.
shape(rset_stack)[1]))
for i, row in enumerate(rset_stack):
for j, col in enumerate(row):
rset_percentiles[i,j] = np.nanpercentile(
rset_stack[i,j, :], percentile)
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return rset_percentiles
#---------------------------------------------
#---------------- MAIN PROG ------------------
# general variables
fps = 1
# shape parameters of upcoming RSET maps
delta =0.6
x = np.arange (-79.8, 79.8+0.01 , delta)
y = np.arange(-24, 126+0.01 , delta)
if not os.path.exists(’1RSET’):
os.makedirs(’1RSET’)
# the trajectories of every seed are assumed as zipped XML
file in the current working directory
zips = sorted(glob.glob(’*.zip’))
for zip in zips:
try:
with zipfile.ZipFile(zip) as myzip:
traj = ’traj_%s.xml’%zip[:-4]
traj_xml = ET.parse( myzip.open(traj) )
except:
print(traj , ’skipped ’)
continue
print(’‘->’, traj)
traj_root = traj_xml.getroot ()
for level in levels:
#-> FUNCTION CALL
x_min , x_max , y_min , y_max = determine_dimensions(
traj_root , level)
#-> FUNCTION CALL
x,y,rset_map = setup_rset_map(x, y)
#-> FUNCTION CALL
rset_map = determine_rsets(traj_root , level , x,y,
rset_map)
header = ’x_min=%i, x_max=%i, y_min=%i, y_max=%i’%(\
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x_min , x_max , y_min , y_max)
np.savetxt(’1RSET/RSET_%s_%.2f.txt’%(traj[-8:-4],
level), rset_map , header=header)
for level in levels:
percentile =95
#-> FUNCTION CALL
rset_percentiles = process_rset_maps(level , percentile)
header = ’x_min =%i, x_max=%i, y_min=%i, y_max=%i’%(\
x_min , x_max , y_min , y_max)
np.savetxt(’1RSET/% iRSET_ %.2f.txt’%( percentile , level),
rset_percentiles , header=header)
#--------------- DONE ------------------
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B.3 Difference Map Generation
Listing B.3: RSET map generation routine
’’’This script conducts the ASET RSET comparison for a
particular fire scenario and an evacuation scenario , i.e.
the difference map is computed.’’’
import os
import sys
import argparse
import numpy as np
#----------------- FUNCTIONS --------------------
def collect_ASET(cwd , level):
’’’Go to firesim dir and collect ASET maps. The raw ASET
map is then broadcasted to a bigger map in order to be
aligned with the RSET map for the later analysis ’’’
raw = ’ASET_%s.txt’%fire_levels[level]
raw_map = np.loadtxt(cwd+’/0ASET/’+raw , skiprows =1)
# prepare larger aset_map in order to ensure alignment
with rset_map
delta = 0.6
x_map = np.arange (-79.8, 79.8+0.01 , delta)
y_map = np.arange(-24, 126+0.01 , delta)
aset_map = np.zeros ((len(y_map), len(x_map)))
aset_map [:]=np.nan
r = open(cwd+’/0ASET/’+raw)
header = r.readlines () [0][1:]
r.close()
header_content = [float(i) for i in header.split(’,’)]
x_min = header_content [2]
y_min = header_content [4]
#determine the belonging indeces to broadcast raw_map into
aset_map
ix = (np.abs(x_map -x_min)).argmin ()
iy = (np.abs(y_map -y_min)).argmin ()
# broadcast raw_map into larger aset_map
aset_map[ iy:iy+np.shape(raw_map)[0] , ix:ix+np.shape(
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raw_map)[1] ] = raw_map
return aset_map , x_map , y_map
def collect_RSET(cwd , level):
’’’Go to pedsim dir and collect nth percentile ASET maps
’’’
raw = ’95 RSET_ %.2f.txt’%level
print(raw)
rset_map = np.loadtxt(cwd+’/1RSET/’+raw , skiprows =1)
rset_map[rset_map ==0] = np.nan
return rset_map
def analyse_ASET_RSET(aset_map , x_map , y_map , rset_map):
diff_map = aset_map - rset_map
np.savetxt(’2ASETvsRSET /2 ASETvsRSET_%s.txt’%level ,
diff_map)
return
#---------------- MAIN PROG --------------------
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser ()
parser.add_argument("firesim_dir", type=str , help="firesim_dir
")
parser.add_argument("pedsim_dir", type=str , help="pedsim_dir")
try:
cmdl_args = parser.parse_args ()
firesim_dir = cmdl_args.firesim_dir
pedsim_dir = cmdl_args.pedsim_dir
except:
sys.exit(’No fire_id resp. ped_id specified!’)
# this dict assigns the RSET (pedestrian) z_elevations to the
belonging ASET (slice) elevations:
fire_levels = { 27.3: ’Z_28 .950000 ’, 32.26: ’Z_33 .750000 ’, 35.3:
’Z_37 .050000 ’}
levels = [27.3, 32.26, 35.3] # z_elevations of rset maps
ped_id = int(pedsim_dir [1:])
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print( firesim_dir , pedsim_dir )
log = []
for level in levels:
#--> FUNCTION CALL
aset_map , x_map , y_map = collect_ASET(firesim_path+
firesim_dir , level)
os.chdir(pedsim_path+firesim_dir+’/’+pedsim_dir)
#--> FUNCTION CALL
rset_map = collect_RSET(os.getcwd (), level)
if not os.path.exists(’2ASETvsRSET ’):
os.mkdir(’2ASETvsRSET ’)
#--> FUNCTION CALL
analyse_ASET_RSET(aset_map , x_map , y_map , rset_map)
#----------------- DONE --------------------
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Appendix C
Life Safety Analysis
C.1 Scenario Cluster C
200
U8
U9
CL
1
2
3
T
R
InL
u
g
g
R
et
ai
l
B
R
 F
B
R
 H
T
R
1
6
S
uW
iD
ef
2   (99)  6   (450)8   (697)
11  (700)
1   (707)
10  (762)
12  (773)
0   (8
14)
5   
(91
6)
13
 (1
23
7)
9  
(1
28
4)
7 
 (1
53
2)
3 
 (1
56
7)
4 
 (
16
72
)
14
 (
17
85
)
1
2
0
-1
8
0
 s
1
8
0
-2
4
0
 s
2
4
0
-3
0
0
 s
 0
-3
3
 %
33-66 %
66-100 %
LS
FD
UF
Cluster C: n=688  cmin=-5006  cmax=-7056
Figure C.1: Radar plot illustrating the parametric origin of cluster C.
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Figure C.2: Parallel coordinate plot illustrating the parametric relations of cluster C.
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Figure C.3: FED histogram of scenario cluster C.
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C.2 Scenario Cluster D
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Figure C.4: Radar plot illustrating the parametric origin of cluster D.
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Figure C.5: Parallel coordinate plot illustrating the parametric relations of cluster D.
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Figure C.6: FED histogram of scenario cluster D.
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C.3 Scenario Cluster E
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Figure C.7: Radar plot illustrating the parametric origin of cluster E.
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Figure C.8: Parallel coordinate plot illustrating the parametric relations of cluster E.
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Figure C.9: FED histogram of scenario cluster E.
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C.4 Scenario Cluster G
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Figure C.10: Radar plot illustrating the parametric origin of cluster G.
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Figure C.11: Parallel coordinate plot illustrating the parametric relations of cluster G.
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Figure C.12: FED histogram of scenario cluster G.
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C.5 Scenario Cluster H
10
20
30
U8
U9
CL
1
2
3
T
R
InL
u
g
g
R
et
ai
l
B
R
 F
B
R
 H
T
R
1
6
S
uW
iD
ef
2   (99)  6   (450)8   (697)
11  (700)
1   (707)
10  (762)
12  (773)
0   (8
14)
5   
(91
6)
13
 (1
23
7)
9  
(1
28
4)
7 
 (1
53
2)
3 
 (1
56
7)
4 
 (
16
72
)
14
 (
17
85
)
1
2
0
-1
8
0
 s
1
8
0
-2
4
0
 s
2
4
0
-3
0
0
 s
 0
-3
3
 %
33-66 %
66-100 %
LS
FD
UF
Cluster H: n=55  cmin=-19524  cmax=-22402
Figure C.13: Radar plot illustrating the parametric origin of cluster H.
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Figure C.14: Parallel coordinate plot illustrating the parametric relations of cluster H.
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Figure C.15: FED histogram of scenario cluster H.
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C.6 Scenario Cluster I
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Figure C.16: Radar plot illustrating the parametric origin of cluster I.
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Figure C.17: Parallel coordinate plot illustrating the parametric relations of cluster I.
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Figure C.18: FED histogram of scenario cluster I.
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